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# Daily Report

# Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-208
Friday
27 October 1995

# Daily Report
## Central Eurasia

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## Key Developments

### Premier: Yeltsin Illness Not To Affect Elections

*LD2710083595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0738 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 27 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — President Yeltsin's condition is not causing concern. His doctors have said that it will take him about a week to recover, Russian Federation head of government Viktor Chernomyrdin told journalists today after his speech at the Higher School of Economics. The school is headed by the Chernomyrdin government's former vice-premier, Aleksandr Shokhin.

On the subject of what caused Boris Yeltsin's indisposition, Viktor Chernomyrdin told journalists that, "firstly, the president had not completed a course of treatment. The second reason is the stress after a difficult flight to the United States and back. Apart from that, the president went to the United States with a bit of a cold. Of course, all this has had an effect," said the premier, adding that "we all want to do things quicker and quicker." Nevertheless, the president's health is "all right", the premier emphasized.

Asked by journalists if Yeltsin's indisposition and his admission to hospital might complicate the situation ahead of the forthcoming elections, the premier unequivocally said "not at all." Boris Yeltsin's doctors are saying that, at present, one week is required for full recovery, the head of government said.

### CPRF Appeals to Special Forces, Border Troops

*MM2610163095 Moscow PRAVDA ROSSII in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 3*

[Appeal from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Central Committee "To Staffers of the Special Services and Border Troops"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This is an appeal to you, staffers of the special services and border troops of the Russian Federation — from private to general — from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] Central Committee.

While being openly in opposition to the ruling regime, our party has no intention — unlike the so-called democrats — of urging you "not to carry out the criminal orders of your commanders" because we are confident of your honesty and integrity. We never have regarded the special services and their staffers as being to blame for what has happened and is happening now in our country and society. We always have worked and always will work to strengthen the special services and border troops as an inalienable part of our people, because Russia cannot be strong unless its special services are strong.

It is now clear to many that, in the struggle for power and to satisfy their own political objectives, our opponents have destroyed and are continuing to destroy everything right down to the foundations, even the home in which they live.

Exercising a dictatorship of the minority over the majority, they stop at nothing. Conflicts between different branches of power and clashes between power structures and the people are provoked, interethnic discord is stirred up, and Russia's sovereignty and integrity are weakened for the sake of strengthening this dictatorship. The incumbent Russian authorities have dismantled what was once the strongest special service in the world, the USSR KGB, thereby creating the conditions for their own actions to go unpunished and the operational scope for foreign intelligence services to throw their weight about.

The stand taken by the CPRF Central Committee is fundamentally different.

Our interpretation of the special services and border troops is that they are a single organism defending the security interests of our country and society. They are an extremely important political instrument of state. Society must create the conditions in which the special services and border troops serve exclusively in the interests of their fatherland and their people.

Unfortunately for Russia, the political storms are not over yet. Under pressure from the opposition and the people, the ruling regime is being forced to address national state interests, but slowly and with a grinding reluctance. However, those who hate Russia are doing their utmost to prevent this and are trying to stir up a large-scale civil conflict within its borders in order to stop our development once and for all and destroy the conditions in which our state and society can function. Realizing this, the CPRF consistently advocates peacefully extricating the country from its all-embracing crisis by holding parliamentary and presidential elections, allowing the majority of the people to freely express their will, and consolidating all healthy forces in society.

In these conditions we appeal to you, staffers of the special services and border troops, not to fight against your own people but to improve your professional skills and combat training in the struggle against our country's enemies and their special services in order to preserve the integrity, sovereignty, and independence of the Russian state. In the final analysis, we, the citizens of Russia, will decide for ourselves how and in the name of what to live our lives. But it is the duty of the special services and border troops in the service of the people and the state to defend our country against plunder and humiliation.

We are sure that all patriotically minded forces, including former staffers discharged on political grounds, will be your active helpers in this noble task.

We are sure that our best, patriotically minded young people will strive as before to serve in the security organs and border troops.

May the images of Russian patriots like Feliks Dzerzhinskiy, Nikolay Kuznetsov, and Yuriy Andropov protect you all in the difficult, noble, responsible task of serving the Fatherland.

We will stand up for Russia's honor.

### Electoral Aide Reviews Progress of Registration

*MM2610144195 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 4*

[Interview with Aleksandr Ivanchenko, deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, by Zhanna Kasyanenko; place and date not given: "Test for the Authorities. Central Electoral Commission Deputy Chairman A. Ivanchenko Answers SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Correspondent's Questions" — first two paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sixty-nine blocs and associations started the election campaign — those who certified lists of their candidates in single-seat districts and on the federal list. Forty-three blocs managed to collect and submit signatures. So far only eight have been registered.

We asked Central Electoral Commission [TsIK] Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Ivanchenko to talk about the fate of the other contenders for seats in the State Duma.

[Ivanchenko] At present applications and other requisite documents have been received, lists of signatures supplied by eight associations and blocs have undergone a preliminary inspection, documents and lists provided by another 27 are being inspected, and statements of late submission of documentation have been issued to the following associations: the "Association of Lawyers of Russia," the "'Union of Muslims of Russia' All-Russia Sociopolitical Movement," the "Fedeal-Democratic Movement" (Novikov, Kalugin, Kazakova), and also the blocs "Democratic Russia and Free Trade Unions" (Starovoytova, Ponomarev, Yakulin), "Our Future" (Umalatova, Shashviashvili, Begov), the "Election Bloc...." of Yuriy Nikulin, Dikul, and Voyevodin, the "Zemskoy Sobor — Union of Zemstvo, Cossacks, and Orthodox Patriotic Organizations" (Klykov, Panina, Gora), and "We Serve Russia" (Nenashev, Karaseva, Danilchenko).

[Kasyanenko] What does the future hold for those who did nonetheless manage to submit documents by 2400 hours 22 October and are now undergoing the preliminary inspection? Are they not in a less advantageous position than the others, who supplied everything earlier?

[Ivanchenko] Their chances are considerably less than those who supplied documents and signatures a week earlier, say. Why? Because a whole batch of documents is being handed over, and whereas the electoral associations that have been registered spent a week preparing their affairs, holding consultations, and bringing everything into line with the law, the latest ones are simply unable to do so — everything has already been handed over.

I can tell you already that some of them lack statements of consent to run from individual candidates — usually well-known people. If we do not have their consent to run, naturally the signatures cannot be counted. Right now I am unable to name specific associations, the law does not allow it.

The examination of these documents will begin 27-28 October.

[Kasyanenko] The final date for the registration of electoral associations is 2 November. What will the TsIK be doing after that date?

[Ivanchenko] A very crucial phase will begin then for us, involving election canvassing and monitoring expenditure of the funds allocated for this purpose. We have already noticed that some registered electoral associations are in no rush to open their accounts. That is a serious sign: It means that they are unwilling for their funds to be monitored. That could well be grounds for the TsIK to file charges against them and eliminate the association from the race.

Article 44 of the Election Law bans a candidate from using his official position for the purposes of being elected — for instance, transport, communications, his subordinates, etc. That may also be grounds for legal proceedings. This rule applies both to all candidates who have official positions, and to deputies who have been registered as candidates for another term.

I must say that the elections represent a test for the authorities. I am not ashamed to repeat this phrase from the past. And the authorities must prepare for it. Anyone who is afraid of it will try to engage in sharp practice as Mavrodi tried to do.

But it will spell disaster for the country if we erect a financial pyramid during the elections; the authorities must not be formed in that way. Voters must get a chance to make a conscious choice.

## Regional Activities

### Agrarians, NDR Seen Competing for Rural Vote

*MM2610145795 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 2*

[Report by Valeriy Konovalov: "Taking Peasants for Granted. Fight for Rural Votes Heating Up"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Kaluga Oblast's remote Kuybyshevskiy Rayon I recently recorded a totally unprecedented upsurge in party life. Even the CPSU, elderly residents confirmed, was not as insistent in its endeavor to reach everyone here.

Canvassers are visiting these remote villages virtually every day. Representatives of over two dozen parties have already been here recently collecting signatures and recruiting supporters. Some make speeches and use posters, while the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia man treats country people to "Zhirinovskiy" vodka.

However, most parties have virtually no chance of winning the support of voters here. Only two forces can seriously compete for peasant votes here, as is generally the case throughout the Russian countryside.

The position of Mikhail Lapshin's Agrarian Party of Russia [APR] is strong once again. Most collective farms in their various forms — limited partnerships, closed-type joint-stock companies, etc. — sympathize with this party. There is no doubt that the APR will get through the 5-percent barrier. The requisite number of votes for registration were collected with room to spare and fairly quickly at that — virtually all from rural areas.

Nevertheless, this time the situation is different. Now the APR has a rival in the countryside. Last time Association of Russian Peasant (Private) Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives [AKKOR] private farm structures sided with Gaydar, but did not receive a single place on the deputies' list from their partner. Now the private farm association has chosen another, more powerful partner. The AKKOR was behind the creation of the Union of Landowners of Russia, which has joined the "Russia Is Our Home" [NDR] bloc.

The private farm organization feels far more confident within the framework of Chernomyrdin's bloc: In addition to private farmers it is trying to win over in the countryside not just owners of personal plots but also collective farm workers, playing on their proprietorial sentiments. People in the countryside are now far more attentive to the voice of the APR's main opponents since they are backed by the premier and many top officials, while the APR's only government assets are Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha and Minister Aleksandr Nazarchuk.

This confrontation will become plain 27 October when the APR holds a "peasant assembly" at Moscow's Parliamentary Center and the Union of Landowners holds its own congress at City Hall. One group will protest the buying and selling of land in the name of the peasants, the others will claim that the peasant will die without a market in land. The sides' arguments are well-known. And the point of holding two rural assemblies in the capital simultaneously may be to demonstrate to their delegates and thereby to the countryside who supports whom, who has more clout, who can make more realistic promises, and who can provide more. This duel was organized by the Union of Landowners with the intention of pitting their Chernomyrdin, who has promised to deliver a report at this congress, against the APR's Zaveryukha and Nazarchuk. However, the APR has also sent the premier an invitation and intends to get him to appear at its assembly come what may.

...Vast tracts of arable land have been taken out of circulation. But it is not because the peasants have suddenly become fonder of any party that the countryside has been politically galvanized of late. The countryside has simply realized that if legislators do not work properly, it is impossible to work normally on the land. And you cannot solve anything by self-immolation or hunger strikes. But how are you to get competent legislators? Elect them. And politicians have sensed this mood among the peasants. So they have rushed to the countryside — to garner the peasant vote.

## Forecasts & Commentary

### KRO's Rise Seen Causing 'Nervousness' in NDR

*MM2510111995 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 24 Oct 95 p 3*

[Article by Valeriy Aleksandrov: "NDR Starting To Get Nervous"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Everybody knows that even before the election campaign has begun "de jure," it has long been under way "de facto." Take the "Russia Is Our Home" [NDR] government bloc, for instance. Its leaders have long been making frequent TV appearances and appearing in newspaper pages. Admittedly, it is emphasized in every possible way that these appearances are solely in the line of duty and cannot be regarded as the start of the election campaign. But on 11 October Sergey Belyayev, chairman of the Russian Federation

State Committee for the Management of State Property, who is also head of the NDR campaign headquarters, without awaiting the official start of the election marathon and using the channels of ITAR-TASS, the state agency, unexpectedly launched sharp attacks on another electoral association — the Congress of Russian Communities [KRO].

Thus on 11 October ITAR-TASS circulated a statement by Sergey Belyayev to the effect that "the rumors of a deterioration in relations between the president and the premier and of coolness on Boris Yeltsin's part toward the NDR, which was set up on the president's instructions — all this...is a KRO-inspired campaign to discredit our movement." The leader of the NDR campaign headquarters also stressed that "the Congress of Russian Communities is certainly our rival in the upcoming parliamentary elections."

This statement can be regarded as an unprecedented instance, especially as the NDR leaders had previously stated that the NDR has no worthy rivals in the elections. Apparently all these statements were a bluff. At any rate, whereas formerly the top officials in the government and therefore in the "Russia Is Our Home" electoral association simply brushed aside the recent spate of reports of a deterioration in relations between the president and the premier and NDR leader, they have now been forced to issue a denial in a clearly irritated tone. This irritation conceals thinly veiled nervousness. And the main NDR strategist names the KRO as the "source of the evil."

Thus the KRO, which only a few months ago was regarded as a "dark horse" in the election race, has now been officially recognized by the government association as its main rival. It is difficult to find any other explanation of the actions of Belyayev, the main NDR campaign strategist. It looks as though the KRO has clearly messed up all the election cards of the "party of power."

If you carefully compare the NDR and KRO movements, it is probably hard to find more dissimilar political forces. The NDR was created overnight on "orders from on high," and immediately proclaimed its existence as the "party of power." Whereas the KRO has traveled a long path of the unification of Russian communities in the states that have emerged on the ruins of a once united country. While the NDR unites mostly high-level and low-level leaders, the KRO represents an association of a multitude of regional organizations that operate in practically all regions of Russia. The KRO regional organizations are effectively social listening posts where voters' instructions are collected and people are given practical help in solving their vital problems. And it unexpectedly transpires that this sort of work is far more effective and understandable than the insistent publicity for the NDR in numerous progovernment mass media.

Recently the NDR leadership has clearly begun to feel that, despite the plethora of levers of power in their hands, the political ground is slipping from beneath their feet. The Kremlin's coolness toward what was once its favorite child — something that the NDR leaders are so reluctant to recognize — should also be attributed to this.

Meanwhile the Kremlin is clearly beginning to seek a new support, which is accordingly arousing jealousy in the NDR. This jealousy and uncertainty about the NDR's future prospects are eloquently shown by the aforementioned remarks by Mr. Belyayev. His irritation about the rumors of a sharp deterioration in relations between the president and the premier makes it possible to assume that there is indeed such a deterioration.

The question arises: What about the KRO? This movement's leaders reacted to Mr. Belyayev's statement with olympian calm. Yuriy Skokov, who heads the KRO ticket, declared: "We are doing our job, they are doing theirs. Our task today is not to combat anybody, but to create a political force that can say to the authorities: We can monitor all your actions and demand that you keep all your promises. Our task is to create a movement. The State Duma elections are a method of self-organization, of creating the movement. So we do not regard anyone as our competitors, opponents, or enemies. We have our own goal."

Another KRO leader — Aleksandr Lebed — was even more laconic: "May the strongest win."

Unlike the NDR, the KRO, which states its opposition to the country's present leadership and senses growing support among voters, is feeling much more confident on the political stage. The KRO is still inclined to play an independent role, since it consists of people who are dissatisfied with the present situation in the country and who offer a realistic, well thought-out program for emerging from the crisis. A crisis that is in many respects caused by the actions of the present government, in other words, the NDR.

Maybe this is exactly what Mr. Belyayev is afraid of?

### Zyuganov Comments on CPRF, Elections, Presidency

*MM2610094095 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Oct 95 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Communist Party of the Russian Federation leader Gennadiy Zyuganov by Vladimir Bolshakov at Zyuganov's home; date not given: "The Zyuganov Phenomenon. Vladimir Bolshakov Meets With Russian Federation Communist Leader" — first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow-Paris — I initially met with Gennadiy Zyuganov in his office at the State Duma. But there could be no question of any kind of interview there — the phone was constantly ringing, usually for a long-distance call. Zyuganov would reply to his secretary's unspoken request — "Of course, put it through!" He was "keeping his finger on the pulse." The electoral campaign had already begun and everything was important. Each vote was worth its weight in gold. Consequently, in order to speak in more detail and without interruption, we agreed to meet at his home. There, too, our conversation was interrupted from all corners of the former USSR. But nonetheless, the conversation went ahead. I have not embellished it and am hiding nothing from readers.

[Bolshakov] The election campaign in Russia is gathering pace. And according to the polls Zyuganov is out in front. How do you explain that, Gennadiy Andreyevich? Is it a revival of sympathy for the Communists or is it the "Zyuganov phenomenon"? After all, there are at least four Communist Parties in Russia. But neither they nor their leaders are able to boast of high ratings.

[Zyuganov] To all intents and purposes there is just one Communist Party in Russia — the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF]. It has more than 500,000 members united in 20,000 primary organizations. These are to be found in all cities large and small and in villages and settlements. The party produces 120 newspapers and magazines and has links with more than 150 parties and movements around the world. There are small groups which state that they too reflect communist views, but they lack both a vertical structure and mass support. I tell you this for your own information. As to the phenomenon.... It is extremely easy. We always had two parties in the CPSU. There was the party of patriots. Those who were members of it fought honestly and worked honestly. And they had one privilege — to be the first into battle and to work their fingers to the bone. Then there was another party. The party of Trotskiy, Beriya, Yakovlev, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin. It viewed Russia as its booty. Today it is this party that is ensuring the thieving division of property and power which has led to the collapse of our country and the destruction of its spirituality, culture, and best traditions. So we have revived the party of patriots, statesmen, and honest workers. It was born within the CPSU and fought both at the Constitutional Court and in workers' collectives for its right to exist. It now has many members who were never in the CPSU.

[Bolshakov] Your party is indeed the biggest in Russia. But does that mean that the masses support it?

[Zyuganov] Objectively they are doing so already. At the recent elections we either doubled or tripled the number of our supporters everywhere. There has not been a single major event in the country or a single election campaign without our extensive participation.

[Bolshakov] Your party's name is emphatically Russian. In your speeches and books you are constantly noting the need to maintain Russian traditions and the continuity of Russian history. Moreover, you follow that precept in the CPRF's practical activity. How do you react to your party and you personally being accused of national communism by your opponents?

[Zyuganov] A party divorced from its national spiritual roots or from the real economic and political situation can have no future in Russia. Our tragedy lay largely in the fact that very considerable numbers of Communists and communist sympathizers believed that prior to 1917 everything in Russia was bad. Now, admittedly, the very same people who tried to convince the people of this are claiming that we have not had any history since 1917. It is just like a black hole. These, of course, are not just lies. They are cynical lies. Our party is striving to restore continuity and a link between eras. We rely on all that is best in our history and in world practice.

As for the accusations about nationalism or, even more so, "national communism," in which only the politically purblind would fail to discern historical parallels and a very sinister context, we respond to this as follows — a political party which failed to take account of the national and cultural features of a people (primarily the Russian people, which put together vast lands and regions and was the cement that bound together the various peoples of Russia and later the Soviet Union), would operate in Russia as if in a vacuum and would be, not only for Russians but for all other peoples and ethnic groups, an alien element, irrespective of the beautiful ideas it may have. Incidentally, when troubles came, Stalin — who, for all his numerous failings and unforgivable crimes, was an outstanding statesman — appealed to the people as has been the case in Russia since time immemorial: "Brothers and sisters!" And people believed him, people followed him.

[Bolshakov] When you speak of Russian history and the Russian national tradition you clearly have in mind not only the borders of the Russian Federation but the historic Russian state and the Russian people in its entirety.

[Zyuganov] Yes, of course. A genuinely national party has to take account of national features and the entire panoply of nationalities within the framework of the historic state and the nation that created it. And we must not only take these things into account but identify with our nation and with its spirituality and history. You can be half Russian and half Georgian or Tatar. But you cannot be half Orthodox and half Catholic.

Russia came about geopolitically only toward the middle of the last century. Prior to this there had to all intents and purposes not been a single century in which Russia's borders had not changed. But the 20th century was tragic for Russia not only because of the change to its borders. For the first time the Russian people were divided up. The Russian people had been conquered before but never dismembered. And in this connection particular reliance on the national features of Russians is inevitable for any responsible party.

In our program demands we are directly making it our goal to reunify the collected, unified, whole Russian people. And that is our main task. Just as it is our task to reunify and gradually revive the Soviet Union state. We believe that one of the key tasks is to propose from Moscow, from the Kremlin, that all superfluous barriers that do not infringe anyone's identity, language, or culture — primarily those of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan — be removed.

[Bolshakov] Why them in particular? Because they are the biggest or the most Slavic in their national makeup?

[Zyuganov] Primarily because their unity is predetermined by history itself. These three republics supplied more than 70 percent of their output to the Russian Federation. On the other hand, every second family in Russia has either close or distant relatives in these republics. My wife, for instance, is Ukrainian, and Ukrainian blood flows through my children's veins. You do not cut yourself to the quick. And there is no reason for any split or destruction of the natural historic union of the peoples of Russia. And, incidentally, all present-day world practice shows that interdependence and integration are most important development trends. West Europe has already set up its own Soviet Union. Customs and other barriers are coming down....

[Bolshakov] The EU....

[Zyuganov] Yes, I stand corrected. I am talking about the phenomenon of integration, not about the "Sovietization" of Europe. In that respect the Soviet Union is still a working model. There has simply been none other in human history. The practice of coexistence by more than 100 peoples within the framework of first the Russian and later the Soviet state helped Europe to conclude that it is necessary to overcome the lack of national coordination. Europe has realized that integration is far more advantageous than dissension and the wars that have rent it for centuries. Yet we are now having a medieval absurdity imposed on us — insuperable barriers are being erected between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus in areas where borders are inconceivable.

[Bolshakov] Nonetheless, your speeches against this artificial separation are seen as a kind of "separatism" or "great power chauvinism"....

[Zyuganov] That should be on their conscience. People who think this know just as well as I that the political ambitions of yesterday's "internationalists" from the CPSU's top leadership who have now become "national leaders" have brought the ordinary people nothing but suffering.

[Bolshakov] You say you have inherited the best traditions of the CPSU. But surely it is no secret that many Bolshevik leaders hated the Russian people with a vengeance. It is well-known, for instance, that some of them called on Soviet schools to teach the rising generation that there had never been anything good in Russian history or in the Russian people. At PRAVDA I personally saw how the leading newspaper replaced the word "Russian" on every page with the word "Soviet." There was an evident desire to turn the Soviet Union into a kind of "caldron of the nations" along American lines, where everything national would be recast into a faceless international-Soviet model. At the same time, there is a rational core to internationalism, if only it is properly understood. Can the Communist Party abandon this? You, incidentally, are often accused of abandoning internationalism....

[Zyuganov] People who don't love their own people cannot be internationalists. They will be political rolling stones. As for the statements you have quoted, I cannot justify them even by citing revolutionary times. Internationalism cannot be replaced by cosmopolitanism. Whatever references to "intelligence" may be used to cover it up. Just as patriotism cannot be confused with chauvinism. Consequently, when we adopt positions of patriotism and statehood only to hear charges of national chauvinism in response, I want to remind our accusers of the words of Napoleon Bonaparte: "Love of motherland is the prime virtue of a civilized man." I agree with him on that.

[Bolshakov] Nonetheless, in our history there have been not only glorious pages but frankly shameful ones as well....

[Zyuganov] Russia is not unique in that respect. But if we were to cite only those pages — and, I would note, there are not that many of them — it would be a distortion of history. Once when I was on Sakhalin

I imagined myself looking across all our vast expanses to Kaliningrad. And I caught myself thinking: "People have always tried to tell me that all the Russian czars did wrong. But how could they have opened up such vast expanses — and essentially not by the sword but by the cross and through industrial production and trade?"

So I repeat — the attempt to belittle everything in Russia's prerevolutionary history was one of the most blatant mistakes. And that is clearly visible in our history. Incidentally, people only started talking about Pushkin as a great Russian poet in the early thirties. Until recently people had even been condescending, put it that way, about Yesenin. Stalin mentioned the history of our forefathers and our glorious military leaders only when Hitler was at the gates of Moscow. In an incredibly short time some marvelous shows and films were put on about Aleksandr Nevskiy, Dmitriy Donskoy, and the Battle of Kulikovo. It thereby proved possible to revive a historic memory in the people without which it would have been impossible to wage such a bloody and truly great war as the Great Patriotic War.

[Bolshakov] I think that you still need to clearly state your party's attitude to other peoples of Russia — particularly smaller peoples. Tact is needed in this area, not only as a matter of courtesy. Quite honestly, I feel ashamed as a human being for those Duma deputies from the autonomous republics who are shown on TV as if to illustrate that passage in Solzhenitsyn's speech where he called for such autonomous areas to be abolished. They are Russians too. And there is plenty of their blood in Russian veins. After all, everything has been mixed up. Particularly in Siberia, the Far East, and the North Caucasus.

[Zyuganov] Appealing to deep-seated features of our Russian patriotism and friendship among the peoples is also real internationalism. Respect for your own history and culture, of course, should also be combined with respect for your neighbors. The responsibility of each people, including small peoples, for the Russian Federation's fate is one of the demands of our program and our election manifesto.

[Bolshakov] You have retreated from the CPSU's aggressive atheism. Why is that?

[Zyuganov] I believe that the Communist Party has no right to deprive its own members of the freedom of conscience proclaimed in the Constitution. What God people believe in is their own personal affair.

For me God is goodness, truth, justice, and beauty. But I am not imposing my views on anyone. We have openly declared that religious belief is no obstacle to membership of the renewed CPRF. This has been well received by our fellow citizens and countrymen. I studied the Bible with a pencil in my hand. I twice read Krachkovskiy's translation of the Koran when I was studying the Caucasus. It is impossible to understand the Caucasus without an understanding of the Koran.

The CPRF has a respectful attitude toward the Orthodox Church, because the history of Russia is inconceivable without it.

Karamzin wrote "The History of the Russian State" relying on sources found in monasteries. If we take architecture, icon painting, painting, our cultural and spiritual traditions, official documents, and literary texts, they all had their beginnings in the Orthodox Church. This cannot be denied, much less should we abandon it. These things are the strength of our nation. Why do you think overseas sects and preachers are now descending on Russia like locusts?

They are fighting the Orthodox Church far more mercilessly today than the CPSU did. They are perfectly well aware that if they can pull out Russian people's spiritual roots the question of enslaving our country will have been fully and finally resolved. Goebbels said that if Germany managed to implant its religion and its clergy in every Russian village the question of conquering Russia would be resolved once and for all.

[Bolshakov] Does this mean that we are now talking about a spiritual occupation?

[Zyuganov] Precisely. And the gates were first opened for the occupiers by Gorbachev and his team.

[Bolshakov] In his last interview to PRAVDA Gorbachev accused you of supporting the Belovezhskaya Forest Agreements which led to the collapse of the USSR. I did not believe that from the outset, knowing a little of the history of the matter. But Gorbachev has long been waging a kind of open warfare with you personally and with the CPRF. How do you explain this vendetta on the part of the former general secretary?

[Zyuganov] Everyone in our party and in the country knows that I was one of the politicians in the CPSU Central Committee who was categorically opposed to perestroyka and said that it would inevitably escalate into shooting. Reforms had long needed to be implemented — they were begun by Kosygin and continued by Andropov. But in order to implement reform clear goals are needed along with a strong team, good administrative methods, and the appropriate information backup. Gorbachev did not have any of these elements in place, nor could he have had, since he is really muddle-headed. In the spring of 1991 at a closed conference attended by many leading deputies, I proposed a 10-point reform program, preserving the Soviet Union and reforming the CPSU. Gorbachev did not object to any of these points. Later, in his near-40-minute closing speech, he did not mention any of my proposals. That was when I published for the first time my open letter to Aleksandr Yakovlev, entitled "Architect By the Ruins." To all intents and purposes it was addressed to the entire people, to the entire party, and to Gorbachev. I stated bluntly that a massive and unprecedented betrayal of our interests was under way and that this would inevitably lead to the collapse of the unified state. A month later I published together with others my open "Address to the People." It stated that whole sectors were grinding to a halt, that science had collapsed, that the country was being enslaved, and the people spiritually humiliated. I addressed a conference attended by almost 600 deputies. I spoke for a whole hour, making myself hoarse trying to convince them that if you put Russia's sovereignty below Union sovereignty, you would organize a civil war throughout the south of Russia. And that would be the greatest crime against the entire people and the party. At the Constitutional Court I submitted a number of documents, including some in English, demonstrating how an operation to bring about the collapse of the Union was being implemented. I asked for them to be published, but this was not done.

So Gorbachev's accusation is yet another lie, an absolutely contemptible lie by a man who betrayed all his friends and allies, his colors, his country, and his countrymen — a man who cannot be forgiven. This Nobel peace prize winner unleashed in our country a civil war that has already killed 600,000 people, wounded more than 1 million, and resulted in 6 million refugees. Any normal man would at least put his diploma on the table and say "I have no right to be a Nobel peace price laureate." Yet he continues to lie and slander those he himself betrayed. I think that he is panicking about his responsibility for all that he did and therefore is taking any opportunity to muddy the waters.

[Bolshakov] The statements by Gorbachev and other figures have confused some people when it comes to the role of the CPRF and of yourself personally in the October 1993 events in Moscow. In particular, a lot remains unclear regarding your meeting with Khasbulatov at that time.

[Zyuganov] Contrary to Gorbachev's allegations Khasbulatov and I met for a conversation for the first time in October 1993, on the eve of the attack on parliament. I explained to him the kind of provocation that was in preparation and I proposed a few options for getting out of this situation. At least the leaders of all Federation components had managed to gather at the Constitutional Court and they were prepared to deliver an ultimatum to Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin. Moreover, even the Orthodox Church was using its authority to avoid civil war and a bloody conflict and to halt the carnage. If only it had not been for the cravings of certain "ultrarevolutionary figures"! All that was needed was eight-nine hours to assemble the soviets, move everything onto the level of dialogue, and save the country from further destruction.

[Bolshakov] Your party has now been recognized by the official authorities and by the voters. Does this mean that the CPRF has been integrated into Russia's present-day political system and that you are "moderate," "pink" Communists?

[Zyuganov] It means that our party has been reborn on a solid basis. We have clear proposals and a responsible electoral platform. These did not come from above. All of our documents have emerged from the ground up, as it were. We have an entire system of powerful intellectual centers based in universities, science schools, and academic institutions. Their recommendations and developments are discussed at our meetings, colloquiums, and conferences. We have just held two parliamentary hearings and one scientific conference on the problems of stable development. We believe that a modern political party cannot be extremist or call the people to the barricades when it is not ready to do so and when any attempt to erect such barricades would merely lead to bloodshed. A truly responsible political party should base its activity on scientific elaborations of the problems which society is encountering. These are largely determined by the contradictions between people and society, people and the state, people and nature. A modern political party should be able to find solutions to these problems which are in line with the realities of the 21st century rather than the realities of two centuries ago. The world today is more intricate and complex....

[Bolshakov] Are you talking about the "Communist Manifesto"? Do the ideas of Marx no longer hold good?

[Zyuganov] A wholesale denunciation of Marx would be just as stupid as being dogmatic about him. Whereas previously it was possible to rely solely on social-class analysis, which was largely justified, today this is inadequate. We need to take account also of social-class, social-psychological, cultural, information, and geopolitical factors.

[Bolshakov] Geopolitics was considered a pseudoscience in the Soviet Union. You use its terms very frequently. Many of your critics see this as proof of the CPRF leaders' imperial aspirations. How would you answer such critics?

[Zyuganov] Peter the Great broke through to the warm waters of the Baltic and the Black Sea without knowing about geopolitics. And, as is well known, he was not a Communist. But as a statesman he realized that without access to these sea lanes Russia could not be a strong and stable state. We are now leaving those warm waters and the Baltic. And if another four warm straits are handed back in the Kurils, Russian territory will be corked up and Russia will be left without any proper access to the high seas. And not a single leader — irrespective of what party has brought him to power — will be able to solve a single major problem without that access. A modern political party has to be able to see all this. And it is necessary to know about geopolitics in this area. But this does not constitute grounds for accusations of "empire-building."

[Bolshakov] Your party's emblem has the traditional hammer and sickle lying on an open book. What does this symbol mean?

[Zyuganov] It symbolizes the current spirit and essence of the party, which advocates a union between people of physical labor and intellectuals.

[Bolshakov] Let's talk a bit more about symbolism. Your critics believe that you are trying to combine the incompatible — the hammer and sickle with the two-headed eagle, the red flag with Russia's red, white, and blue.

[Zyuganov] That is not so. I am no supporter of the tricolor. I have an easy-going attitude about the Russian state symbols that existed prior to the October Revolution. But I would note that the Bolsheviks and their red flag did not betray Russian traditions. On Kulikovo Field, for instance, the Russian troops of Prince Dmitriy Donskoy carried red, gold, and purple flags.

The tricolor, which Yeltsin has now made the national flag of the Russian Federation, is Vlasovism [reference to the turncoat Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov who fought on the Nazi side during World War II]. The Vlasovites fought under that flag in the ranks of Hitler's Wehrmacht against the people they had betrayed. And this flag of theirs was thrown down at the foot of the Mausoleum together with Hitlerite standards during the Victory Parade on Red Square in 1945.

Vlasovite attitudes have not yet been imposed on military units — the Vlasovites are scared their colors would be confiscated. And all military units have red flags bearing the legend "For Our Soviet Motherland!" Not all honest officers have been expelled yet — even though more than 900,000 have already been discharged.

As for Yeltsin's games with the two-headed eagle.... He can be asked just one question — why does the eagle have a second head, when Russia's western border is visible from Government House with the naked eye? The border is to be found where it was in the days of Ivan the Terrible. This man has no great-power attitude. After all, everything relating to the unity and strengthening of the country has been given away. From Narva to Kushka. This security system was formed not over decades but over centuries — in a natural and normal way. Back then the symbol of the two-headed eagle had a meaning — a powerful Russian state existed on two continents (Europe and Asia). Today that state, regrettably, no longer exists. Today its destroyed borders let through narcotics, weapons, radioactive waste, infectious diseases....

[Bolshakov] Can you tell us who your supporters are? Who are your voters or, as people put it nowadays, your electorate? Who do you rely on?

[Zyuganov] First and foremost we have to bear in mind that the coming parliamentary and subsequent presidential elections are clearly the last chance for a peaceful solution to the current dramatic and very grave situation. Consequently, our program covers, as it were, two periods — the parliamentary and the presidential elections. Because if 100 percent of patriots get into parliament and the power structure remains the same as it is now, they will be unable to solve many problems. Consequently, we are making it our key task at these elections to reach as many citizens are possible. We are acting on the principle of man to man, eye to eye, apartment block to apartment block. We want to show people that there are forces in the country that are able to halt this collapse. We have the organization, we have the experience, we have the traditions, and we have a strong team of professional administrators — a team of people representing all the social strata of our fatherland. We are relying on their common sense and reason. The essence of our election platform is to create a bloc of Communists and nonparty people, intelligentsia, and competent professional administrators. Then to form a strong team and propose that the Duma set up an alliance of state-patriotic forces. Relying on our Duma majority, we would create a government of national confidence and put forward a corresponding program. We already have a sufficiently strong team which has a program for economic and financial stabilization and for combating crime and banditry and bringing about a phased revival of the single union state on a voluntary basis.

We have already elaborated a program of legislative initiatives which we will be putting forward on our arrival in the Duma, as well as a program of stabilization in the country once our president comes to power in the elections.

[Bolshakov] The West is scared of a revival of communist radicalism. This is a fear shared by Russian business circles, which have direct ties to the West. The press and TV both here and abroad are starting to scare ordinary people with the prospect of a "return to the gulag."

[Zyuganov] While people are talking about the gulag, our entire country has been turned into a crime zone. In the past year alone 140,000 people in our country have been killed or poisoned. That's 10 times more than in the 10-year Afghan War. Everyone in Moscow used to feel completely secure. I can remember — and I have checked this myself — that in 1986 there were just 14 shootings in a city of 10 million. Each case was separately investigated, and all the cases were closed. But now people are firing assault rifles. Every night. More than 100 bombings injuring absolutely innocent people have been recorded in the past year alone.

We have directly stated in our program that our party disavows the perfidious policy pursued by a whole slew of leaders. And it guarantees that there will be no repetition of repression and lawlessness.

[Bolshakov] Saying that is one thing, taking it on board and implementing it is another. For instance, THE EUROPEAN wrote: "Although the Communists have moved quite a long way from Stalinism, once they won power they would return to a state monopoly."

[Zyuganov] We realize perfectly well that the main reason why both the CPSU and the Soviet Union collapsed was a monopoly. A monopoly of ownership, power, and the truth. It ruined the country and led to the decay and later degeneration of its elite, who directly betrayed our national interests. That is why we advocate a mixed economy, even though we give priority to social and collective forms of ownership. We advocate a pluralistic political system. We are prepared to demonstrate the correctness of our ideas and approaches in an open, honest campaign. We advocate glasnost. But this presupposes above all equal access to the mass media for different political forces operating within the framework of the law. We advocate good-neighborly relations with both East and West. And, above all, we advocate the improvement of relations with all our neighbors. In short, the West has nothing to worry about. It should be worried not about the Communists but about those who are pushing our country into the abyss. Our Russian Ilya Muromets [epic hero of the Kievan cycle of byliny folk songs who is endowed with exceptional strength] seems frozen at the intersection of three roads. One leads toward the transformation of Russia into a bigger version of Chechnya. You can imagine what that would mean in a country where there are 27,000 nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and 60 obsolete nuclear reactors. The second leads to a criminal kingdom reigned over by gangsters. The mafia is now moving into politics and many godfathers are getting into legislative organs of power. These people are bereft of any moral consideration whatsoever, and they would be prepared to indulge in purely criminal nuclear blackmail. The West can hardly fancy the prospect of Russia's turning into a larger version of Colombia. There is, finally, a third road — to decide the fate of our country and our people through honest and fair elections. We are confident that the future government will be a coalition that groups together Communists, Agrarians, commodity producers of all forms of ownership, and women's, veterans', and other organizations. We are in favor of such a coalition government.

[Bolshakov] I recently read in a U.S. newspaper that the United States and its allies, although they prefer Chernomyrdin, nonetheless think that they would be able to reach agreement with Zyuganov. Does this recognition of you as a leader in this context not shock you?

[Zyuganov] No, it doesn't. The West is pretty pragmatic in its political preferences. I have long since noted that. For instance, representatives of business ,scientific, and other circles did not break off contact with us even during the period of deepest reaction when we were effectively underground. Now more and more important figures, scientists, envoys, and analysts are passing through our offices. Incidentally, they are taking account of the fact that our predictions during the previous elections were borne out in the overwhelming majority of regions.

Consequently, I think that Western business circles will maintain normal relations with those who ensure stability, order, and a future in our country — including a future for investment — and provide guarantees for the development of production on the basis of the achievements of scientific and technical progress.

[Bolshakov] Do you consider yourself personally capable of that?

[Zyuganov] We have the strengths and we have the relevant programs and structures. Our cadres are excellently trained and experienced and could resolve these tasks pretty quickly.

[Bolshakov] I'm talking about you personally. Are you ready to be president of Russia? Would you undertake that responsibility?

[Zyuganov] In the form in which the presidency currently exists, president-mania is inevitable and it has infected the entire country. There has been a revival of the era of the seven boyars [reference to power struggle during the Time of Troubles] which is tearing Russia to bits. We advocate changing the power structure. We want the legislature to ensure reliable controls over the executive. We advocate that the patriotic opposition at an enlarged meeting should nominate candidates for president, premier, five key deputies, and 10 leading ministers. And that it should put forward this united team with a corresponding program. I am prepared to play the part allotted me in that team. Of course, the leader of a major political party enjoying mounting public confidence should not rule out the possibility of heading such a team.

[Bolshakov] You used to oppose the presidency.

[Zyuganov] In the form in which it exists it is a bad thing for us. This power corresponds to neither the multinational nature nor the federal structure of Russia. There are 21 national federal states in the world, and nowhere are there direct presidential elections. Even in America the President is chosen by electors. We advocate that there be a corresponding constitutional reform guaranteeing that this official is under the control of an elective representative organ. Call it what you like — a congress, an assembly. But it is important that this organ represents all constituencies and all Federation components so as to ensure that the corresponding powers are delegated to them. I would note that we do not even have a medical commission which could decide whether the president is in a fit state to run the country. Even a bus driver has to have a checkup before being allowed to take charge of passengers. Yet here we are talking about running a huge country. That is why control mechanisms are needed. If, suppose, it were discovered that the president was not coping with his duties or was unable to carry them out on health grounds or, God forbid, was an alcoholic, the corresponding representative organ should be able to meet, discuss its report, and relieve him of his duties without involving the entire people in endless enmity and referendums. We have proposals for such amendments to the Constitution. Including proposals on a medical commission, which should be able to monitor any official. This is normal and should not offend anybody. But it would provide a guarantee that drunkards or sick people — including the mentally ill — could not come to power. We have also drawn up a draft law on the responsibilities of officials. Great trust is placed in them. And they should be responsible for their words, their promises, and their actions. So far we have not submitted these proposals, since the Duma as currently constituted is not ready to adopt such serious decisions.

[Bolshakov] It is claimed that you are dreaming up all these measures in order to bind the government hand and foot and give it no freedom of action.

[Zyuganov] On the contrary. We consistently advocate wider powers for the government. I have told Chernomyrdin — tell us what powers you need and we will vote for all your proposals. But on condition that you come and report to us every three months on your successes and failures. No, they do not want to report back. As a result, we do not now have a normal government.

There are four governments. One around Yeltsin. This is the government which deals with those who shoot and plant. This government is already into its third reincarnation. The Burbulis government destroyed the Union. The Gaydar government fleeced the people. And the government headed by Chubays is selling off everything that was created in Russia over the last 1,000 years.

The second government is Chernomyrdin's. It is essentially an economic department, a kind of economic administration under the president. Its instructions are not being carried out. Any enterprise leader or entrepreneur will confirm that for you. The third government has taken shape around Kozyrev. It carries out not the orders of Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin, but those of the U.S. State Department. And the fourth government is the mass media, which are often not subject to any laws, issue televised appeals for age-old Russian territory to be given up, and give airtime to various transatlantic preachers and anyone who will pay, whatever their message. Under these circumstances, thinking people in Russia simply cannot have access to TV and cannot rebuff those conducting this anti-Russian and anti-Russia propaganda. Here is an example — Yuriy Chernichenko [leader of the Peasants Party of Russia], an asphalt peasant, lectures everyone almost daily on how to live and work on the land. Yet Vasiliy Starodubtsev, who knows his stuff inside out, cannot get airtime. Yet he is leader of the 15-million-strong Agrarian Union.

We advocate a strong government, but under controls.

[Bolshakov] What is your attitude to your political rivals — the "Russia Is Our Home" [NDR] bloc, Rybkin, and Zhirinovskiy?

[Zyuganov] We call NDR "Their Home." A proper home is built from the ground up, not from the roof down. And owners take care of their homes and are concerned about them. But a home where everyone is wasteful, drunk, and stealing things, where children are not taught (only one in three students will have textbooks this year; even during the war we had enough textbooks), or where the elderly are not cared for is the kind of place the people would call a den of thieves rather than a home. In my mind, NDR has no particular chance. But it does have power, money, structures, and will be in charge of the election campaign. But there has been a very important indication from Yekaterinburg. Rossel trounced Strakhov, the NDR candidate, who had been given tens of billions [of rubles] to run his election campaign. But money doesn't work in Russia the way it does in America. I very much like the way a deputy was elected in Kolomna — first there was a clash between the party of power, the mafia, criminals, and our candidate, the cosmonaut General Titov. So Titov won and I asked our guys how they had voted and what their attitudes were to the campaign in general. And one told me frankly: "Vedenkin was giving out money, so we took enough for a bottle of vodka; Mavrodi's wife was campaigning, so we got a lottery ticket off her; the 'party of power' candidate was selling sheets on the cheap — we took some of them too. And we voted for the upstanding man — Titov. We'd never seen a campaign like it."

Of course, we know that there is a threat of rigging — since the elections will be held under the control of the "party of power." We have now worked out control methods from the time that the ballot papers are printed until the final count. We have already tested this method, and it has to be said that in a number of cases it has had a sobering effect.

As for Zhirinovskiy, he's come down to earth with a bump. Last time his influence was deliberately exaggerated. Last time they got all the opposition together in the House of the Soviets. They nabbed them at one fell swoop. They staged a model firing exercise to bring about a psychological shock, they published the Constitution, forcing elections to be held in 40 days and making people vote for the Constitution. At least 90 percent of people had never even seen it or read it. The authorities were trying to advance the fortunes primarily of their own clique. They had reckoned on Gaydar and his team getting 60 percent, and the other flank was purged — all patriotic newspapers were closed down. PRAVDA was not being published, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA was not published for two and a half months and did not reappear before the elections. Any publications whose names included the words "state," "people's," "patriotic," or "Russian" were closed down. Everything was closed down. Communists and patriots were dispersed. They cleared away Astafyev, Baburin, Aksyuchits, and other patriots and left Zhirinovskiy in their place. They gave him a lot of money and airtime. The mission was to ensure that Zhirinovskiy mopped up all the votes which could have gone to us. But when they saw that we had collected 500,000 signatures in just five days — and we were allowed to compete just a week before the expiry of the signature-collection deadline — they realized they'd gotten it wrong. They had thought we wouldn't collect the number needed and nothing would come of it.

That was when Zhirinovskiy came to the fore. He has now lost many of his supporters. But, sadly, there are still people who like it when he says that if he came to power he would the truth is as follows [as published, words apparently dropped]: Zhirinovskiy has supported both Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin — who are responsible for all the lawlessness in Russia — on all issues. He has carried out just one of his conditions — cheap vodka is now on sale on every street corner.

That, too, is no accident, incidentally. Vodka today has become six-seven times cheaper when compared to bread. A bottle of vodka used to cost the same as 40 loaves of white bread. Now it's the same as three. I think that all of Russia's worst enemies will thank Zhirinovskiy for getting the Russian people drunk in this way.

[Bolshakov] Who would you be prepared to join in an electoral alliance?

[Zyuganov] We could rally around our party the broadest circles of Communists, nonparty people, and intelligentsia. The strong "Spiritual Heritage" movement is with us. It includes people of different orientations. But at their congress, which was attended by more than 1,000 people, they made the decision: "We support the state-patriotic position consistently followed by the Russian Communist Party, and its main program provisions." The Agrarian Party is close to us in spirit. I had thought that Rybkin would align himself with the Agrarians and that the Ryzhkov bloc would align itself with us. So far this hasn't happened....

The task facing the current authorities, however, is to do as much as they can to split the political blocs opposing them. I do not rule out the possibility that any provocations could be staged to complicate the situation and disrupt the elections in general. They are scared of open and honest elections. Consequently we all need to be very alert.

[Bolshakov] Suppose you win the elections and you and your allies form a government of national confidence. The current ruling grouping will see at first hand that power is slipping away. Won't it then dissolve parliament and introduce direct presidential rule or something of that kind — in short, won't it plump for open and no longer disguised dictatorship?

[Zyuganov] These authorities are no longer running anything in the country. Presidential edicts are being churned out — up to 100 of them are signed every week. Nobody is even able to read them, let alone implement them. But everyone knows that they do not hold good any further than the Kremlin wall. And that could be Russia's salvation. Its strength has always been its provinces and its mighty spirit. From time immemorial whenever there was trouble in Moscow, powerful men would come from the Volga or the Urals and make their decisive contribution to Russian politics.

Of course, any kind of attempt could be made. We have even prepared a document called "The Fatherland in Danger." We sent it to the Security Council, the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FSK], the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and the Defense Ministry. All of them responded to a man. It showed for the first time the condition the country is in and what the reaction could be in the event of the provocation you have mentioned.

There are 20 million unemployed in the country, 15 million starving and semistarving, and 6 million refugees. Add to that the fact that entire sectors are not working. And you will realize the explosive potential that has built up in the country.

I was recently in Stavropol. There the average net income for peasants is 111,000 rubles [R] a month. A coal-fired stove for the winter costs R1-1.2 million. That means that the average resident of Stavropol — and it is a very rich area — will not be able to afford heating. Add to that the collapse of the economy. The banking system is already shaky. And there is the lack of any proper administration, there is a power vacuum. This could have the most serious consequences.

At the same time, we have shown that if the president and his "power men" attempt to introduce presidential rule or a French-style Bonapartist dictatorship, nothing will come of it. We need to take into account the general rules governing emergency situation. I used to work on this and I have studied the experience of a number of foreign countries. So experience shows that such a dictatorship can only work under the following conditions.

First, the dictatorship is brought in by a man who has the support of half the population. Preferably two-thirds. Even under the most optimistic polls, Yeltsin's ratings are currently no higher than 10 percent.

Second, the dictatorship can work if there is a combat-capable not in the Russian Federation [as published, words apparently dropped]. Blood is currently being shed in Chechnya, where it [antecedent unclear due to dropped passage, possibly 'the Army'] has been forced to fight against its fellow citizens. And the Army is being destroyed and degraded before our very eyes and left without any strategic stockpiles.

The third condition is a strong repressive system. An attempt is currently being made to create one. But this will in no way be possible.

Fourth, a law-enforcement system. But in the Russian Federation it cannot even cope with street crime, not to mention organized crime and the mafia. So not a single one of the elements for setting up this kind of power is in place. An attempt to establish a dictatorship in Moscow would mean the disintegration of the Russian Federation. Federation components such as the Urals, the Far East, or the Volga would simply refuse to carry out the instructions of such amoral and criminal authorities. So there is no future for dictatorship. Its authority would extend no further than the Garden Ring [downtown Moscow]. I have explained this to many Western politicians, including the U.S. leadership, and when chatting to deputies at the French National Assembly, the European Parliament, and the Council of Europe. I have held talks with parliamentary delegations from 15 European countries. I think they realize the danger of such a turn of events and would not support any dictatorship by Mr. Yeltsin.

There are grounds for thinking that the United States would also not lend its support to such a scenario. President Clinton, answering a direct question from me on this score, said that Yeltsin had personally promised him that there would be no attempt to disrupt the elections. Admittedly, I told Clinton that our president is master of what he says only in the sense that he can say something and take it back later. Let's see how events develop. At any rate, it is encouraging that all the ministries and services — including the power ministries — realize that only democratic and honest elections are a proper way out of the situation and the only chance of finding a way to strengthen the country and change the situation in it for the better. Without any fighting or repression.

[Bolshakov] Desperate gestures of resistance may also be caused by fear on the part of those who are objectively to blame before the people and the law for the numerous crimes committed by them in the country since 1985. The Russian Federation press, which is linked to these circles, is now conducting a campaign against the CPRF, painting a sinister prospect of the Communists coming to power in order to take revenge.

[Zyuganov] We even stated in our program that we oppose historical revenge. Our country has fought repeatedly this century and lost 100 million people. We will not permit any further extermination of the nation in a civil war. [Zyuganov ends]

...I have known Zyuganov for a long time. Watching him from year to year, I have seen the "Zyuganov phenomenon" develop. The Communist Party in Russia is headed for the first time by someone who is Russian not only by origin but at heart. He was not shaped as a leader in the corridors of power, not as an apparatchik — although he has been through the "universities" of the party apparatus — but among the people and in the opposition which the authorities could at any moment attempt to drive underground once again, as they did in August 1991 and then in October 1993.

Zyuganov — unlike the graduates of the Industrial Academy and different party schools with extra university degrees who we had as leaders in the past — is a thinking man. He realizes that the modern Communist Party must think in terms of the 21st century and operate not in a theoretical vacuum but on a specific national territory with corresponding geopolitical parameters.

Zyuganov is a scientist. And, consequently, he does not lean toward the borrowed ideas or costly improvisations which we encountered with the dullard Khrushchev or the "philosopher" Gorbachev. Each step by the party is measured, checked, and analyzed by the country's best minds.

The CPRF's claim to power is weighty and serious, and it can no longer be ignored. Unlike many other parties, the CPRF has no leadership problem. It is ready for power and is well aware of what it is going to do when it gets it. Zyuganov has around him a superbly selected team that enjoy prestige the country — something that is recognized not only by the Russian press but by the foreign press as well. And although foreign capitals would prefer their own "democrats," with whom, as Mrs. Thatcher used to say, they could "do business," nobody there would deny Zyuganov respect and recognition.

Zyuganov is calm, assured, and confident that he is right. He knows that there has been a radical change in Russian social awareness — people are following the CPRF and placing their trust in the Communists once again. That is the guarantee of success for Zyuganov and his comrades.

While this article was being prepared for the press, the president launched his entirely unprovoked attack on the Communists. We asked the chairman of the CPRF Central Committee how he viewed this malicious attack.

[Zyuganov] We should probably thank the president for giving the Communist Party publicity — we ourselves find it hard to get on TV. He himself made it clear who is serving the regime and defrauding the people together with it, and who rejects the antipeople policy and advocates saving the country. As for the tone of malice — that is his style; the style is the man, as the wise would say. We stressed in our State Duma statement that a signal had been given to extremist forces. And we can already see how this black propaganda has started working. Against the Communist Party. Unless the gentlemen have gotten it wrong....

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## APR's Lapshin Views Elections, Landownership

*MK2410131295 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Oct 95 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Agrarian Party leader Mikhail Lapshin by Viktor Bashkin; place and date not given: "Elections as Subject Matter for a Theater of the Absurd. Agrarian Party Leader Mikhail Lapshin Argues That Russia Is Being Readied for Another 'Black Redistribution'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Bashkin] Mikhail Ivanovich, how would you assess today the election campaign jigsaw puzzle, and which place in it is taken by the Agrarian Party of Russia [APR]?

[Lapshin] It should be pointed out first and foremost that the present lineup of political forces radically differs from the previous elections that took place on 12 December 1993. [passage omitted]

The brain and political center of today's regime is the president's staff — they have developed any number of tricky election moves. The main among them is the scheme involving two "centrist" blocs intended for plowing up the entire electoral field, for dividing the political camp in accordance with new, unexpected, but actually absurd criteria. It is not a matter of leftists or rightists, liberals or conservatives, Westernists or patriots; it is rather one set of presidential supporters against another set of presidential supporters — that's all there is to it. Mr. Chernomyrdin versus Mr. Rybkin, or the other way around, whatever one would prefer. [passage omitted]

Remarkably, the "[Russia Is] Our Home" facade bears many slogans of the opposition. The trick is as old as it is sly. Totally safe for a plagiarist: He is not going to act on these slogans, but at the same time he might divert some gullible voters. [passage omitted]

Something similar has happened to "Ivan Rybkin's Bloc." It is still unclear what forces it unites, what real social sections it is going to rely on. This is yet another soap bubble inflated by the Kremlin. Something else is, however, clear: In the previous election, Ivan Petrovich Rybkin was included on our party's ticket on the urgent request of the communists, although we had certain doubts on this score. What is more, relying on his decency and political experience as a former second secretary of a CPSU oblast committee, we recommended him and, with support from other factions in the Duma, we got him elected speaker. Alas, he failed the test of power; he came to curry favor with the regime, started drifting toward the other shore. Having created "Ivan Rybkin's Bloc," he separated himself from the party.

The regime's other election ruse is to try and weaken the main representatives of the left-wing opposition — the communists and Agrarians — by stimulating a process of breaking up all opposition forces. Literally within weeks there cropped up numerous public organizations noisily hyped by the official mass media. They also extol the so-called left-wing communists, Rutskoy, Ryzhkov, and many others.

This, of course, worries us. There emerges a danger of pulling apart the left-of-center-oriented electorate using hurriedly-formed blocs. While they are most unlikely to clear the 5-percent hurdle, they may divert the votes of electorates that traditionally vote for the Agrarian Party of Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

We are entering the electoral fray as a team representative of the three components of our agrarian movement: the Agrarian Party of Russia as a political organization of peasants, the Agrarian Union as an economic body bringing together commodity producers, and the trade union of agroindustrial complex workers. Furthermore, our electoral association has been joined by rural consumers' cooperatives, numerous representatives of farmers organizations (AKKOR [Association of Peasants and Farmers Households and Agricultural Cooperatives]), the Council of Veterans of War and Labor, the armed forces and law and order agencies, the "Reserve Officers" farmers association, a number of sectoral trade unions, and so on. Thus, we have considerably strengthened our positions and occupied a firm place on the left flank of the opposition.

[Bashkin] Many people know that you tour the country a great deal, meet with various people — peasants, farmers, intelligentsia, and so on. What has stuck in your memory?

[Lapshin] During several recent months alone I went on more than one occasion to the Northern Caucasus, Chechnya, I made a trip to the Far East and Siberia. It is of course impossible, sitting in a State Duma office, to understand how the country is living, what the people are thinking about and what they want. The people, first and foremost, want peace, stability, they want to live and work in peace on their own land, to raise children. [passage omitted]

It is high time to realize that the situation cannot be resolved unless there is a radical rethinking of the policy in Chechnya. The main emphasis should be laid on restoring relations of understanding and cooperation with the Chechen people, who understand the language of friendship very well. I speak about it from the experience accumulated in Chechnya by our Agrarian Party. We have created in this republic, with the help of Chechen peasants, a strong, influential organization that is capable of having a stabilizing influence on the situation. The voice of the Agrarians is the voice of peace and cooperation. But so far we find it hard to shout down the cannons and machine guns. [passage omitted]

[Bashkin] The question of the ownership of land is perhaps in the epicenter of the election campaign today. The leader of "Our Home," Premier Chernomyrdin, has even spoken in favor of holding a referendum on the private ownership of land. What is the Agrarians' stance on this matter?

[Lapshin] We defined our stance at the time of developing and discussing our draft of a new Land Code and included it in our election program. We proceed from the constitutional provision that land can be state, municipal, and private property. That is what you should proceed from.

The modern world has developed various forms of ownership, and no one throughout the many millennia could prove which form is the most effective. We do not deny that citizens can own dacha or garden plots, have subsidiary plots, plots to build private houses or a garage. These plots of land, along with other immovable property, can be used by their owners as they see fit: they can sell them, leave them to someone, make a gift of them, and so on. But we are against the free selling and buying of agricultural and urban land, especially to foreigners. [passage omitted]

Now, regarding a referendum on the private ownership of land. We oppose it, because this could prove to be a mine planted to blow up the peasantry. Joining the electoral race, irresponsible politicians are actually prodding us into a new "Black Redistribution" [a branch of two populist bodies formed in 1879 from "Land and Liberty."] This idea is being supported not only by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, but by "the best jurist of the year," Mr. Shakhray, as well. They would be better off asking the peasants and city dwellers: Do they want another revolution?

We intend to hold a second All-Russia Rural Assembly in Moscow at the end of October so that peasants can clearly define where they stand on the private ownership of land. I think the results of this assembly will make some people think. [passage omitted]

### Duma Chairman Views Ukraine Relations, CIS

*WS2510123795 Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 20 Oct 95 p 5*

[Interview with Russian State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin, by Oleh Medvedev; place and date not given: "Ivan Rybkin: 'I Wish Our Relations Were Closer'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Medvedev] A year has passed since the Ukrainian delegation led by Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz visited Russia. However, neither the leadership of Russia's Federation Council nor the State Duma chairman have paid a return visit to Ukraine. What is the reason?

[Rybkin] The exchange of our legislative delegations is very intensive. Our legislative committees, too, cooperate very actively. As for my return visit to Ukraine, it is hard to do everything within a year. I have not visited the great majority of CIS states. However, we maintain constant contacts with Oleksandr Moroz, including telephonic contact. We discuss allissues without exception and consult.

[Medvedev] Are you satisfied with Ukrainian-Russian interparliamentary cooperation, at least on the part of the State Duma?

[Rybkin] I think our cooperation is well-established. Given that we even play soccer games between Ukrainian and Russian legislators, there is not much room for expanding our cooperation further. Scores of those games are not important, given that friendship is the real winner.

[Medvedev] The issue of [Ukraine's participation in] the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly is being actively discussed in Ukraine. Presuming that you advocate Ukraine's admission to that organization, what arguments would you voice to convince the Ukrainian side about the necessity to join the assembly?

[Rybkin] It is very hard to overcome crises all on one's own, no matter whether they are of a political, economic, or moral nature. We are friendly nations; we lived together for ages; we used to be a single people. And given that Ukraine has joined the Council of Europe and is a full-fledged member of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, it should also occupy an appropriate place in the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, as a state that has great potential. It is important because Ukraine finds it hard to live without Russia, just as Russia finds it hard to live without Ukraine. What does the Interparliamentary Assembly facilitate? It facilitates the coordination of interests. Another aspect of the organization's activities is that of drafting exemplary laws. Similar processes are going in our states and we should make efforts to prevent our respective legislation from growing further apart. We should coordinate legislation on a voluntary, respectful basis and not thrust our will on others.

[Medvedev] Are there any positive examples of coordinating enforceable acts by Ukraine and Russia?

[Rybkin] The Fifth State Duma has passed 300 laws within two years; some other 500 laws are being drafted and will be handed over as a legacy to the Sixth Duma. We do not make a secret of our legislation. Our delegations go to Interparliamentary Assembly sessions equipped with texts of adopted laws and bills. They are made available to everyone, including those who only have observer status. Sometimes, our colleagues from other CIS parliaments come to us before sessions and we give them the opportunity to become familiar with all our bills. Incidentally, we also use international experience.

[Medvedev] The State Duma has often discussed the issues of Ukrainian-Russian relations and passed such resolutions or made such moves which later met with a negative reaction in Ukraine. It is enough to mention the speech delivered in the Russian parliament by [former Crimean Supreme Soviet Chairman] Sergey Tsekov (as far as I know you did not support the idea of giving the floor to Tsekov), or numerous statements on Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet which, in fact, amount to interference in Ukraine's domestic affairs. Do you think that all the State Duma's moves were balanced and well-considered? Are you satisfied with the work of the Committee for CIS Affairs and Ties With Compatriots? Many people in Ukraine believe that both the committee and its chairman are engaged in activities that run counter to their direct functions, and instead of constructively developing Russia's ties with the CIS member-states, they work to weaken those ties.

[Rybkin] A number of documents dealing with our relations probably had an excessively emotional tinge.

However, I would like to point out the following. A very sore problem currently exists and cannot be ignored. Some 25 million Russians have found themselves far from their motherland. As you know, their living conditions differ from country to country. Take the Baltic states, for instance, where even in cities dominated by the Russian population — such as [Estonia's] Narva or Kohtla-Jarve — they do not have the right to elect their representatives to the supreme bodies of power. Certain international organizations regard this as a normal situation, which means that beyond any doubt they apply a double standard.

Speaking about our bilateral relations, I do not want to sling mud at those who left behind a legacy of tough problems for us to resolve. Those problems, indeed, are tough. However, we should preserve common sense. If we acknowledge that problems exist and await resolution, then we should also acknowledge that they cannot be resolved by banning their discussion. Neither can they be resolved by the quick temper occasionally demonstrated by members of the aforementioned committee.

We have the tough problem which awaits resolution — the problem of Crimea. We cannot turn a blind eye to it. However, it should be resolved proceeding from the formula which I have always supported: Crimea is a component of Ukraine. All decisions regarding Crimea should be well-considered and take into account the Crimean peoples' will.

There is the problem of the Black Sea Fleet. In light of the violence in Yugoslavia, this problem acquires a somewhat different aspect. Certain states are striving to join military blocs by all means. It is hard to say whether they will find happiness and success there. I would not risk predicting that they will. I do not share the opinion of those who believe that the Black Sea Fleet is exclusively Russia's property. I remember that sailor Kishka [hero of Russian-Turkish war in Crimea] was a Ukrainian from Poltava. Among the sailors protecting Sevastopol during the Crimean war were naturally both Russians and Ukrainians. Together they fought against one common enemy.

[Medvedev] Different opinions are currently voiced about the state of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Certain people even believe that the two states are in a state of "cold war." What do you think?

[Rybkin] I think that Russia's relations with Ukraine are not bad if regarded from the perspective of relations between all the European states or Russia's relations with those states. However, I am sure that our relations can be closer, and I wish they were. We should not stick to any narrow selfish nationalistic interests, many of which are fictitious. I believe that if we act proceeding from the commandmants of our fathers, grandfathers, and grand grandfathers, we will find correct resolutions to all the problems without exception.

The lives of our peoples in the transitional period are hard, very hard! Donbass and [Russia's] Kuzbass, conversion in Russia and Ukraine, Ukrainians working in Russia's Far North and Russians working in Donbass mines — those are similar problems. We will have closer political cooperation and economic ties. I do not even mention spiritual closeness because one should not mention in vain values which are very important and sacred to each of us, and constitute a sacred element of our spirituality. [passage omitted]

## ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 27 October

*LD2710065995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0647 GMT 27 Oct 95*

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 27 (Itar-Tass) - ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on the problems of the Russian insurance system.

"The insurance market could have become a ground for new financial pyramids if President Boris Yeltsin signed the State Duma-adopted Law on Amendments and Addenda to the Russian Federation Law on Insurance".

Touching upon the reasons for the Presidential veto, the newspaper's commentator points out that "the new Law inadequately protects the national market from being actively penetrated by foreign capital". The newspaper believes that "the Law-stipulated ban for companies to engage simultaneously in insuring life, property, responsibility, etc. may lead to mass bankruptcies". Insurance companies now survive only due to their universality, the newspaper points out.

IZVESTIYA on the conduct of Russian Defence and Foreign Ministers as citizens.

The newspaper's political news analyst examines the conduct of Pavel Grachev who appeared in the news in view of his attitude to court proceedings. President Boris Yeltsin recommended him to attend the court session.

Andrey Kozyrev is in the news in view of the Presidential evaluation of the work of the Foreign Ministry and the Minister personally on the eve of his visit to the U.S.

The analyst draws the attention to the conduct of the two Ministers as citizens, not officials. He criticises Grachev for lack of civic valour, and gives credit to Kozyrev for his evaluation of the situation that has developed in his relations with the President in the Russian TV programme Podrobnosti (Details) on October 25.

The writer of the article perceives elements of Boris Yeltsin's pre-election activity in his attitude to the two Ministers.

IZVESTIYA on rivalry between foreign and Russian confectionery firms.

The newspaper frontpages an article with a big headline "Chocolate wars of global dimensions are raging in Russia". The rivalry assumes rather an acute character, including political one, when patriotically-minded citizens publicly bury Western-made chocolate bars.

The writer of the article portrays the national confectionery industry which is being appropriated by Western competitors. In principle, the newspaper points out, the competition has made national chocolate producers grow wiser, so national chocolate eaters will only benefit from these chocolate wars.

TRUD on food prices in Moscow.

In an interview with the newspaper, Vitaly Morozov, Chief of the Moscow Government's Department for Food Resources, has stated that the prices of poultry meat, milk, butter, and apples in Moscow are higher than those in Washington.

Complaining that the economy intertwines with politics in the supply of Moscow with food, Morozov emphasises the insolvency of the Russian agricultural sector in providing the capital with food.

Moscow's requirement for meat is 650,000 tonnes. Regions promised to deliver only 200,000 tonnes, whereas in actual fact Moscow has received less than 100,000 tonnes. Farms in the Moscow Region sell potatoes to the capital at prices which are twice as high as the prime cost, whereas Poland offers potatoes that are 66.7 per cent cheaper.

TRUD on Public Russian Television (PRT) costs.

In an interview with the newspaper, PRT Chief Sergey Blagovolin has said that "on Channel 1 the PRT does not possess anything but a license for broadcasting. The lease costs about one million U.S. dollars a day. One hour of broadcasting on the Channel is 50 per cent cheaper than the Ostankino was for the State. The State owns 51 per cent of shares in the PRT and 49 per cent of shares are held by non-State shareholders".

IZVESTIYA on the criminogenic situation in the country.

Mark Zakharov, prominent stage director and publicist, suggests that punishments for crimes in Russia should be toughened greatly, if only for a "transitional period", for three or five years, to curb arbitrariness.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA on corruption instances in the Interior Ministry.

The newspaper runs an article headlined "A false driving license", in which it points out that the "guarantee" that a person will get a driving license is now estimated at 150-250 USD.

### 'Close Medical Observation' for Yeltsin in Nov

*AU2710105095 Paris AFP in English
1042 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Oct 27 (AFP) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin is to remain under close medical observation for the whole of November, presidential spokesman Sergei Medvedev said Friday [27 October].

However, head of the Kremlin press service Igor Ignatyev told AFP that "this does not mean the president should remain in hospital all that time."

### Grachev Taken By Surprise

*LD2710065495 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian
0600 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Responding to questions from journalists about President Boris Yeltsin's health, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who is on a visit to Washington, declared that the president's illness had come as a complete surprise to him:

[Begin Grachev recording] It took me completely by surprise. I had a meeting with him literally just before I left to come to the United States. We talked a lot. He felt fine. But evidently he was simply being very restrained in my presence about his illness and about just how tired he had become.

I can give you no more details about his illness, you know, because I know no more than you do. [end recording]

### Ministry Announces Postponement of Yugoslav Summit

*LD2710125795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1212 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Valeriy Sevryukov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 27 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — "Owing to Russian President Boris Yeltsin's state of health, the Moscow meeting planned for 31 October with Bosnia-Herzegovina presidium chairman Alija Izetbegovic, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman cannot, unfortunately, take place," ITAR-TASS was informed today by the information and press department of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

"There is agreement among the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Union Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Croatia, and also among the members of the Contact Group, that this important stage in the negotiating process should take place in Moscow," the announcement from the Russian diplomatic department says. "Accordingly, a new time for the meeting will be decided later."

### Illness 'Endangers' Balkan Summit

*LD2610211095 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy
in Russian 1900 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Russian president's illness endangers a meeting between the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, scheduled to take place in Moscow on 31 October. The possibility of the meeting has been questioned by Viktor Ilyushin, first aide to the Russian president. Our radio station has learned that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's visit to Moscow might be put off. ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin is reporting from Zagreb that Croatia expresses regret over Boris Yeltsin's illness.

[Naryshkin] We hope the Russian president will soon get better and the processes of peace settlement, in which Russia is playing a very important role, will not be damaged, Natasa Rajakovic, press secretary to the Croatian president, said today. President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia has accepted an invitation to Moscow talks. His position remains unchanged. The timing of the meeting will most likely depend on the Russian party's suggestions, Rajakovic said.

In his turn, Hasan [word indistinct], a special envoy at the Foreign Ministry of Bosnia-Herzegovina, told me today that the Bosnian government delegation is continuing to prepare for the Moscow meeting. The Bosnian diplomat said Alija Izetbegovic, head of the government delegation and chairman of the presidium of Bosnia-Herzegovina, hopes that the Moscow summit will take place on time, that is on 31 October.

[Announcer] The third party, Serbia, has not yet reacted to Yeltsin's illness and to the possibility of talks being put off. ITAR-TASS corespondent in Belgrade Ivan Ivanov learned this is because the Belgrade officials have no formal pretext to make any statements.

[Ivanov] First of all, this is because the Serb president has received no official invitation from Moscow until today. The prospective Moscow summit scheduled for 31 October was discussed with the leaders of the Croats and the Muslims a few days ago only provisionally. Local diplomats in Belgrade think the Moscow meeting will not take place, if Boris Yeltsin is not going to take part in it. Milosevic is unlikely to attend a meeting with Andrey Kozyrev, accompanied by Tudjman and Izetbegovic.

[Announcer] Moscow is expected to decide tomorrow morning whether the president's health will make the summit scheduled for 31 October possible.

### Tudjman Postpones Visit Due To Yeltsin Illness

*LD2610173495 Moscow INFORMATSIONNOYE AGENTSTVO EKHO MOSKVY in Russian 1625 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow Echo radio station has learned from informed sources in Zagreb that the visit by Franjo Tudjman, president of Croatia, to Moscow will be postponed. The visit by the President of Croatia is being postponed in connection with the illness of President of Russia Boris Yeltsin.

### China Regrets Postponement of Yeltsin Visit

*LD2710063195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0545 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Marat Abulkhatin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beijing, 27 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — China has learned with profound regret of the announcement that Russian President Boris Yeltsin has been admitted to hospital and that, because of this, his official visit to the People's Republic of China has been postponed. This was a statement made in an interview with ITAR-TASS today by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesmen commenting on the report from Moscow of the Russian head of state's illness.

Boris Yeltsin has made a great personal contribution to achieving a high degree of stability and mutual trust in Russian-Chinese relations, the Chinese interviewees noted, adding that China wishes the Russian Federation president a speedy recovery and hopes that he will then visit China.

### Grachev Meets Perry at Pentagon; Discusses Bosnia

*LD2710023195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0053 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Lebedev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington, 27 Oct [dateline as received] (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev who arrived on a visit to the United States on Thursday [26 October] discussed with his American counterpart William Perry in the Pentagon the participation by Russian servicemen in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. Grachev told journalists that discussion had concentrated, in particular, on the tasks and the composition of the Russian troops that could be sent to former Yugoslavia and on coordination of their actions and the actions of the peacekeeping contingents from other countries.

He said the subject was discussed following instructions from the U.S. and Russian presidents, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, who met on Monday in Hyde Park . "The strategy has already been defined," Grachev said. Tactical questions are still to be finalized.

The first round of talks went on for three hours at the U.S. military department. "Each side defined its position clearly and unequivocally regarding the question of how Russia could participate in the process of establishing peace in Bosnia," William Perry said after the meeting.

That is what both Russia and the United States aim at. Their positions, however, differ substantially. The businesslike negotiations somewhat smoothed but did not conclusively remove these differences. That is why, the U.S. secretary of defense said, the negotiations will continue.

Once the negotiations are over, the two countries' military leaders will head for the base of Fort Riley in the state of Kansas which will host the Peacekeeper '95 joint Russian-American maneuvers with the participation of 150 Russian servicemen who arrived in the United States a little late because of a delay to their flight due to the poor weather in Russia's Far East. Despite that, the exercises are to begin precisely on schedule, a Pentagon representative told an ITAR-TASS correspondent in a telephone interview on Thursday.

In addition, Grachev will tour the U.S. airbase of Whiteman where, under the START-I treaty, nuclear arms are being dismantled. The Russian defense minister will be able to demolish a Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile silo.

### Has Instructions To Refuse 'Auxiliary' Role

*LD2610220495 Moscow NTV in Russian 1900 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[Report by Aleksandr Gerasimov, from the "Segodnya" news program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pavel Grachev has been in the Pentagon for two hours now trying to implement the recent promises by the President of Russia about Moscow taking a real part in forcing the warring sides in Bosnia to peace.

The aims with which the Russian delegation came to Washington directly oppose the American stance. Moscow is ready today to send a division of mobile forces but will never agree to place them under NATO command.

We have learned that before the airplane of Pavel Grachev landed in America, it received a telegram confirming that it was unacceptable to fulfil only auxiliary operations even if there was complete independence in carrying them out.

What has been proposed to Russian airborne assault troops is restoration work, clearing territory of mines and reconstruction of bridges which have been destroyed.

Beginning today's talks, Pavel Grachev reiterated that the tasks which the Russian contingent could fulfil should be determined on the basis of the role which Russia plays in world politics. It seems that this role is not assessed so highly in America. [passage omitted]

Nobody in the Pentagon is reckoning on speedy results. Russian generals think that next week American military officials will come to Moscow to continue the talks. [passage omitted] [video shows correspondent on lawn, with American guard of honor behind, Grachev inspecting guard of honor]

### Russia Wants 'Key,' Not 'Secondary,' Role in Bosnia

*LD2610183395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1815 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] WASHINGTON, Oct 26 (INTERFAX) — Russia is ready to play a key part in the multinational peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, a member Russia's military delegation told INTERFAX Thursday in Washington. The delegation headed by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev had arrived here earlier this afternoon.

The delegation will discuss options for Moscow's involvement in the Bosnia operation with the U.S. department of Defense.

At the same time, the source underlined that "the degree of Moscow's influence on the warring sides in Bosnia" should be considered while determining the form of Russia's involvement.

"Russia cannot agree to the secondary functions offered by the NATO leadership," the Russian officer said. "In this peacekeeping operation, Moscow intends to take up a certain zone of responsibility in the conflict area," he added.

The source said Russia believes it is necessary to retain control of its contingent in Bosnia.

The officer said all states involved in the peacekeeping operation should create an international military and political council to exercise general political control of the operation. A joint command should direct the operation, "since it is multinational forces rather than NATO alone that are carrying out the operation."

According to the Russian military, the United States had proposed Russia take up only secondary functions in the Bosnia operation, including forwarding shipments, repairing bridges and clearing the area of mines.

Meanwhile, Moscow can expand its military presence in the Balkans, the officer said. "We are ready to bring the strength of the Russian contingent to a rapid deployment division of 10,000 to 12,000 troops. However, Washington believes that the present contingent of 1,400 Russian airborne "blue helmets" stationed in former Yugoslavia is sufficient for the role NATO offered Moscow in a Balkans settlement," he stated.

"Command of the operation may be conferred on the representative of any participating states having made the greatest contribution in this operation," he said.

"Moscow's position as to authorization of the operation remains same: it should be guided by the mandate of the U.N. security Council rather than the NATO leadership," he said.

### Ryurikov: Bosnia Peacekeeping Accord Will Take Time

*LD2610183695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1815 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 26 (INTERFAX) — Much time will be needed to resolve coordination between Russia's and NATO's military contingents in Bosnia, Russian presidential aide on international affairs Dmitriy Ryurikov believes.

"One should not dramatize the situation if Russia's and America's defense ministers fail to reach an agreement on armed forces stationing in Bosnia at their first meeting in Washington," Ryurikov said at a briefing in Moscow. "The search for concrete forms of peacekeepers' interaction in Bosnia may take much time."

A tripartite meeting of Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian leaders will begin in Moscow, Ryurikov said. The negotiation process will pass a certain stage and the issue on forces deployment will be raised only after the document on peace is signed.

Thus there is time to reach an agreement, Ryurikov said. He also reported that U.S. President Bill Clinton sent a letter to Yeltsin expressing satisfaction with the fact that "the spirit of partnership has prevailed over problems." Ryurikov expressed hope that Boris Yeltsin's answer will be of the same tone.

## 'Theses' May Underlay New Military Doctrine

*MM2610190395 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Oct-2 Nov 95 p 6*

[Article by Aleksandr Lyasko under the "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Investigation" rubric: "Will Grachev Invade the Baltic? A new Russian Military Doctrine Is Being Drawn Up at a Secret Defense Institute"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Three weeks ago KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reported, citing a senior officer of the General Staff, that the formulation of a new Russian military doctrine had begun at the Defense Ministry. Later we were able to establish that the trail of the document in question, which is being eagerly cited by military men, leads back to a man by the name of Anton Surikov, military expert at a rather closed institution called the "Independent Institute of Defense Studies" (INOBIS).

What is INOBIS? Some 30 km northeast of Moscow, if you follow the Yaroslavl highway, you will come to the city of Kaliningrad. Hidden deep within one of the city's pleasant parks is an eight-story building in pale pink brick with no signboard. If you try to get into the building the security guard will examine your documents meticulously and summon his superior. Then the superior calls the security chief, and together they ask you to explain in detail the purpose of your visit. If they are satisfied with your answers, they assign you to an escort in a severe suit that barely meets across the chest — also with no identification marks.

On the eighth floor, in an office under a portrait of Lenin, you will most likely be greeted by Mr. A. Surikov, who introduces himself as an "independent scientist." He works surrounded by powerful computers, half a dozen telephones, and a poster giving instructions on how to handle a U.S. M16 rifle. Don't be surprised if your conversation is interrupted from time to time by telephone calls from Washington, London, or Delhi. The staffer will answer the callers in good English, but with an accent betraying the training of a Soviet military instructor of the mid-eighties.

It was thanks to the assistance of this inquisitive man of science that we were able to obtain the document with the ominous title "Conceptual Theses for a Strategy for Resisting the Principal External Threats to the National Security of the Russian Federation." This work was prepared "by way of initial data for the pursuit of military-technical studies."

Let us note particularly that INOBIS is a complex organization originally founded by respected private individuals. Here are some of them: Nikolay Alekseyevich Sham, former chief of the USSR KGB Main Economic Counterintelligence Directorate; Vitaliy Khusseynovich Doguzhiyev, USSR first vice premier and minister of general machine building (that was the Soviet euphemism for the missile and space industry); Yuriy Dmitriyevich Maslyukov, formerly chairman of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee].

Every year, 1995 included, INOBIS carries out a number of studies financed by the Defense Ministry in the sphere of research into strategic nuclear weapons, the military use of space, and ABM defense. To cap it all, certain fragments of the "Conceptual Theses" bear a suspicious resemblance to remarks made by Defense Minister Grachev after his meeting with the president in Sochi. These interesting similarities and coincidences prompt the obvious thought that the text of the "Theses" contains what Grachev cannot say by virtue of his office, but which the Defense Ministry would like to make known urgently to probable allies and, equally, adversaries.

Above all, the document confirms what we have said before: It examines the question of a close military alliance with Belarus involving the deployment of "tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus, in the Kaliningrad Special Region, and on the naval vessels of the Baltic Fleet." It also proposes the siting of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in both the Northern (the border of the Kola Peninsula and the Barents Sea) and Southern (the Black Sea and Russian Federation bases in Crimea, Abkhazia, Georgia, and Armenia) theaters.

The theme of the admission of the Baltic republics to NATO is also developed in an interesting way in the "Theses." It is recognized that Russia's interests would be met by a neutral status for the Baltic republics — along the lines of Finland during the "Cold War" period. "However," the document says, "in the event that NATO embarks on admitting the Baltic republics to its membership, Russian Federation Armed Forces should be sent into the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia."

The "moral and legal justification" whereby Russia is to be absolved of its sins in connection with a possible occupation of the Baltic is particularly curious. First, the "Theses" relate, "from Russia's viewpoint, the inclusion of the Baltic republics in NATO would constitute no less a threat than, from the U.S. viewpoint, the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba once was." Second, the defense researchers believe that one ethnic group (in Estonia and Latvia) has deprived people of another nationality of their rights, and has usurped power. Therefore the noncitizens who are discriminated against are "entitled to create [their] own parallel governmental [vlastnyye] and power [silovyye] structures," and, in response to the use of coercion against them, to appeal to Russia for armed support. The Russian population of the Baltic is thus assigned the unenviable role of hostages whom the Russian Armed Forces may save by once again depriving the Baltic republics of their independence.

The authors of the "Theses" believe that the West is not likely to go to war with Russia over the Baltic. And there will not be a total blockade, if only because they value our gas exports and the possibility of thereby covering 100 billion cubic meters of the gas shortfall in Germany, Italy, and Eastern Europe. Or if the enemy takes a very strong line, we could intimidate them by the sale of nuclear missile technologies to Iran, Iraq, or Algeria. We could even form a military alliance with Iran, "within the framework of which a contingent of Russian troops and tactical nuclear weapons could be stationed on the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz."

What do the authors of the concept propose that Russia should do after it has washed its warheads in the waters of the Persian Gulf? Extend the operating life of MIRVed [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle] ICBMs to 20 years. After the year 2008, start deploying 100 ballistic missiles with six medium-power warheads each, in the version mounted on railroad flatcars. Finally, in extremis, bury the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons — because, according to the "Theses," the number of nuclear powers is going to increase steadily in any case.

That point is particularly noteworthy. The text contains references to 200 nuclear weapons belonging to Israel with a range that would reach Moscow. China is also likely to build up its nuclear missile forces. At the moment Russia, following official Foreign Ministry policy, is cooperating with America to contain the possessors of nuclear weapons in the "Third World." The document's authors believe this line will fail completely in the near future. Instead, we should sell delivery vehicles first to India (just as the Americans sold Britain the "Polaris" and "Trident" missiles for British warheads), and in the longer term to Iran and certain Arab countries.

This could mean the prospect of unfurling a nuclear umbrella over such fine men as Saddam Husayn — in the event, of course, that the "Theses" really do get incorporated in the Defense Ministry's future work plan. And they will — at the end of the text, it says in black and white: "The present document may be used in the course of formulation of the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation."

What might the immediate future of the "Conceptual Theses" be? They are expected to be used in the introductory volume to the future Russian military doctrine. In the course of 12-18 months General Staff officers will be able to come up with a whole host of appendices to them, such as an operational plan for sending troops into the Baltic republics. By 1997, this whole collection of folios could be approved by the next defense minister. After that it will become clear that local conflicts in the Caucasus and tactical nuclear strikes against NATO troop accumulations in Eastern Europe are not the last surprise that is being prepared for us by the military strategists and "independent researchers."

## Duma Urged To Ratify START-II in Agreed Form

*LD2610194495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1850 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By Arseniy Mironov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 26 (ITAR-TASS) — It is very important that the Russian State Duma ratify the Start-II nuclear arms reduction treaty in the form which was agreed with the U.S., Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin said today.

Commenting on reports that the Russian lower house of parliament will consent to ratify only an amended version of the treaty, Demurin said the treaty as it is originates from "sober analysis of objective possibilities and strategic interests of Russia".

The Foreign Ministry has sent the treaty for parliament ratification on an understanding that the U.S.' compliance with the air defence treaty is inbuilt in Start-II.

This refers to the reported intention of part of the parliament to link the ratification of Start-II to the air defence treaty.

The Start-II treaty reflects a carefully gourged [as received] balance of interests which was struck through mutual compromises, Demurin said. This was reaffirmed by presidents Yeltsin and Clinton at their recent meeting.

A State Duma spokesman told ITAR-TASS today that the ratification of Start-II had been debated in three meetings of parliamentary committees. A recent closed-door meeting of the defence committee chaired by Sergey Yushenkov had discussed the "military-strategic and economic acceptability" of ratifying the treaty.

The committee debate has not yielded any resolution, suggesting that the committee, much less the entire State Duma is far from a consensus over the ratification.

### Yushenkov Denies Attempts To Amend START II Treaty

*LD2710101995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0933 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 27 (ITAR-TASS) — Sergey Yushenkov, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defence, has categorically denied Western press reports about certain attempts by the State Duma to amend the agreed-upon text of the Russian-American START-2 Treaty.

A spokesman for the State Duma Press Service has told ITAR-TASS that the Committee on Defence, at a closed-door meeting on October 17, really discussed the problems of the military-strategic advisability abd economic acceptability of the realisation of the Treaty between Russia and the U.S. on further reductions and limitation of strategic offensive arms. However, no final recommendations were made.

This was also confirmed by Yushenkov who said that participants in the discussion "expressed various points of view on a final document about the Committee meeting but no final statement was adopted". He said in this connection that reports that had appeared in the West about the Committee's some agreed-upon stand on the issue and, still less, that of the entire State Duma were simply untactful.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin, in an ITAR-TASS interview on Friday, emphasised the importance of the State Duma ratification of the START-2 Treaty "in the form in which it had been fixed with the U.S."

Commenting on reports that Russian parliamentarians are ostensibly prepared to ratify the Treaty, provided some changes are introduced to its text, the diplomat said the Treaty in its present form "is based on a sound analysis of the objective possibilities and strategic interests of Russia".

"Presenting the START-2 Treaty to the Federal Assembly for ratification, we proceed from its being directly interconnected with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Defence Treaty," the diplomat said.

In response to a request from an ITAR-TASS correspondent to comment on the MPs' intention to link ratification of the START-2 Treaty with U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty, Demurin pointed out that "this connection is reflected in the START-2 Treaty itself".

"The Treaty reflects a thoroughly adjusted balance of interests achieved on the basis of mutual compromises," Demurin said. He recalled that this had been confirmed by President Boris Yeltsin during his recent meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton.

### Ministry Welcomes S. Pacific Nuclear Treaty Plans

*LD2610194695 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1520 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Arseniy Mironov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 26 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — Russia welcomes intentions by France, Great Britain, and the United States in the first half of 1996 to sign protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga), Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mikhail Demurin told a briefing which took place today.

A joint statement by the United States, Great Britain, and France on their intentions to sign this treaty was handed over to Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk by French ambassador Pierre Morel on Wednesday.

The diplomat recalled that Russia was the first nuclear power to sign the relevant protocols to the treaty. He stressed that the fact that other nuclear powers have joined the Rarotonga Treaty makes it possible to guarantee a really nuclear-free status for the aforementioned zone.

### Conference Examines Russia's Baltic Security Role

*LD2610231895 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] European security is being discussed at an international conference in Vilnius. Speaking about the European security one must also remember the security of the Baltic region, Danish Defense Minister Hans Haekkerup said opening the international conference today on the issues of Baltic security.

The danish defense minister urged not to ignore Russia's role in the architecture of the European security, although, according to him, one cannot speak about the expansion of NATO without thinking about the Baltic countries.

Members of Seimas, Lithuanian and foreign politicians, defense specialists, and representatives from international organizations arrived to the conference organized by the Lithuanian parliament and the North Atlantic Assembly to hold discussions. In his address to the conference, Ceslovas Jursenas, chairman of the Lithuanian Seimas, spoke about Lithuania's efforts to integrate into political, economic, and defense structures of Europe.

Although Russia is important, it is not an indispensable condition with regard to the security of the Baltic countries, Albinas Januska, secretary of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, said.

He expressed his surprise that the world can no longer speak about the security of the Baltic states without mentioning Russia. Should we then draw a conclusion that after democracy had taken root in Russia we would no longer have to fear anybody and therefore stop aspiring for NATO membership, Albinas Januska asked the European politicians present at the conference.

He reiterated once again that membership in EU and NATO was the priority of Lithuanian foreign policy. If Western politicians have decided to group the countries for membership in the alliance, then there is no doubt they will create new seats of insecurity, the Foreign Ministry secretary said. He stressed that while remembering the history of their own country, the people of Lithuania are very sensitive about the possibility that the West may once again sacrifice them for the sake of Russia's interests.

The Lithuanian politicians will aspire at the negotiations with NATO that the invitation to join the alliance would be handed in to all the applicants at the same time, although not all of them would be actually accepted simultaneously, Baltic News Service reported.

### U.S. Envoy, Yeltsin Aide Cited on Summit Outcome

*MK2710125395 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 Oct 95 p 2*

[Article by Dmitriy Gornostayev: "General Conclusions. The Kremlin and White House Paint Results of Yeltsin-Clinton Meeting in a Rosy Hue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Official Russian Federation and U.S representatives continue commenting on the results of the meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton. As always, the Americans were first to react to the press reactions: U.S. Ambassador in Moscow Thomas Pickering met with journalists an entire day before the press conference given yesterday by Dmitriy Ryurikov, aide to the Russian Federation president on international policy.

In principle, much as was expected, both described the Hyde Park talks in rather upbeat tones. A spirit of partnership and cooperation was named as the main result. That would be a good result as far as meetings between the Kremlin and the White House incumbent are concerned at any other time, but not today.

It did prove possible to reach an agreement, which is relatively significant but very general and in principle incomprehensible, on Russia's part in the operation in Bosnia. It is now becoming clear, however, that the details that are supposed to be harmonized today by the heads of the two countries' military departments, Pavel Grachev and William Perry, are the object of wide-ranging differences. According to Pickering, the American side is quite firm in the belief that there should be a single operational command and that it should be, naturally, NATO command. Ryurikov, on the other hand, echoed Yeltsin in stating that the Russian troops could not be under NATO orders. In his words, neither side is in a hurry to compromise. Furthermore, the Americans' view of the zones of responsibility in Bosnia is very complex. Nevertheless, both Pickering and Ryurikov asserted that the two sides' positions are in no sense immutable.

Taking a question from NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's observer, Ryurikov said that in the course of the meeting Clinton was handed Russian proposals on the problem of flank limits under the CFE Treaty. "Clinton expressed understanding of Russia's approach. A compromise on this matter is in sight, but we have not gotten the final answer." Ryurikov explained this by saying that expert opinion was not yet available.

Thus Moscow does not seem to have won in an unofficial trading session with START II offered instead of the CFE Treaty. It is true that Clinton received no guarantees that START II is going to be ratified, only Yeltsin's assurances. So these two important questions still remain unresolved.

Nor was Yeltsin's meeting with Chirac forgotten. Judging from what Ryurikov said, the French president expressed readiness to heed Russia's anxiety over NATO expansion. And the discussions in Paris about European security and a Bosnian settlement did in fact play a role in the Hyde Park talks. Although the question of NATO expansion, which needed to be discussed in detail primarily with the American president, was also touched upon only in general terms.

### Lawmakers Seen Stalling on Bosnia Compromise

*MK2710125295 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 27 Oct 95 p 1*

[Report by Pavel Felgengauer under the "Situation" rubric: "Grachev, Perry Bring Up the Rear in the Partnership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Several days ago President Yeltsin finished his successful, if not triumphant trip to the United States. A partnership was established for all eternity, reporters were pleased, Clinton was publicly shedding tears of mirth. But the program of "people's" diplomacy was not completed — last week news agencies had reported an extra presidential wish: "If I am invited, I would like to attend the 'Peacekeeper '95' joint Russian-American maneuvers."

But the president was not invited. A clearly distressed American general explained this as follows: "The president is expecting an invitation, but there is nothing we can do about it. The start of the maneuvers has already been put off for several days at the Russian side's request so that General Grachev can have time to visit Kansas after he has dealt with MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Moscow on the 25th."

President Yeltsin's words about eternal friendship and an unshakable partnership would have sounded even more convincing, had they been spoken against the backdrop of Russian-American military patrols across Kansas fields, not at Roosevelt's country house. Naturally, Grachev did not have to wait long for a punishment to be meted out. Instead of a trip to showcase maneuvers, something any general would relish, he was tasked with sitting down at the negotiating table with William Perry to draw up a mutually acceptable format for Russian participation in a large-scale peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and to agree on the format of the operation itself in the bargain.

At the General Staff, Grachev's assignment is seen as absolutely hopeless. Thomas Pickering, U.S. ambassador to Russia, who participated in the Hyde Park summit, confirmed for the press this week that what is contemplated for Bosnia is peace enforcement, not a classic peacekeeping operation, which, naturally, calls for an effective single command. That is to say, multinational forces must be ready for full-scale combat operations to destroy anyone who may breach the future agreement; moreover, the decision on where and whom to strike, and how severely, must be made single-handedly by U.S. General Joulwan, NATO commander, Europe, possibly, taking account of the NATO Council's view.

Naturally, Russia will be doing its utmost during the defense ministers' talks, the peace conference on Bosnia, and UN Security Council meetings not to give the NATO generals a free hand in the Balkans. In particular, Moscow has proposed that a Russian deputy be assigned to the American commander to prevent NATO from delivering strikes exclusively against the Serbs when the Muslims or Croats are to blame or when all sides are equally responsible. At the same time, the question of the specific forms of the Russian contingent's subordination is not that important, and some preliminary agreements may be reached even during the current meeting between Grachev and Perry.

Despite serious differences, a general Russian-American compromise on Bosnia would probably have been possible had the ultimate decision rested with the executive authorities alone. The U.S. Congress, however, is ready to earmark funds and to allow the use of forces only if American generals are in command of the overall operation. This would be unacceptable for most Russian legislators, who have to authorize the dispatch of extra troops (the Federation Council) and, possibly, put up extra funds (the Duma).

Still, if the talks fail, the presidents will have had nothing to do with it. They did their utmost in order to achieve success, but the military ministers will have let them down. In the end, it is the Russian-American-Balkan "party of war" — the best cliche invented by Andrey Kozyrev during his five years in office — that should be blamed for everything.

### Ambassador Pickering Briefs Russian Press on Summit

*MM2610160295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (Weekend Edition) in Russian 27 Oct 95 p 2*

[Report by Anatoliy Shapovalov: "The Devil Is in the Details"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A press conference that Thomas Pickering, U.S. ambassador to the Russian Federation, conducted on Wednesday evening with typical American energy and brilliance, provided a substantial supplement to and clarification of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's stay in the United States and his meetings and talks with Bill Clinton.

His statement and his answers to Russian journalists' questions (let us note that T. Pickering has just come back from Washington, where he was involved in providing support for the two leaders' contacts) touched on all aspects of the summit meeting, but the Bosnian problem should be highlighted, since it was the subject of the main attention at Boris Yeltsin's talks with the U.S. President.

The two presidents, the ambassador noted, did much work. The United States respects Russia's peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia. The presidents discussed this problem in principle, without going into the details. The details are to be examined at the weekend by the two countries' defense ministers.

Returning to this repeatedly, T. Pickering explained that it is no use putting the cart before the horse. After all, we do not quite have peace in Bosnia yet. A peace agreement still has to be achieved. But even if it is concluded, the center of gravity could shift from the conference table to the battlefield.

The ambassador pointed out that the two presidents had instructed their defense ministers to discuss the details, in particular whether the Russian troop contingent should be under NATO command. But T. Pickering made it clear that the devil is in the details, so let us not anticipate events.

In his opinion Russia could play an extremely important role both within and outside the NATO framework. It is the Russian Federation's choice. NATO expansion (and I believe, the ambassador noted, that this unique process will go ahead) is not the only thing. Discussions are currently in progress on the role of the OSCE, the EU, the Council of Europe — that is to say, European security architecture is at issue. So work should continue in all salients. You know the saying: You can't see the wood for the trees. We now have an opportunity to see the wood, and even better, both the wood and the trees.

T. Pickering noted that he was very interested in B. Yeltsin's speeches in the United States and made it clear that we should not attach too much significance to differences in our leaders' views. The main thing is that, while discussing complex problems and reflecting national interests, they demonstrated the capacity to find points of contact and achieve progress in moving U.S.-Russian relations forward.

The American ambassador also had to answer blunt questions on how U.S.-Russian relations will develop if the U.S. Congress and the State Duma get restive.

That must be decided, the ambassador replied, by our peoples, through elections whose results will determine the formation of new governments. That, basically, is the meaning of democracy.

This question was also put to him: Although you are not the U.S. President's press spokesman, all the same, what made Clinton laugh so infectiously?

Our President, the ambassador explained, has an excellent sense of humor, which is one of the best qualities for people who move in public circles to have. What made him laugh was not only the Russian president's words, but also his face and gestures toward the U.S. mass media. B. Yeltsin was smart, and it was appreciated.

Since you did your bit to support the summit meeting, could you, the journalists wondered, answer a tricky question: Did Clinton ask Yeltsin to let Kozyrev stay on as foreign minister?

I can't even drop a hint, the ambassador said. I hope you'll understand. I will only note that the secretary of state indicated the personal respect he feels for Kozyrev. I think Christopher expressed our position accurately.

Near the end of the press conference T. Pickering was informed of the Russian Foreign Ministry statement concerning the upcoming meeting in Moscow between A. Izetbegovic, S. Milosevic, F. Tudjman, and B. Yeltsin. This is a positive development, the ambassador said, and the U.S. President supports such a meeting.

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### Paper Plays Down Results of Yeltsin Trips

*MM2610154595 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 7*

[Article by Vasiliy Safronchuk, deputy UN secretary general 1987-1992 and retired ambassador: "Who Was Conducting in Hyde Park? The Luggage Befits the Trip"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Let us assume that when he crossed the ocean 20 October the Russian president was guided by the best of intentions: to take part in the special anniversary session of the General Assembly, and stop off in Paris on the way and receive the support of the French president on the Bosnian question. To meet with President Clinton in New York and persuade him that Russia should play a proper role in the Balkans and be an equal partner in reaching a Bosnian settlement.

Let us see to what extent he has succeeded in all of this. Yeltsin's 24-hour stopover in Paris and his two meetings with Jacques Chirac seem to have borne fruit. As Yeltsin himself reported at a joint news conference, the positions of Russia and France on the Bosnian problem fully coincide, and the French president supported his proposal for a meeting of representatives of the sides in the Bosnian conflict in Moscow. Admittedly, the French president did not confirm this himself, but the mass media close to him observed that the Moscow meeting will take place if all sides in the conflict and President Clinton agree to it. Thus the understanding reached currently amounts to an equation with two unknown quantities. In any case, there was no need to go to Paris in order to find out Chirac's opinion on this subject. When Chirac felt the need to persuade the Russian president not to worry about NATO's air strikes on Serb positions in August he did this without leaving the Elysees Palace. He simply called Yeltsin. It is unclear to what extent the Russian president managed to convince Jacques Chirac not to expand NATO by moving eastward. The future will reveal this. We have heard nothing from the lips of Chirac himself. By and large, everyone remarked that, unlike our president, the French president was unusually restrained at the news conference and did not make any promises.

It cannot be ruled out that Jacques Chirac had an interest in Yeltsin's visit to Paris. A few days ago France was shaken by a powerful strike by 5 million civil servants protesting cuts in budget allocations for social needs. The inhabitants of Paris and other French cities are living in fear of Islamic extremists, who are committing one act of terrorism after another. The country is undergoing an acute government crisis in connection with the corruption charges against Prime Minister Alain Juppe. Finally, the world community is putting enormous pressure on France in connection with the series of nuclear tests it is conducting. It was necessary to deflect the attention of the French from all these unpleasant things, and the visit of the Russian president could not have been more opportune.

As for the Russian president's stay in New York, this will scarcely leave its mark in history. Along with the other 165 heads of state and government he gave a five-minute address which contained nothing new. He promised support for the United Nations on Russia's part, and complained about the fact that the United Nations has found itself sidelined by NATO's Bosnian military operation. Yesterday's meeting between the Russian president and UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali left a painful impression. The ostentatious kissing and embracing with a man who gave the go-ahead for the bombing raids and the artillery and rocket fire against Serbian civilian population centers went far beyond the customary protocol in such circumstances. Yeltsin informed the UN secretary general that Russia intends to send its contingent to Bosnia as part of the multinational forces, but Russia will operate independently and the Russian contingent will not be subordinate to the NATO command. Butrus-Ghali, a pretty knowledgeable man, realises that this will depend not so much on Moscow's wishes as on the stance of NATO countries, particularly the United States.

The meeting with Clinton at F. Roosevelt's Hyde Park estate near New York did not result in much either. Following a meeting with A. Kozyrev two days before this meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned that Moscow should not expect the U.S. stance on the terms of the Russian contingent's participation to change following Yeltsin's meeting with Clinton. And one of the President's aides said bluntly on the eve of the meeting that it would not be a "breakthrough" but simply the next — the third — meeting between the two presidents. Our president's aides should have warned him that Clinton has to take Congress into account on this issue, and that the U.S. Congress has a far greater weight in foreign policy affairs than our Duma does. Meanwhile the U.S. Congress, in which the majority belongs to the Republican Party in opposition to Clinton, made it clear to the President that it would only approve appropriations for a Bosnia operation under the full control of U.S. generals.

Neither the U.S. nor the Russian press predicted any "failures" in the talks between the two presidents. The only thing that was said was that they would be difficult and would scarcely resolve all the controversial problems, and that there would not be any breakthroughs there in terms of overcoming existing differences of opinion. The Russian president's press secretary also said this, incidentally. So Yeltsin was unnecessarily ironic about the press's pessimistic predictions. These predictions have been entirely confirmed, and the results of the meeting, no matter how they may have been embellished by the two presidents, are modest to say the least. The artificial optimism of the two presidents is clearly intended for internal consumption and can be attributed to campaign considerations.

So just what was achieved during the third meeting between the Russian and U.S. presidents? B. Clinton and B. Yeltsin have agreed that the Russian Armed Forces will participate in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. But there had been agreement on this before. The stumbling block is the question of the configuration and command of the multinational forces, the way in which the Russian troops will be integrated within the forces' composition, and who will command them. The proposal made by the Russian side to rotate the command of the operation between Russian and American generals was not accepted. The presidents instructed Defense Minister Grachev and Defense Secretary Perry to hold week-long oconsultations on this problem and come up with a solution. This is apparently a matter for the military, and not for presidents. That is what Yeltsin said. But the ministers are scarcely likely to achieve what the presidents failed to achieve. This is a political question, not a military one.

The idea of the Russian contingent's being autonomous and independent of NATO and stationed on the Serb side of the demarcation line between the Serb forces and the forces of the Muslim-Croat confederation is in the air. The NATO forces will be stationed on the other side. Incidentally, the Bosnian Serbs are proceeding on the basis of this assumption. The Serb Republic Assembly has already agreed to the stationing of Russian and Ukrainian troops on its side. Certain political analysts believe that, if this idea is accepted, then a situation of confrontation between two military forces emerges which very much resembles the one that existed at the center of Europe during the Cold War years. This time it will not be the Warsaw Pact that will be opposing NATO but a weakened and isolated Russia, whose only allies will be the Serbs.

As for the other "achievement" at the talks — Clinton's agreeing to support Russia's request to ease the so-called flank restrictions for Russia ensuing from the treaty on limiting troops and conventional weapons in the center of Europe — the agreement of the other parties to the treaty is required for this. Nor can the agreement on concluding a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty be considered any kind of a breakthrough inasmuch as four nuclear powers — the United States, Russia, Britain, and France have already committed themselves to this.

The meeting between B. Yeltsin and B. Clinton has demonstrated graphically once again that the removal of ideological differences of opinion between Russia and the United States at the price of the destruction of the Soviet socialist system has not eliminated the profound contradictions between them ensuing from the different geopolitical and economic interests of the two countries. Nor have Russia's unilateral concessions to the United States in domestic and foreign affairs helped remove these differences. Those people who hoped to find a place in the sun for Russia by relinquishing positions and sacrificing its vitally important interests have made a flagrant miscalculation.

The Hyde Park meeting between Clinton and Yeltsin is symbolic. The owner of this estate, Franklin Roosevelt, a sick man, left the United States twice during World War II in order to meet with Stalin in Tehran and Yalta. Other venues were proposed to Stalin, but he rejected them, citing pressure of work. The current Russian president goes to meet the young and healthy U.S. President in Hyde Park. This shows how great the distance is between the Soviet Union then and Russia today. It is embarrassing even to talk about the distance between the two leaders.

...Twenty-five heads of state and government did not go to New York for the anniversary session because they had more urgent things to do at home. They included Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, President E. Shevardnadze of Georgia, and others. But the president of a country in which there is a war going on, which is going through the most difficult period in its history, which is experiencing a must acute political and economic crisis, and which is preparing for elections, deemed it possible to go abroad for almost a week.

One involuntarily comes to the conclusion that either the president is essential in the country, or else the president does not need the country. The question also arises of how much the president's trip across the ocean cost. Evidently a great deal in rubles [R] and in dollars. But we will never find out about that. Meanwhile, a few days ago the Duma adopted a decision to raise the minimum wage by as much as R5,000 a month — to R60,000 a month.

## Ministry Regrets U.S. Decision on Embassy in Israel

*LD2610204895 Moscow INTERFAX in English*
*1901 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 26 (INTERFAX) — The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin expressed regret Thursday with the recent decision of the U.S. congress to move the American embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

At a Moscow briefing he said that whether the decision is enforced or not, its very adoption by a country which co-chairs together with Russia the Mideastern peace process can complicate the settlement.

According to the senior diplomat, the decision does not conform with the mandate of the Madrid peace conference under which the future of Jerusalem should be a subject of direct Palestinian-Israeli talks on the final status of Palestinian territories.

Demurin confirmed the unchanging approach of Russia to the matter. Jerusalem is the center of three world religions and under any circumstances all believers should have free access to the sacred places in it, Demurin said. Besides, Russia views East Jerusalem as part of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and does not recognize its annexation.

"Russia is ready to help the sides find a mutually acceptable solution to the entire set of problems related to Jerusalem," the spokesman said.

He hoped that the United States would refrain from steps concerning Jerusalem that could worsen the atmosphere of the Mideastern peace process.

## No Kiev Visit if Black Sea Fleet Issue Unresolved

*LD2610182895 Moscow INTERFAX in English*
*1814 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 26 (INTERFAX) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin will obviously not be able to visit Kiev while the "very serious and important" issue for Russia of the Black Sea Fleet remains unresolved, Russian Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Dmitriy Ryurikov told a news conference in Moscow Thursday.

Speaking about Russian-Ukrainian relations, Ryurikov compared them to the relations between Russia and the United States. "Both here and there we have moot points but they do not define the nature of our bilateral relations which have a large safety margin," he said.

Ryurikov confirmed that Yeltsin plans to pay an official visit to Brazil in April 1996 and expects to meet with South African President Nelson Mandela in Moscow in the winter.

Ryurikov denied that during the recent Russian-U.S. summit in Hyde Park near New York City U.S. president Bill Clinton asked Yeltsin to leave Andrei Kozyrev in charge of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The presidents did not talk about Kozyrev, he said.

### Unilateral Seizure of Caspian Sea Assets Rejected

*LD2610191895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1729 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 26 (INTERFAX) — Russia rejects any unilateral measures to seize areas of the Caspian Sea and the attempts of several non-Caspian states to interfere in the normal process of consultations among the five Caspian countries, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin declared at a briefing in Moscow Thursday.

The Russian side "does not support the idea to divide the Caspian Sea," he underscored.

Five nations border the Caspian Sea, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.

"We are in favor of preserving the Caspian Sea's present status as an inter-continental reservoir, not comprising the national territory of any Caspian-bordering states and therefore open for equal utilization on the part of any of them through common consent," Demurin said.

### Kozyrev: Russia Seeks Membership in WTO

*LD2610200995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1937 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By Valeriy Sevryukov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 26 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia seeks membership of the World Trade Organisation [WTO], Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said today.

He said the integration of Russia, already a member of the International Monetary Fund, in major international business cooperation structures is irreversible.

Meeting World Bank President James Wolfensohn today, Kozyrev said Russia in its quest for integration also counts on support from the World Bank.

Russia should be seen not only as a country in need of help but also as a helper to others already today and especially in the future, Kozyrev said.

He described such a vision as "investment in tomorrow".

Wolfensohn, who had already visited Moscow, Nizhniy Novgorod and Vladimir, said his three-day tour was a first-hand look at the progress of Russia's industrial reform and the conversion programme.

He said the leadership of the World Bank is sure of the need for assisting Russia in these endeavours.

### U.S. Journalist Interviewed on Aldrich Ames

*MM2710114095 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 95 p 6*

[Interview with American journalist Pete Erli by Vladimir Snegirev, date and place not given: "Russian Intelligence Owes CIA $2 million. Interview With the Man Who Knows Everything Or Almost Everything About the Superspy Aldrich Ames" — first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sentenced to life imprisonment for spying for the USSR and Russia, the ranking CIA staffer Aldrich Ames is in jail. But within a year, America has seen the publication of several books recounting the life of the most highly paid spy in the history of the special services. But the most detailed and sensational book is still being written. Its author, the well-known American journalist Pete Erli [name as transliterated], promises to astound readers by revealing a whole raft of fascinating secrets. Following the agent's trail, Pete has already visited Moscow twice, where he was received by many foreign intelligence veterans. The other day he gave an exclusive interview to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

### Agent on His Bunk

[Snegirev] You are said to have spent more than 50 hours talking to Ames in jail. And one on one, without any prying ears. If that is true, what are the guys from the U.S. Special Services getting their money for?

[Erli] Yes it is true. It is a long story. When Ames was locked up he expressed a desire to meet with correspondents — simply meet with them and say "hello," no interviews. The FBI was very upset when it found out. The FBI informed the CIA of its ban. The CIA informed the prisoner's lawyer and Ames himself but forgot to warn the prison governor. It was a typical bureaucratic foul-up. When I asked the governor for a meeting, he said "Why not." I met with Ames at night and we spent a very long time talking. Until the CIA and FBI guys got wind of it. But by then it was too late.... He had proved to be exceptionally talkative.

[Snegirev] And what did your friend's talkativeness indicate — a desire to justify himself in the eyes of society, a desire for publicity, a desire to continue his work of destroying the CIA?

[Erli] All of those things. He wants to remain a celebrity. At the same time, he never stops talking about the need to reorganize the intelligence service, considering the organization's staff too cumbersome and dangerous. He admitted to me that he had never been procommunist, but nonetheless he had great respect for the KGB officers with whom he came into contact.

As he saw it they were two separate worlds — politics and intelligence. Ames focused exclusively on the latter. He was convinced that both the KGB and the CIA were too huge and that U.S. intelligence was fooling everyone. The two enemy organizations were mainly involved in tracking down spies within their own ranks. This has nothing to do with obtaining serious information. Ames believes that the special services should employ a very restricted range of specialists involved in collecting and analyzing really important strategic information. He is also confident that the Langley leaders have never told the truth. For instance, the CIA was perfectly well aware that militarily the Soviet Union was not as strong as the White House had always told the world it was. The politicians wanted more appropriations to develop the military-industrial complex, and the intelligence service went along with that.

[Snegirev] Let's talk about the agent's wife — Rosario — who got a five-year sentence. Did you try to meet with her? Was she sociable too? Did she hope for leniency?

[Erli] Rosario is very upset, very.... She was never a spy. Mrs. Ames is convinced she was imprisoned only because she came from Colombia and because Washington was venting on her its anger at her husband. Yes, she is very bitter. And so far I have not heard anyone wanting to release her early. Their six-year-old son is living with Rosario's mother in Colombia.

[Snegirev] Have you heard about any attempts by Russia — through third countries, say — to provide material support for the boy and give heart to Ames himself?

[Erli] Yes, judging by everything, he is expecting such help. Rosario, conversely, does not want the Russians to have any hand in the boy's fate or in her own life — she is scared this will lengthen her stay in jail.

But, on the other hand, there are also people in Russia whom the United States would like to support materially. For instance, the families of those agents who had worked in your country for the CIA and were discovered and shot. There is no official mechanism for transferring money. There are no guarantees that our dollars, sent as aid, would not be confiscated by your state.

[Snegirev] How is he passing his time in jail? Whom does the spy share a cell with? Does he work?

[Erli] He is almost totally isolated from other prisoners. All his correspondence is monitored — with the exception of letters to his lawyer. He is only allowed to meet with his sister. He reads a lot — sometimes two books a day. He is not allowed to work. I tried to send him some articles from Russia to allow him to practice his Russian, but the CIA prohibited it.

[Snegirev] Wouldn't other inmates like to get even with the "traitor"?

[Erli] It would be a major mistake to think that patriotically motivated prisoners are thinking only of revenge. On the contrary. The inmates hate the state which has put them behind bars, and they are sympathetic toward Ames. They like his brains and his erudition. Ames has helped some of his unfortunate neighbors to properly draw up their appeals — that is valued very highly inside.

[Snegirev] Has he come to terms with being condemned to live out his life in jail? Or is he perhaps hoping for a miracle? Is he perhaps hoping to eventually be exchanged for an American spy captured in Russia?...

[Erli] Every prisoner lives on hope — my client is no exception. But he is also very well aware of two things. The CIA will never agree to pardon him. Unfortunately, Russia made haste to shoot the agents he once betrayed — consequently, there are simply no options available for an equal exchange.

### Who "Betrayed" Ames?

[Erli] There is quite a widespread story in Russia that the unmasking of Ames was the result of a betrayal. Given the particular value of this agent, only a very limited range of top officers in Russian foreign intelligence would have known about him. That, clearly, is where the CIA's "mole" is to be found. Even such a major specialist as General Nikolay Leonov, who long headed the U.S. department at the First Main Directorate [of the KGB], recently told a KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent openly: "Ames was 'blown' in Moscow." And I have previously heard other intelligence veterans whispering that for many years there has been a pretty important person somewhere who is working for the Americans.

As for our hero, no, he does not believe he was betrayed. Having studied this case in some detail, I do not believe it either. The key to unraveling the secret of his downfall, I believe, was the checks into his bank accounts, which revealed that the CIA staffer's spending was clearly out of line with his declared income. He was spending $30,000 a month on his credit cards, yet his annual salary was just $70,000.

Ames blames himself for his downfall, as well as the Lubyanka, which in 1986 clearly moved too quickly to arrest and eliminate the people in Moscow he had fingered — which immediately alerted the Americans. The people in the First Main Directorate who were in contact with him tried to reassure the agent by telling him that the decision had been made at Politburo level.

[Snegirev] Yes, from the standpoint of common sense such hasty punitive action is hard to understand. Although, who knows.... Everything with the special services is so complicated. After all, we know, for instance, that alongside the people who were executed after being fingered by Ames there are also others who have not been harmed at all, even though Ames in his reports unambiguously called them American agents as well. Perhaps certain operatives were not just double but triple agents?... Alright, that's all in the realm of conjecture. I would like to ask you something else — what have you learned about the operations undertaken by Moscow to provide a cover for its CIA source?

[Erli] There were a great many of them. The KGB spared no effort to lay a false trail for the Americans. Remember the fuss about the incident when a Russian blonde got into the CIA station at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow after seducing a Marine sergeant? A typical KGB "smokescreen." And the defection to Russia of our intelligence operative Edward Lee Howard....

[Snegirev] Some people are inclined to believe that the defection of the high-ranking First Main Directorate officer Vitaliy Yurchenko was one such cover-up operation — but there is still a lot about that incident that is unclear. He defected to the Americans, spun them some long yarn, and then suddenly changed his mind and came back home. Everyone thought that he would at least be tried, but Yurchenko was not even dismissed from the intelligence service.

[Erli] Yes, I have read investigative articles about the case. The incident did indeed cause a big fuss and has even become the subject of a whole string of books in our country whose authors are convinced that Yurchenko was a double agent. But Ames has his own explanation for why Kryuchkov took the defector back.

[Snegirev] Why?

[Erli] Possibly the reason why Yurchenko decided to go back was the information he had gleaned in the course of his debriefing. After all, when people spend a long time asking you about something, you too can draw certain conclusions from the way the questions are asked, can't you?

[Snegirev] Yes, and if you consider that the American operatives interrogating the defector included the Russian specialist Aldrich Ames, your theory looks simply intriguing.

[Erli] There is one other amusing detail of which you are probably unaware. Ames not only passed on to the KGB everything that Yurchenko told the Americans, but he even gave them the phone number of the house where the defector was being held. So, if they wanted to, his Moscow colleagues could have phoned Vitaliy and had a nice chat with him. Maybe they did.

[Snegirev] Moscow presumably had some measures in place in the event of the superspy's being caught. For instance, did they discuss with him the option of his defecting to Russia?

[Erli] He was offered a tract of land near Moscow for a dacha and was even shown a photo of the site. But Ames himself said that he would like to spend the rest of his life in Bogota, where he had acquired some fine real estate — an apartment, a ranch, and even a private beach. As far as a defection plan is concerned, no, I have not heard about one. Maybe they're working on one now?

### What He Was Paid For

[Snegirev] His remuneration, going by press reports, was $2.5 million. Did the agent ask for that amount or did Moscow itself display unprecedented generosity?

[Erli] Ames told me that he had never discussed a price for his information. When he gave your guys his famous list of Russians working for the United States, the KGB immediately offered him $2 million. He received the money in separate payments, mainly left in dead drops. He subsequently earned another $2 million, but was unable to collect that money.

[Snegirev] Ames himself has asserted in some interviews that he did serious damage to his country....

[Erli] Officially the CIA quotes the following facts — 10 people were arrested as a result of being fingered by Ames and several hundred operations planned against the USSR and Russia collapsed. You can grasp the true value of the man's activity by recalling the fantastic rewards he got from Moscow. Clearly, nobody in the entire history of espionage has ever gotten money like that.

[Snegirev] He wrecked several hundred operations! Could you mention just one example?

[Erli] Ames once wrecked a very costly plan aimed at planting a clever device to bug conversations in the Lubyanka.

[Snegirev] It is said that after August 1991 Aldrich Ames worked in a special group inside the CIA whose aim was to destroy Russian foreign intelligence. It would be interesting to know a few details about the work of that group. For instance, did it inspire the numerous speeches and articles (or some of them) against the KGB which flourished at the time in our mass media?

[Erli] Yes, he admitted to me that the group was tasked with plunging a knife into the heart of state security. The Langley leaders had chosen what they saw as the best method to win this battle — they did everything to ensure that KGB officers themselves destroyed their own system from within. Nobody apart from the CIA bosses knows what actions were provoked from outside and which ones arose naturally, since there is no doubt that the Russian special services were in need of reform.

[Snegirev] But, as many people in your country have stated, the CIA too is now in need of reform. Has anything changed within the organization in the wake of the unmasking of the "spy of the century"?

[Erli] A few people have been fired. But in terms of the big picture nothing much has changed. And nothing will.

[Snegirev] In other words, this also means that the secret war between the two intelligence services goes on? And it is entirely possible that a "mole" of ours is currently digging away somewhere on Capitol Hill or at Langley, while one of yours is quietly strolling around the Kremlin or the offices at the Lubyanka?

[Erli] Of course! Pay attention to the following detail. John Walker, who was recruited by your intelligence service, worked for the KGB from 1967 through 1985 (incidentally, I believe he did far more damage to the United States), and two weeks before his arrest you got your hooks into Ames, who "worked" for you for the next nine years. In other words, there was an unbroken chain. It is the same story with the CIA's successes — they got Tolkachev, then Gordiyevskiy, then Polyakov.... It is a continual process. Walker, who has already served 10 years of his life sentence, likes to joke that spies are very important for maintaining peace.

## Political Issues

### 'Ischaemic Cardiac' Illness Sends Yeltsin to Hospital

#### Ilyushin Reports Yeltsin's Condition

*LD2610213095 Moscow NTV in Russian 1600 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[Report from the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president's aides and his administration staff have assembled in the Kremlin once again. Our correspondents on duty in the Kremlin are on the line. The president's aide Viktor Ilyushin is sharing the latest information with them:

[Ilyushin, addressing press conference] One of the latest conversations I had was with Sergey Pavlovich Mironov, head of the medical center. According to information from the doctors, Boris Nikolayevich's ischaemic cardiac illness has become exacerbated. It is probably a continuation of what happened during the summer.

Boris Nikolayevich is an indefatigable man; therefore, he pared to the bone the time for his recuperation, but I have to admit to you that the regime, the burden which has been on Boris Nikolayevich's shoulders recently in connection with his fleeting visits to Paris and New York probably left their mark in the short time, and the rather difficult flight, the intensive talks, tense expectations, and, naturally, I would say, the heavy psychological, moral, and physical burdens — all of these probably left their mark; and unfortunately, before the trip, Boris Nikolayevich had a slight cold, and all of that together led to such an unfortunate outcome, I repeat.

Talking to the heads of the medical center and doctors who are working with Boris Nikolayevich now, I have to say that the president's condition seemingly does not give rise to great optimism [V razgovore c rukovoditelyami meditsinskogo tsentra i s vrachami kotoryye rabotayut seychas s Borisom Nikolyevichom, ya mogu skazat chto bolshogo optimizma, vidimo, sostoyaniye prezidenta ne vyzyvayet]. It is unlikely that he will be able to go to work over the next few days and in connection with this, we think that tomorrow morning, taking account of the state of health of Boris Nikolayevich and of the doctors' conclusion, we will make a final decision on the further actions and the further work of Boris Nikolayevich over the next few days.

#### November Visit to PRC Canceled

*LD2610193395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1915 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 26 (ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin, hospitalised Thursday with a heart trouble — second in three months — is fully in charge and continues to carry out his presidential duties, but will scarcely return to his Kremlin office soon, according to his aides.

The president had an attack of myocardial ischemia and was rushed to the Moscow Central Clinical Hospital from his country residency, just two days after a four-day trip to France and then the United States where he addressed the UN General Assembly and held a summit meeting with US President Bill Clinton.

Ischemia restricts the supply of blood to the heart. Symptoms include difficulty in breathing and chest pains.

The presidential press service cited doctors as saying that president's illness "was less serious than it was in July" when he was hospitalised with a similar ischemia attack. In July, Yeltsin spent almost a month in a hospital and then in a spa.

Medics will deliver a final diagnosis on Yeltsin on Friday, but it is evident that there is no need for an operation, top presidential aide Viktor Ilyushin said on Thursday.

"An operation is out of question," the aide told reporters adding that from conversations with medics he had drawn a conclusion that Yeltsin "will scarcely return to his office within the next few days."

In spite of hospitalisation, Yeltsin "is in charge and continues to carry out his presidential duties", Igor Ignatyev, head of Yeltsin's press service said. However, it is quite evident that his next week's working schedule will be revised.

Yeltsin's Chinese visit scheduled for early November will be canceled, having "zero chances" according to Ilyushin.

It is still unclear, whether the President's illness kills a Moscow summit of leaders of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia scheduled for October 31. Ilyushin said that a final decision on this matter will be taken before noon Friday.

According to Ilyushin, the ischemia attack "had been caused by intellectual, moral and physical stresses during the latest trip of the president".

The aide said that upon the return from the US, Yeltsin, instead of taking a rest, "worked hard with papers, often contacted with his staff, gave orders and saw to their fulfilment".

For Thursday, he planned to attend jointly with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin a divine service and a religious procession on Red Square to mark the blessing of a chapel in honour of the Iverskaya Holy Virgin icon. But the plan was ruined by the disease.

Ilyushin believes that "in the future, Yeltsin's foreign trips should foresee a definite period of time for normal adaption of the organism to different time zones, and several days for rehabilitation after the stress of the flight."

Before departure for France and the USA last week Yeltsin told reporters he was fit enough to challenge French President Jacques Chirac for a tennis game.

In September, Yeltsin spent two weeks vacationing in Sochi where he played tennis with Byelorussian President Alexander Lukashenko, in particular.

All eyes are now on Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russia's number two, who would take over if the president is unable to perform his duties. His Friday schedule will not be altered in connection with Yeltsin's hospitalisation, his spokesman said.

### Yeltsin To Stay Under Close Observation

*LD2710105595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1025 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 27 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — Doctors have come to the conclusion that Russian President Boris Yeltsin will remain "under their close observation" until the end of November, Sergey Medvedev, the head of state's press secretary, told an ITAR-TASS correspondent today.

"According to the findings of the doctors treating him, as of 1230, following examination and consultation, it has been established that Russian President Boris Yeltsin still has an unstable blood supply to the cardiac muscles," the press secretary told the ITAR-TASS correspondent. "At the present time there are no signs of cardiac insufficiency, and active therapy is being carried out".

In a conversation between Viktor Ilyushin, the president's first aide, and Sergey Mironov, head of the Russian Federation president's medical center, Medvedev continued, the question of how long Boris Yeltsin's course of treatment might be was discussed. "The doctors have concluded that at the end of October and in November the Russian president will need to be under their close supervision," Sergey Medvedev noted. Sergey Mironov recommended that the first aide should refrain for the time being from visiting the president at the central clinic, the press secretary reported. Evidently, he believes, this could be done "in the near future."

### Yeltsin Still Holds 'Nuclear Briefcase'

*MS2710092695 London THE GUARDIAN in English 27 Oct 95 p 14*

[Report by James Meek: "President Still Controls Arsenal"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow — Not far from Boris Yeltsin's, bed in the Central Clinical Hospital sits a military officer with a black attache case. This is the notorious "nuclear briefcase", containing the mobile communications system which gives the Russian leader instant access to the control centre of the country's formidable strategic arsenal.

Mr Yeltsin remains commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces as long as he is head of state and as such, even while ill, has ultimate responsibility for the 10 to 11 missile-carrying submarines on continuous patrol around the world, and between 600 and 700 long-range rockets.

But experts point out that the Russian president, like Soviet leaders before him, does not have exclusive control over launch codes. The defence minister, Pavel Grachev, must also be consulted.

In the event of Mr Yeltsin's condition worsening, the system provides for a smooth transfer of power to the prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin.

"We know Chernomyrdin well. He's a balanced person who is capable of running the country — a person who really presents no threat to Russia, to the Russian establishment, to Russian democracy," said Sergey Oznobyshchev of the Centre for International Security Issues.

However, Mr Oznobyshchev said there was no question of control being transferred simply because the president was in hospital. After June's mild heart attack, Mr Yeltsin's spokesman explicitly said that the nuclear briefcase remained with him.

"Control over nuclear weapons is really nominal because these days we do not anticipate attacks from each other. The officer carrying the nuclear briefcase will none the less remain close to the president's room in hospital," Mr Oznobyshchev said yesterday.

Last year President Yeltsin alarmed Russia and the West alike by boasting how he had used the briefcase to contact strategic command when an allegedly unidentified missile had been tracked approaching Russian air space. It turned out to be a Norwegian scientific rocket, of which Oslo had notified Moscow well in advance.

Mr Oznobyshchev said there was no likelihood of command and control confusion during a changeover period. "I don't have the slightest concern today about the reliability of the technical controls over Russia's strategic weapons. The system is very reliable, well supplied and well defended, regardless of any change of leadership," he insisted.

"It couldn't be subject to the will of a single person in power. No individual, no matter how high-ranking he was, would be able to launch or target a single strategic weapon."

### No Changes to Chernomyrdin's Work Schedule Expected

*LD2610155795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1524 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[by ITAR-TASS correspondents Nadezhda Anisimova and Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 26 October (ITAR-TASS) — There will be no changes to Viktor Chernomyrdin's work schedule in connection with President Boris Yeltsin's indisposition, according to the premier's press secretary, Viktor Konnov today.

Chernomyrdin has been briefed in detail about Yeltsin's health. Yeltsin is at the central clinic diagnosed with ischemic heart disease. Viktor Chernomyrdin briefed James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, about Yeltsin's health during their meeting today.

Konnov stressed that the head of government has at his disposal the most detailed information about Yeltsin's condition.

In an interview for ITAR-TASS, James Wolfensohn said that he was deeply concerned about the president's indisposition and hoped that Yeltsin would get better in the next few days.

It was noted during the talks between Viktor Chernomyrdin and James Wolfensohn that the meeting planned for tomorrow between Boris Yeltsin and the World Bank president would probably be postponed.

### Premier Blames Shafranik's Handling of Investment Bill

*LD2610205995 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1200 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] A government meeting took place today in Moscow. Speaking during the debate on the government investment program for 1996, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin emphasized that if the country fails to attract foreign investment there will soon be no question about domestic investment. In connection with this, the question was raised about the bill on division of the output which once again was not approved by the upper chamber of the parliament. The premier thinks that it is the government's fault that the Federation Council turned down the draft law, and in particular the fault of the head of the fuel and power ministry Yuriy Shafranik personally, who let things slide and did not explain the nature of the draft law to the deputies. The Russian premier made the suggestion that 90 percent of the regions had failed to comprehend the significance and meaning of the draft law and the work of the department which was supposed to lobby the draft law on division of the output was inadequate.

### Satarov Interviewed on Parliament, Presidency

*MK2510141895 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 95 p 5*

[Interview with presidential political adviser Georgiy Satarov by Ivan Rodin under the "Alternatives" rubric; place and date not given: "It Is Important for the Federation That the Upper Chamber of Parliament Is Not Elected. Presidential Political Adviser on the Duma Election Prospects and Other Problems of State Organization in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Rodin] Shall we talk about present-day political outrages, Georgiy Aleksandrovich?

[Satarov] Outrages sounds too general....

[Rodin] Well, then, the first question: Why do you think the idea of two centrist blocs, which was devised by powerful politological brains, has effectively collapsed?

[Satarov] Generally speaking, it is not alone — many ideas have collapsed. For example, after his illness the president met with representatives of democratic factions and tried to help them knock together a democratic bloc, but that did not succeed either. There is a natural law: if you wish, the implacable operation of a proportional electoral system. As long as it exists, the formation of large parties is effectively impossible. [passage omitted]

[Rodin] There is the following suggestion as to why the left wing has effectively broken up: When the party and Komsomol [Communist Youth League], soviet, management, and trade union nomenklatura were instructed to join a party, they naturally joined the party that was strongest, that is, the one that was set up by the executive authority. For this reason, almost nothing was left to the party that appeared to represent the legislative authority. It is for this very reason, so many people think, that Rybkin is demonstratively cool on the idea....

[Satarov] The delayed launch of Rybkin's bloc can well be interpreted that way. But one should also say that these two blocs obviously had different potential merits and different advantages. The merits of Chernomyrdin's movement are organizational capabilities, that is, authority held in its hands. The potential merits of the Rybkin movement are, so to speak, "nongovernmental": They include the opportunity to criticize and the possibility of offering alternatives, which is extremely fashionable on the political market. [passage omitted]

[Rodin] It is said that the idea of creating two centrist blocs emerged after the available resources were evaluated and it became clear that only one resource had not yet been committed, namely the government.

[Satarov] [passage omitted] One motive behind the idea of two blocs, among other things, was an attempt to compensate for the flaws in the electoral system by upsizing electoral structures, diminishing the number of offers on the political market, simplifying elections for the voters, and so forth. An attempt to knock together a democratic bloc also fits in with this scheme.

[Rodin] So the sole reason for the failure is the proportional system and nothing else?

[Satarov] No, of course not. I can cite another one. Imagine yourself in the place of the president, his entourage — aides, advisers, and so forth — who understand the possible negative consequences of this electoral system, are trying to do something, but are somewhat hamstrung in terms of their resources. Imagine what would have happened in the press, including NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, had Boris Nikolayevich proposed a majority bill and firmly insisted on it. He would at once have been accused of undermining the elections, stifling democracy in the country, and so forth.... This has already been in the press, and there is even no need to fantasize; it is evident. And he also has to take that into account.

[Rodin] Do you think that a "majority" bill would not have been passed in any case?

[Satarov] It is plainly so. Remember the Federation Council's stance. [passage omitted]

[Rodin] As far as I know, in Western countries political scientists have already worked out a formula showing how many parties can clear the 5-percent hurdle under the proportional electoral system if there is such and such number of contestants. It is probably impossible to calculate such a formula here, but still.

[Satarov] No, why? It is possible.

Depending on the actual number of blocs or movements that compete with each other, between four and six blocs or parties will enter the Duma on the party lists.

[Rodin] Can one surmise now who these four or six will be?

[Satarov] It is very difficult to make a complete list because the situation is extremely volatile. I think that the troika including the communists, "Russia Is Our Home," and Yavlinskiy is more or less stable.

[Rodin] And what about the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR]?

[Satarov] I think that all the rest are within the 5-percent zone. Who will clear 5 percent will be determined by incidental circumstances.

[Rodin] You see, Georgiy Aleksandrovich, the result turns out to be quite good in principle. There will be fewer factions, they will be larger, and it will be easier to work with them. So, maybe, the proportional system is not so bad after all.

[Satarov] Everything depends on what initial criterion we are choosing. If it goes like that — this law is written for the political elite, not for the voters — then, maybe, it is no bad thing. But, first of all, the law was introduced so that the political elite could reproduce itself well and feel secure and comfortable — I mean the elites both inside and outside the Duma — and also, as you said, so that it would be easier to reach agreement. Then everything is correct. But from the viewpoint of universally known criteria of an electoral system's democratic nature this does not bear any criticism. People should not delude themselves: There is no ideal electoral system in principle. Any system you may invent has its merits and flaws. But it is well known how to offset the flaws of the various principles on which authority is organized — majority, proportional, mixed, and other principles. Usually, when such laws are molded, their authors are careful to offset their flaws, but they do so proceeding from the principle of representation, not a comfortable reproduction of authority. [passage omitted]

[Rodin] Then do you think that the next Duma will be able to make a good law? Spend three years out of four debating it, discarding everything that did not work...?

[Satarov] Not if it is done once again just before elections.

[Rodin] But the next Duma is not going to last four years, is it?

[Satarov] Why not?

[Rodin] What about the presidential election?

[Satarov] What about it?

[Rodin] Whichever president we have — a new or the old one — may dislike the existing Duma. Or is such a probability out of the question?

[Satarov] Why, it is just as likely as the probability of a lethal outcome for the current Duma. But it should hardly be considered seriously at this stage. I do not remember, for instance, any illusions left after the 1993 elections as to the newly-elected Duma or its relations with the president.

[Rodin] Will the next Duma be even more opposition-minded?

[Satarov] That cannot be predicted.

[Rodin] But why? It could be done according to your own estimates. Both the communists and Yavlinskiy are in opposition, albeit to a different extent. But it is evident judging by the incumbent Duma that they often join forces. Maybe they vote similarly for different reasons, but the result is the same.

[Satarov] Yes, this does happen.

[Rodin] Is the Presidential Staff ready to collaborate, for instance, with a communist Duma?

[Satarov] What do you mean, communist?

[Rodin] You know; there is a prediction that the communists will be the only ones to make progress....

[Satarov] Come now, what are you talking about? This is unrealistic.

[Rodin] Why?

[Satarov] You know that such forecasts are based on one single premise, namely a wrong interpretation of incorrect information about the results of elections for the Volgograd City Duma.

[Rodin] Do you think Zyuganov will stand a chance in the presidential election? Or can our country no longer have a communist president?

[Satarov] It is hard to say. You know, in our country, where the system of interests and political consciousness has yet to stabilize, it is difficult to make accurate predictions. There are certain public opinion polls that ask the following question: For whom will you not vote in any circumstances? The communists, too, are members of the leading troika. The communists have a very stable support base, but those who will never vote for them are much more numerous. This is crucially important for presidential elections.

[Rodin] By the way, as regards public opinion polls: I have repeatedly heard that public opinion services, as they themselves say, forward slightly different polls to the people "on high." Is this really so?

[Satarov] It depends. Since we have people working here who are fairly experienced in that regard, we hedge our bets.

[Rodin] That is, you are trying to get as many such poll results as possible and to analyze them on your own?

[Satarov] There are polls that are conducted under our fairly reliable supervision. Generally, there are many channels of obtaining survey information.

[Rodin] Are the communists really the front-runners according to these more or less reliable polls?

[Satarov] Yes, they are. Their lead is not gigantic, but it is fairly stable.

[Rodin] And how are other places allocated? Is "Russia Is Our Home" [NDR] second or third?

[Satarov] The next troika is more or less clear. But there are things that are difficult to compare. The Congress of Russian Communities [KRO], for one. When personalities are assessed, Lebed dashes ahead. Skokov finds himself at the very end — which is, on the whole, not surprising. I do not speak about the comparative merits of these two people but about their different levels of promotion by the press and different degrees of perception of them by the voters. The KRO as an organization has a very low rating. But a combination of Lebed's popularity and the KRO itself will, of course, generate a higher result.

Some surveys give second place to Yavlinskiy, others — to NDR. If we look at their overall balance, however, NDR fares slightly better, but this means nothing: The whole difference is within a margin of error.

[Rodin] For some reason the Agrarian Party features rarely in such polls. Is this because their samples do not include the countryside, or is it how things really stand? Because the Agrarians are a corporate party that usually always does well in a difficult economic situation. What is their problem?

[Satarov] One reason is that their voters are being siphoned off. For this same reason Zhirinovskiy now has fewer supporters.

[Rodin] I wonder what will happen if the Agrarian Party does not clear the 5-percent hurdle....

[Satarov] No, it can clear it. But, you know, it is all the luck of the game, not a logical reflection of stable interests. You can imagine an exhausted voter whom 30 parties will begin wooing starting 15 November, with 20 candidates in each district who will say more or less the same thing; moreover, all kinds of squabbles, bickering, and washing of each other's dirty linen. And then he will turn out for his electoral ward to be presented with the holy book containing the electoral lists....

[Rodin] Well, we have talked enough about the elections. Now, explain another thing to me. Why did the president adopt such an illogical line of conduct in that old saga on the Federation Council bill — maybe that was also your fault, since you are his adviser. Do you recall that when the Federation Council and the State Duma fought each other over the bill on elections for the Duma, you said — apparently giving voice to the president's words — that the most important thing was for the chambers to reach agreement, while there could be no edict on elections for the Duma because there is a provision in the Constitution saying that they are to be regulated by law. As regards the Federation Council, an absolutely identical situation came about: The chambers reached agreement, and there is a provision in the Constitution that its formation is to be regulated by law. Where is the problem? And where is the logic?

[Satarov] It may be a little low on logic, as happens in life — not only the life of politicians but of anyone, simply because they are living people. I only draw attention to the fact that this lack of logic has been rectified, at least for the time being.

[Rodin] Yes, it has been rectified. But do you have any information as to how the president would react to a new version of the bill?

[Satarov] Not yet.

[Rodin] But requests have already been filed with the Constitutional Court, and even if now the problem seems to have been resolved, he will still have to return to it. Or do you think that the court can refuse to accept them for consideration if these requests have lost their urgency?

[Satarov] Of course it can. They can also be withdrawn.

[Rodin] Do you mean that the president could possibly withdraw his request?

[Satarov] I do not know. Since I am not aware of the president's stance yet, it is difficult for me to say.

[Rodin] Nonetheless, the recently adopted version of the bill on the Federation Council gives eight months to hold elections. There is a presidential edict postponing these elections. How can this collision be overcome?

[Satarov] You know, on the whole, everything is clear. From the viewpoint of this edict there are, on the one hand, minuses — you have already referred to them, including the fact that it runs counter to the bill — and, on the other, pluses that in fact prop up the bill. The dates there are linked to the creation of a legislative framework, and a framework law has already been passed. Elections — municipal and local elections in the Federation components — must take place on the basis of laws that will be passed to follow up on the framework legislation. Currently there are lots of problems regarding regional lawmaking. I can cite a graphic example — the law on presidential elections in Kalmykia which, despite the Constitution and despite the framework laws, allows elections to be held with only one candidate.

Presently we face a tide of approaching elections, but in my view they are going to be held according to rather low-quality laws. What will we get if we set in motion the entire mechanism of elections according to arbitrary laws? Elections that are not only bad just from the politological viewpoint but also run counter to the Constitution and the framework laws.

[Rodin] Certain observers have already dubbed the new version of the newly-passed bill on the Federation Council "a poisoned compromise." Do you agree?

[Satarov] There is a modicum of truth it that metaphor. [passage omitted]

[Rodin] Is it absolutely certain that the leaders of the regional elites for whom their [Federation Council] seats appear to be already reserved want to hold deliberations in Moscow?

[Satarov] It is absolutely certain that there is no absolute unanimity of views on the matter, and it would be strange if a 100-percent unanimity existed on any complex matter. But the Federation Council has an opportunity to express its view: The law approved by the Duma will now be passed to them. If they think that the presidential version — under which they were invited to decide on their own who will represent them on the Federation Council — is more convenient for them, they will ax this bill and return to the presidential one, or to the same version with certain adjustments, which will not oblige any regional leader to be a member of the Federation Council.

[Rodin] The president enabled them to make their choice precisely because he wrote "representatives of the Russian Federation components"?

[Satarov] Not for that reason, but because the Constitution stipulates it. This is how it is stated there! The Constitution simply does not say "the heads."

[Rodin] Then the law can specify the article of the Constitution if it does not run counter to it?

[Satarov] Of course it can. And let them specify it together, God speed them!

[Rodin] For this very reason the law can specify the word "formation," can it not?

[Satarov] Oh, no.

[Rodin] Why "no"? The term "formation" has a broader definition that the words "appointment," "addition," "election...."

[Satarov] Right. But there is a term and there is the will of the legislator who drew up this Constitution. In the Constitution — again, I ask you to see its articles in their entirety — this will is expressed unequivocally. Each time it refers to the Duma, it uses the term "elections." And each time it refers to the Federation Council, it speaks about formation. Moreover, different terms are used for members of the two chambers — a member of the Federation Council and a deputy of the State Duma.

[Rodin] What is your forecast, Georgiy Aleksandrovich: Will a new Federation Council be formed after 12 December on the expiry of the incumbent Federation Council's term of office? Or will the current Council's powers have to be extended?

[Satarov] In a way, they are extended under the Constitution automatically.

[Rodin] How? Provisional articles stipulate that its term is two years and that's it.

[Satarov] Again, one needs to consider the rules of law in their entirety. Article 99 sets forth that the powers of State Duma deputies and Federation Council members expire when the next chamber's term of office begins. According to the theory and practice of legislation, this provision is more important than what the provisional articles say because in fact it calls for a periodical renewal, but does not foresee an absence of exceptions. For instance, this rule can be offset by a cancellation of elections in the event of a state of emergency. You understand? For this reason, in the absence of a law, or in the absence of an edict, or with an edict that will be turned down by the Constitutional Court, and so forth — in short, in the absence of a legislative framework, it is Article 99 that will be applied.

[Rodin] That is, there is even no need....

[Satarov] For any special piece of legislation? No, there is not.

## Poegli Found Guilty of Insulting Grachev, Amnestied

*LD2710115595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1128 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Solodova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 27 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — By a verdict of the Presnenskiy intermunicipal court in Moscow, Vadim Poegli, deputy editor in chief of the MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS newspaper, was today found guilty of "deliberately insulting in an unseemly manner" Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. He was sentenced to one year's corrective labor and the confiscation of 30 percent of his salary each month. However, in connection with the amnesty to mark the 50th anniversray of Victory Day, Poegli has been immediately granted amnesty. An appeal against the court's verdict may be made at the Moscow city court.

## Skuratov Views Appointment, Prosecutor's Office

*MM2610101595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Oct 95 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Yuriy Skuratov, Russian Federation General Prosecutor, by Valentin Maslennikov; place and place not given: "Relying on Professionals. That Is How New Russian Federation General Prosecutor Yuriy Skuratov Sees His Task"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Maslennikov] Yuriy Ilich, what was your own attitude toward your new appointment?

[Skuratov] I shall not hide the fact that for me it was something of a surprise. I am aware of the full depth of the responsibility which I shall carry in my new post. It was also a surprise, but an entirely pleasant one, that my approval at the Federation Council was with a rare unanimity among the senators.

My attitude toward my appointment is complex, since public expectations are quite high. And my task is to meet them at least to some small degree. This is all the harder to do in that in the present complex social situation, in the atmosphere of excitement, everyone expects rapid results. I should not like to disappoint anyone but I believe it essential to remind them that it is not only the prosecutor's office that fights crime and indeed far from everything depends on the general prosecutor. Comprehensive, painstaking work is needed here. There will be results but they will not be instantaneous.

[Maslennikov] What difficulties await you at your first steps, in your view?

[Skuratov] The process of taking up my post will, I hope, proceed relatively painlessly. I am made confident by the fact that I know people and the principles of operation of the General Prosecutor's Office apparatus. I know who can do what and on whom I can rely. And I know all the main problems not "from on high," not from the position of an office-bound scholar, but from the primary source, so to speak. I believe it will also help that I myself was a member of the General Prosecutor's Office collegium as will the fact that the institute which I headed worked in the same key as most of the workers at the General Prosecutor's Office.

[Maslennikov] Will you change anything in the style of work of the prosecutor's office?

[Skuratov] That is a deep subject and requires thorough thought. I think that I shall have many more meetings with ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. Then we shall talk. Right now I can say briefly that the paramount task is to set up the prosecutor's office's combat capability, to lead it toward the work regime in which it used to work. I plan to do this through evolutionary, smooth changes. At a more remote stage there will be radical reform too.

Our paramount task is to set up full supervision of the internal affairs organs and other departments engaged in operational investigation activity. An even more serious and urgent task is to increase the importance of the prosecutor's office in implementing a coordinating function since life urgently requires that the efficiency of the entire law enforcement system as a whole be raised to a higher standard. And special demands are made on the prosecutor's office on this plane. And I see a third very important and urgent task in shifting the emphasis toward ensuring human and civil rights. There is no point now in listing all the tasks: The prosecutor's office's supervisory field is too broad. There will be neither the strength nor the opportunity to cope with everything at once. We must take a realistic look at our potential. So I propose initially to concentrate on these tasks. While, naturally, singling out the safeguarding of human rights. That is the most topical and important part of our work.

[Maslennikov] Which of your predecessors had a work style that most impressed you?

[Skuratov] I personally know three of my predecessors well. I had no ideal among them. For each one can not good and bad points. I shall try to take something of his strong side from each. I would not like to analyze their shortcomings just as I would not like to repeat them. Stepankov was strong in his professionalism. Kazannik had a strong side — serving the law irrespective of the political situation. Ilyushenko was distinguished by his vigor and his desire to do something. Each had a mass of mistakes as well. But these individuals had qualities which undoubtedly deserve respect.

[Maslennikov] How will the 'new broom' affect the General Prosecutor's Office workers?

[Skuratov] I do not intend to carry out any purges. The situation in the prosecutor's office now is such that we must urgently resolve the question of how to preserve it and consolidate the forces which it has not yet lost. That is the main thing. And if among its workers someone has discredited himself and the walls within which he works then of course we shall get rid of people like that. We shall retain the cadres potential and then we shall be able to resolve other tasks facing us.

[Maslennikov] What is your attitude toward those who have already been obliged to change jobs?

[Skuratov] I intend to have a personal talk with each person who is of some value to the prosecutor's office. That is a complex process just as the reasons for their departure are complex. Some people you cannot bring back because these people have already adapted to a new job. Strong-arm methods here are intolerable. We shall think and seek mutually acceptable solutions.

I believe that only in this way will we be able to normalize the moral and psychological climate in the prosecutor's office. I count on acting in a balanced but sufficiently persistent and consistent manner. Cadres changes I see not in dismissals but in the recruitment of valuable and experienced specialists.

## Security Chiefs Seen Pushing Leadership Changes

*MK2610064095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 21 Oct 95 p 1*

[Report by Aleksandr Budberg: "Korzhakov To Powder Yeltsin's Nose and Throw Dust in Russians' Eyes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dmitriy Rumyantsev, the man in charge of Presidential Staff personnel, was fired on Thursday. Rumyantsev came onto the Presidential Staff three years ago and appeared to belong to the "democratic" wing. The process of ousting him, which was completed by presidential directive, could have hardly occurred without the involvement of his boss — presidential chief of staff Sergey Filatov. It should be said that only two weeks ago the resignation of Filatov himself also seemed inevitable. But he has managed to keep his post, although, according to a universal view, his main ill-wisher is none other than Aleksandr Korzhakov, the country's main bodyguard.

One of the possible candidates for Rumyantsev's post is Nikolay Yegorov, who headed the Nationalities Ministry until the Budennovsk tragedy and was one of the architects of the Chechnya war. He did not achieve glory as a wise statesman at any of his posts, but nonetheless, after he was forced to leave the Nationalities Ministry, he comfortably took up the job of presidential adviser. Many people link that to Yegorov's friendly relations with the same Aleksandr Vasilyevich Korzhakov. Indirect proof of that is the former minister's reinforced security team, which is made up of presidential security service members. He is the sole presidential adviser protected in this way. Of course, since Chechnya Yegorov has something to be afraid of, and he was fully entitled to ask for bodyguards. But everybody knows that it is impossible to obtain security guards if one is not in the Presidential Security Service [SBP] chief's favor. So, recently he pointedly stripped Filatov of his security guard, even though the latter is one of the country's highest-ranking officials.

The post of personnel administration chief is considered one of the key positions, and the emergence in it of Yegorov or a person hewing to similar views can be interpreted as a compromise of sorts: Filatov will stay on, but personnel matters will be taken over by a person close to the SBP chief.

It should be noted that the role of Korzhakov and Federal Security Service [FSB] Director Barsukov in a number of recent dismissals should not be underestimated. The stream of compromising materials that swept aside former acting General Prosecutor Aleksey Ilyushenko, for one, was clearly prepared in the Lubyanka. Once the information had been carried by the newspapers, it was just a sleight of hand to forward it to the president in a corresponding interpretation.

It seems that the next victim of the powerful Chekist tandem, apart from Kozyrev, could be the defense minister. According to some accounts the SBP and the FSB have already organized a few information "leaks" — sometimes fairly dubious, by the way — regarding Grachev himself and some other top-level officers. The fact that the president "recommended" that Grachev turn up for a court session considering his suit against a MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS journalist shows that someone in the Kremlin corridors is pursuing a hard line against the general. Since Boris Nikolayevich by virtue of his character is unlikely to give his consent to a replacement of the key figures without "preliminary preparations" (Filatov's failed resignation was yet more proof of that), the FSB and SBP chiefs, who are very interested in having the president stay on for another five-year term, may well "prod" the country's leader to take "the correct electoral steps." Whether Korzhakov and Barsukov turned image-makers will be able to shore up the president's reputation or whether the party of the president's entourage will have to search for ways to bypass elections — this is the main Russian domestic policy question for the next nine months.

## Military Issues

### Government Adopts Program for CW Elimination

*LD2610152695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1359 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 26 (INTERFAX) — The Russian government approved Thursday a federal program for eliminating chemical weapons, intended for the period from 1996 to 2009.

Chief of the General Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov told the Cabinet that Russia has 40,000 tonnes of chemical agents at the moment.

The program provides for gradual elimination of chemical weapons. The 7,500 tonnes of blister agents (mustard gas and Lewisite) stored in containers are to be eliminated in the first place. These agents will be eliminated in the regions where they are stored, but in newly-built facilities in the city of Kambarka (Udmurtia) and in the village of Gorniy (the Saratov region). The annual capacity of chemical weapons elimination facilities will amount to 1,850 tonnes.

At the second stage, chemical artillery shells and aviation bombs stuffed with phosphorite-organic agents, Lewisite and phosgene will be eliminated. The reserve of chemical artillery shells and aviation bombs is estimated at 32,500 tonnes. Artillery shells are to be eliminated at facilities to be built in the Kurgan region and in the city of Kizner (Udmurtia). Aviation bombs and missiles are to be eliminated in the places where they are stored in the Kirov, Penza and Bryansk regions.

Chemical weapons are to be eliminated completely in 2005. Work to decontaminate and close down the weapons elimination facilities is to be completed in 2009. A total of 16.6 trillion rubles is to be invested in the program. "Russia has advanced chemical weapons elimination know-how, testing of which is being completed now," said Kolesnikov.

## Federal Assembly

### Federation Council Shrinks From Election Delay

*MK2610142195 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 1*

[Report by Konstantin Katanyan: "Senators Fail To Determine Their Own Fate. They Turn Down State Duma-Approved Law, Fail To Draft Their Own, and Do Not Dare To Postpone Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] It became clear right from the start that the draft law on the

Federation Council stood no chance of being approved. This is also confirmed by two expert conclusions. The only difference between them was that the specialist committee suggested that the law be scrapped "because some of its provisions are unacceptable" while the Federation Council apparatus legal department thought that "a considerable porportion of the provisions are out of keeping with the Russian Federation Constitution," for which reason the law "should be rejected as a whole."

In drawing up this report the legal department's jurists must have followed the directions of Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko, who had stated before the event that the law that took its final shape prompted by Vladimir Isakov infringes the jurisdiction of federation components and therefore clearly contravenes the Constitution.

The dispute on this question went on till the end of the chamber's morning sitting. A majority of the senators agreed that the law should be rejected as a whole while voicing fears that the Duma would be able to override the Federation Council's veto, whereupon the president could sign the document and exclude the upper chamber from the lawmaking process. In a bid not to forfeit chances to participate in deciding on their own future, some Federation Council members insisted that a conciliation commission should be set up to rework the law jointly with the State Duma and presidential representatives.

The senators' fears, however, were founded only on a lack of information. As early as Tuesday [24 October], Russian Federation president's representative in the Federal Assembly Aleksandr Maksimovich Yakovlev stated: "The president will never sign this law because it not only infringes the rights of federation components to independently organize the work of their own organs of power but also lays down an idea for creating a Federation Council obviously incapable of operating." Yakovlev also agreed with the criticisms recently published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA and some other mass media. In particular, the provision in the law ruling that Federation Council members should exercise their powers "on a nonpermanent basis" was open to criticism because, in that event, the real power in the upper chamber would be wielded by Federation Council staff stationed in Moscow and drafting all chamber decisions rather than by representatives of the regions, who would be occupied with their main job of leading the authorities in the federation components.

As Federation Affairs Committee Chairman Vasiliy Tarasenko observed, the law in this shape "actually leads to the cessation of the activities of the parliament's upper chamber," completing the "drift from a democratic parliamentary republic to aristocratic representation in parliament."

As a result, the law was rejected as a whole and Speaker Shumeyko was tasked with organizing work to hammer out a new draft to be considered by the chamber on 14 November and then referred to the State Duma as a Federation Council legislative initiative. At this point a bombshell was dropped in the chamber.

"The situation in the country," Voronezh Oblast administration head Aleksandr Kovalev stated, "calls for a certain stability. To make that possible it is necessary to extend for two years the transition period set forth by the second section of the Constitution, that is to say, to retain all the existing authorities both at the level of the entire Federation and in the regions."

Kovalev explained out in the corridor that he had in mind not only extending the terms of the Russian Federation president and the members of the Federation Council, but also the postponing the elections of deputies for the State Duma, who "are not going to be honest and reflect the voters' positions anyway." Two years from now, Kovalev thinks, "the situation in the economy may have settled down, all necessary law will have been passed, and elections for all the authorities can be held in full conformity with the Constitution."

The Federation Council was as few as 11 votes short of upholding Kovalev's idea, which may appear rather well-reasoned if you disregard the fact that canceling the elections could simply blow the country apart and result in the most undesirable consequences up to total rejection of the democratic principles and the establishment of an authoritarian regime in conditions of a permanent state of emergency.

## Upper House Opposes Strategic Sector Privatization

*MK2610132795 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 2*

[Report by Svetlana Lolayeva: "The Parliamentarians' Drive for Oversight Is Undying. Senators Pass a Law Which Is Going To Displease the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federation Council Committee for Issues of Economic Reform, Ownership, and Property Relations deemed the Law "On Disposing of Federally-Owned Shares in Joint-Stock Companies Set Up in the Process of Privatization," passed by the State Duma on 6 October in three readings at once, so good that it decided to approve the law without even putting before the full upper house for consideration. The law, authored by Sergey Burkov, chairman of the Duma Committee for Ownership, Privatization, and Economic

Activity, prohibits the sale or switching into securities of the state-owned shares in joint-stock companies dealing with strategically important products. Since such joint-stock companies include, among others, oil- and gas-extracting and processing enterprises, the law in fact endangers the government-planned deal on switching shareholdings in 29 enterprises into securities.

When presenting this law to the State Duma Sergey Burkov himself made no secret of its purely prohibitive character and, judging by the conclusion of the kindred committee of the Federation Council, its prohibitive implications have found full support and understanding among the senators. The Economic Reform Committee members realize that, since the program of the second, monetary stage of privatization was approved by the president in the period of constitutional reform but was not endorsed by the parliament, the restrictions imposed by this law are completely jusufiable. Moreover, in their opinion, the law adopted must be supplemented with another, specifying in what way state shareholdings should be disposed of.

The unanimous aspiration of both houses of parliament to bring the actions of the government and the State Committee for the Management of State Property under their total control, however, will hardly meet with the president's support. He will probably veto a law that seeks to amend his own edicts and upsets government plans.

### Duma Split on Representation to Banking Council

*MK2610142295 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 2*

[Report by Svetlana Lolayeva: "Lower Chamber Refuses To Include Deputies From Specialist Committee in Banking Council"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the State Duma still did not manage to name its representatives on the National Banking Council (NBS). The National Banking Council at the Bank of Russia, being created under the Law on the Central Bank, is tasked with considering the concept for improving the banking system in the Russian Federation, draft guidelines for monetary policy and for currency control and regulation policy, and the problems of regulating the activity of credit-issuing organizations and with carrying out an examination of legislative acts in the banking sphere. Under Article 20 of the Law on the Central Bank the NBS, chaired by Central Bank's head, includes one presidential and one governmental spokesman, the finance and economy ministers, and two spokesmen from each of the parliament's chambers as well as representatives of credit-issuing organizations and experts appointed by the State Duma on the recommendation of the Central Bank chairperson.

The Budget Committee, having considered eight of its member as possible candidates, proposed that the State Duma confirm the appointment of Mikhail Zadornov and Aleksandr Turbanov as the lower chamber's spokespeople in the National Banking Council. However, since the Communist, Liberal Democratic, and "New Regional Policy" factions nominated their candidates only following the Committee session, Budget Committee Deputy Chair Gennadiy Kulik proposed that the issue of representatives on the NBS be raised for the committee to reconsider. Speaker Ivan Rybkin disagreed with Mr. Kulik's proposal and recommended that all the nominees be put to a straw poll and that an election be held subsequently among those getting the highest votes. However, LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy intervened in the debate to argue that the faction principle had been violated in the process of nominating the candidates and that a vote must be taken on candidates nominated by all factions and groups of deputies.

Businessman Vladimir Semago of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] faction (170 votes) and Committee for Labor and Social Support Chair Sergey Kalashnikov of the LDPR faction (167 votes) gained the lead in the straw poll. Nevertheless, in the open ballot that followed neither of them managed to muster the required 226 votes.

Despite the objections made by Budget Committee member Vladimir Manannikov as to the inappropriateness of the faction approach in delegating the Duma representatives on the National Banking Council, Speaker Ivan Rybkin proposed that the factions come to agreement on their candidates, and that this be done as soon as possible, so that the seats in the National Banking Council that rightfully belong to the Duma will not be lost.

### Yushenkov Cautiously Welcomes Law on Defense

*MK2710091195 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 2*

[Interview with Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, by A.S.: "Grachev Leaves With Gifts Up to His Ears;" first paragraph is MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The defense minister, sitting in a plane leaving for America, was apparently feeling like a king — right before his departure, State Duma deputies lavished unprecedented favors on him. Not only did the guys refuse to soften the law "On Military Duty," but they also unanimously passed a new law

"On Defense." Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, was very reserved in his comments on the document in an interview for MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS.

[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS] Does the new law "On Defense" have any serious flaws?

[Yushenkov] From the point of view of the system that has currently come about, I do not see any serious flaws in it. A serious drawback is the lack of a federal military reform program. This version of the law simply brings it in line with the current constitution, somewhat redistributes authority between various agencies, limits the number of other military formations (except those of the Armed Forces — MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS), etc. In this sense, the new law only has merits compared with the previous one. Had this law existed last year, the Constitutional Court would have found the presidential edict (on Chechnya — MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS) and follow-up legislative instruments unconstitutional.

[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS] Can the law stand in the way of normal reform in the Armed Forces?

[Yushenkov] No, it absolutely cannot. But this law is clearly insufficient to carry out reform; what is needed is a federal program.

[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS] Then amendments will be required?

[Yushenkov] If decisions on switching to a professional or any other principle of manning are made, of course, certain changes will be essential.

### Law Defining Opposition's Rights, Duties Debated

*MM2610164095 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 1*

[Report by Valentina Nikiforova: "One in Power, the Other in Prison?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Society should be grateful to the fifth State Duma for the fact that its deputies and their specialist aides have exerted unbelievable efforts to ensure that the country abides by the laws. Maybe they were even excessively zealous, but you will agree that it is nevertheless more peaceful to live according to the law than, for instance, according to an edict issued even by the head of state.

Strictly speaking, the current unnatural confrontation between laws and edicts is a reflection of the confrontation prevailing in society. The State Duma Committee for Affairs of Public Associations and Religious Organizations is drafting a law "On Legal Guarantees for the Opposition's Activity in the Russian Federation," in order to forestall a tragic outcome to the confrontation, whereby, as described by committee chairman V. Zorkaltsev, the majority of society would find itself in opposition to the authorities. The draft has been prepared, and parliamentary hearings have been conducted on it.

Various viewpoints were expressed both as regards the draft law and the need for it. The majority of the participants in the hearings tended to believe that it should be adopted as soon as possible, and that the rights and obligations of the opposition should be registered, as well as its relationship with the power structures, because there are no guarantees today that the horror of the suppression of the opposition in October 1993 will not be repeated, Prof. V. Ivanov warned.

Yes, the law is necessary, but it is taking shape with difficulty, because the process of defining the "opposition" is new and strange to Russia. "We have always had two parties," Prof. S. Bogolyubov said. "One in power, the other in prison." Of course, the duties of the opposition could be stipulated in the Constitution, but there is something dubious about the idea of the authorities, while shaping a constitution for themselves, suddenly being concerned about their opponents.

At present, the opposition in our state is being cursed on television screens and in newspaper pages. And it is not allowed to respond. For example, Ye. Gaydar said intimidatingly that if the Communists come to power, there will be starvation and the gulag. Why? Because the West won't give us any credits.

There is no doubt that healthy forces will ultimately come to power. But what they will do is hard to conjecture: There is no law.

## Regional Affairs

### Chechnya Reportage; Military, Negotiations, National

### Mikhaylov Warns Of 'Tough Measures'

*LD2710124995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1211 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[By Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 27 (Itar-Tass) — The possibility of large-scale hostilities erupting in Chechnya again "wholly depends on the behaviour of the unlawful armed units," Russian Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy Vyacheslav Mikhaylov told a press conference here today.

Touching on the possibility of resuming the peace negotiations and the work of the Special Observers Commission (SOC) to implement the agreement on the package of military problems, Mikhailov stressed that the Russian side was ready to take part in the talks, but would "take tough measures against the movements of unlawful armed units and will take all the necessary constitutional measures to wipe them out". The Dudayev side was informed about this warning. "The SOC talks may be suspended only if the agreements on the package of military problems are grossly violated," the minister stressed. Mikhaylov warned Aslan Maskhadov, the SOC Co-Chairman, representing Dudayev's side, that if he was unable to keep the situation under control, the Russian military representives would continue establishing contacts with separate field commanders, who wish to resolve the disarmament problem.

Mikhaylov believes that the solution of the political bloc of problems should be achieved through a broad roundtable dialogue with the participation of all the political forces of the republic. "The current negotiations process in Chechnya should eventually turn into an intra-Chechen dialogue," the minister stated.

Mikhaylov told ITAR-TASS that this meant that the Chechens themselves should overcome their domestic differences, while the Russian government delegation to the talks, which he heads, must concentrate on the elaboration and coordination of the principles of Chechnya's relations with the Federal Centre.

### Bombing Investigators Pressured Into Silence

*MK2710125195 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 27 Oct 95 pp 1, 2*

[Report by Yuliya Kalinina: "Roshni-Chu Was Bombed by Russian Planes, but the Investigation Group Has Been Told To Keep Mum About It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Wednesday [25 October], Major General Yuriy Yakovlev, head of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office investigation directorate, who is currently probing into the circumstances of the air bombing of the Chechen village of Roshni-Chu, promised to issue a report on the conclusions reached by the commission as a result of its investigation activities. According to MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS' information received from sources in Chechnya and close to the Military Prosecutor's Office commission which is working on this case, the report was supposed to state the fact that the bombs were dropped on Roshni-Chu by Russian planes. The commission, too, arrived at precisely this conclusion.

Despite expectations, however, Gen. Yakovlev told members of the press on Thursday that fragments of an air bomb had indeed been found in Roshni-Chu, but there had to be a careful study before any talk of its "national origin."

According to information from the same sources, the result of the commission's efforts is so meager because, a day before, Yakovlev came under strong "pressure" both from the staff of the Combined Group of Forces in Chechnya and from the Main Military Prosecutor's Office.

We all know that sorties to Chechnya follow this procedure: Proceeding from the strategic objectives and using reconnaissance data, the Combined Group command sets a mission for aircraft, say, to provide support for ground troops in some spot. To carry out such missions, there are necessarily several aircraft on combat alert "on duty" on military airfields (obviously in Krasnodar Kray and the Stavropol area). The aircraft take off carrying the appropriate load on orders from the headquarters (that is to say, the commander of the federal forces in Chechnya), carry out the mission, and come back, following which a report on the sortie goes in to the Air Force Ministry [as published]. Thus, there are at least three points at which the sortie is put on record — the command staff in Chechnya, the airport, and the ministry.

Besides, we also have an air defense system powerful enough to detect any flying object made of metal anywhere in the airspace between Astrakhan and Lugansk. Which makes a fourth point where they know about the sortie.

Despite the obvious nature of what happened, however, the military prosecutors do not dare to call a spade a spade. Our just-appointed General Prosecutor is going to Chechnya one of these days; maybe he would dare....

Regarding the seizure of the civil airport in Sleptsovsk (a fact which needs no additional proof), the military prosecution service has instituted criminal proceedings in line with Article 102-d: "premeditated murder committed in a manner threatening many lives." To find out what sort of subunits carried out the takeover is perhaps going to be as hard as to establish the bombers' origin. According to information received from sources in Chechnya's investigating agencies, the helicopters came to Sleptsovsk from Khankala, a military airfield in Groznyy where federal forces are based.

In addition, the Groznyy garrison military prosecutor's office has instituted criminal proceedings concerning the attack on a column of Russian armored vehicles in the area of Dyshne-Vedeno that resulted in 18 deaths. Yet another group is leaving for the scene from the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, which is likely to end up soon without any staff in Moscow because its main forces are slowly but surely moving to Chechnya.

### Attacks Increase in 'Live Shield' Operation

*LD2610121695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1120 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By Nikolay Zagnoyko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY October 26 (ITAR-TASS) — Gunmen of illegal armed formations in Chechnya became more active implementing the so-called "live shield" operation.

Using as a shield women, children and old people, local residents, they begin blocking and attacking checkpoints and posts of federal troops. The gunmen thus subject their compatriots to mortal danger. This is said in a statement of the press centre of the joint federal troops command in the Chechen republic, received by ITAR-TASS on Thursday.

The statement says that the armed provocation staged by illegal formations in Vedeno district on October 24 in which 18 servicemen were killed was a gross violation of military accords. It should be noted that illegal armed formations in the Vedeno district are led by Shirvani Basayev, member of the Special Observation Commission. The Press centre condemns the leadership of illegal armed formations that is engaged in double-dealing and is actually encouraging the terror and raids by Chechen gunmen.

The Federal forces command in Chechnya has not yet been given explanations about the tragedy by co-chairman of the Special Observation Commission, Aslan Maskhadov, the statement says. In accordance with the arrangement on the commission's work, the federal forces command is ready to deal a strike at illegal formations that stage armed provocations and acts of subversion and strive to frustrate the establishment of the peace process in the Chechen republic. The federal forces command is ready to deal the strike jointly with units commanded by Maskhadov.

The joint command knows of the bases in the Vedeno and Nozhay-Yurt districts from which the raid was launched on October 24. The press centre warns local residents to stay away from these bases so that there should be no civilian casualties.

### Shkirko: No Air Strikes Planned

*LD2610213695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2008 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Oct 26 (INTERFAX) — Federal troops in Chechnya are prepared to carry out strikes against Chechen militants' bases, including those near Vedeno, but do not plan to do so in the near future, commander of federal forces in Chechnya Anatoliy Shkirko told INTERFAX Thursday.

He denied that strikes will be carried out soon against the southern Chechen village of Vedeno. "It is misinformation, I ordered not to carry out strikes against villages," said Shkirko.

He stressed that under the July 30 military agreement, federal troops together with Chechen rebel commander Aslan Maskhadov's units can carry out strikes against the units of militants who fail to abide by the provisions of the agreement.

A total of 18 Russian servicemen were killed, seven wounded and eight taken prisoner near Vedeno Tuesday. The incident took place after a federal armored personnel carrier collided with a car. The crowd that gathered at the site of the accident practically shot down the Russian servicemen.

Speaking about the situation in Chechnya, Shkirko characterized it as "difficult but fully under the federal forces' control."

"We are doing everything to implement the military agreement," he said.

### Search For Ambushed Troops Continues

*LD2610174495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1323 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By Nikolay Zagnoiko]

[FBIS Translated Text] GROZNYY, October 26 (ITAR-TASS) — Additional forces joined a search for troops taken prisoner near the village of Vedeno on October 24.

"We use all opportunities at our disposal," ITAR-TASS learnt here on Thursday from a unit commander who was charged with releasing crew members of an armoured personnel carrier, who remained alive.

According to earlier reports, the armoured carrier collided with a Lada car near Vedeno last Tuesday. As a result, one man was killed and two wounded. The road collision entailed a train of tragic events.

The armoured carrier driver was lynched. Eight troops were taken hostage. Federal forces are now looking for them.

Lieutenant-Colonel Oleg Lukyanov, co-chairman of the group on search and exchange of prisoners-of-war from the Russian side, told ITAR-TASS that the latest events only aggravate the already difficult process of exchanging POWs.

Guards often change places of detention. Rebels demanded several weeks ago that the Russian side agree to exchange 14 Russian troops for 145 Chechens detained by investigative authorities due to various reasons.

### Zavgayev To Meet With Chernomyrdin

*LD2610221595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1816 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNY, Oct 26 (INTERFAX) — Prime Minister of Chechnya's Moscow-backed National Revival Government Doku Zavgayev flew to Moscow Thursday to meet with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

"A wide spectrum of issues, including restoration of Chechnya's economy, financing restoration works and the current negotiations process between the federal authorities and Dudayev's supporters, is to be discussed in Moscow," Deputy Prime Minister of the Chechen government Abdula Bugayev told INTERFAX in Groznyy's airport.

Zavgayev declared earlier that his government will strive to transform the negotiation process between the federal authorities and Dudayev's supporters in inter-Chechen negotiations. He also explained that his government will replace representatives of the federal authorities at the negotiation table.

The agreement on this meeting was reached in the course of their telephone talk several days ago, according to INTERFAX.

Former prime minister of the National Revival Government Salambek Khadzhiyev and Chairman of Chechnya's National Accord Committee Umar Avturkhanov, who presented their resignation early this week, left for Moscow from Groznyy-Severny Airport two hours later.

### Lobov Promises More Economic Aid

*LD2710002195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1936 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 26 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Security Council Secretary and Presidential Envoy to Chechnya Oleg Lobov said 1.5 trillion rubles will be appropriated in November and December for the Chechnya economic restoration scheme.

Speaking at a meeting of the state commission for the restoration of Chechnya today, Lobov said 4.5 trillion rubles had already been put in the programme.

Five to seven trillion is required to pay compensation to Chechnya's residents whose housing was destroyed during the war, Lobov said.

### N. Ossetians Deny Aushev's 'Provocative' Statements

*LD2610194195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1834 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By Valeriy Shanayev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIKAVKAZ, October 26 (ITAR-TASS) — The North Ossetian Interior Ministry in its release today vehemently protested the statement by Ingushetia's President Ruslan Aushev that the report on the October 24 attack on Ingushetia's Sleptsovsk air field by Chechen rebels emanates from the ministry.

Interior Ministry spokesman Zaurbek Dzarakhokhov in an interview with ITAR-TASS described Aushev's statement as another clumsy attempt to ascribe to the North Ossetian interior an operation which it is not entitled to carry out.

Only Russian troops and the Russian Interior Ministry may send a mobile check group into Ingushetia to attend to the reported attack on the Sleptsovsk air field, Dzarakhokhov said.

The spokesman recalled that the North Ossetian Interior Ministry was also accused by Aushev of pressing for a state of emergency at the time when the conflict between North Osstia and Ingushetia was subsiding.

He described Aushev's statements as provocative and bringing instability to the region, and leaving the North Ossetian Interior Ministry with the right to sue Aushev and media circulating his allegations for defamation.

### Military: Attack Reports 'Exaggerated'

*LD2610173395 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In the Ingush village of Sleptsovskaya, a group of officers in the main military prosecutor's office are investigating the mysterious landing of a helicopter assault group at Sleptsovskaya Airport. [passage omitted]

However, literally a few minutes ago we received a different version. This is an operational report from the North Caucasus Military District Press Center. According to information received on 24 October, Chechen illegal armed formations undertook actions to seize the Sleptsovsk Airport. A mobile command group was sent to the area of the airport to check these reports. It appears from the report issued by the North Caucasus Military District Headquarters that the group flew there in two, and not seven, Mi-8 service helicopters and landed on the airport's runway.

The Russian servicemen came under fire from a white Zhiguli car. The servicemen were forced to open fire in reply. The group did not enter the air terminal but carried out an inspection of the building from the outside. Having convinced themselves that there were no militants in the airport's territory, the group returned to base in their helicopters.

The rumors about the airport being shot at from the helicopters and the rumors about the theft of money are not in accord with reality.

We have just received this report from the head of the North Caucasus Military District Press Center, Colonel Firsov.

### Kursk Steps Up Security In Light of Chechen Threat

*MM2610121295 Moscow TRUD in Russian*
*26 Oct 95 p 1*

[Report by Vladislav Pavlenko: "Kursk Is Already Surrounded. By Checkpoints. All Russia Seems To Be Becoming a 'Special Fortified Area'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Until recently the term "checkpoint" ["blok-post"] was known to the people of Kursk Oblast only as one of the terrible symptoms of the confrontation in Chechnya. But now the fall landscape of the Chernozem Region is being supplemented by somber structures made from concrete blocks and sandbags....

"Kursk Oblast," Police Major General Vladimir Pronin, chief of the Oblast Internal Affairs Administration, said, "has been kind of encircled. Police checkpoints have been constructed on all the hard-surfaced roads on the oblast's borders. There are now 21 of them...."

It turns out that there are reasons for such a "self-blockade." The first reason is the rapid growth in robber attacks on the oblast's highways. Kursk Oblast policemen claim that this is the handiwork of criminal groupings from outside (mainly from Moscow and Tula). The police maintain that strict entry and exit control has already helped to put a stop to banditry on the roads.

The second reason arises out of the Chechen events. As is known, the Dudayevite terrorist Shamil Basayev has declared that he could bring Russia to its knees by seizing a nuclear electric power station [AES]. So the people of Kursk Oblast, on whose territory (at Kurchatov) there is a powerful AES, have taken unprecedented measures to step up its protection. Sixteen checkpoints have been established around Kurchatovskiy Rayon, and six right around the AES itself. An "Omega" composite combat detachment is stationed in the region of the AES. It consists of OMON [special-purpose police detachment] and spetsnaz [special-purpose forces] fighters and an FSB [Federal Security Service] antiterrorist group. Some Army subunits have also been moved up here.

In short, it seems that Kursk Oblast is being turned into some kind of "special fortified area." And yet there are nuclear and other dangerous installations in other oblasts which attract the attention of terrorists. Will the process of spreading the "checkpoint" system of combating crime through the Russian land really continue?

### Shakhray: Kaliningrad Can Contain NATO Expansion

*LD2610224695 Moscow INTERFAX in English*
*1817 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KALININGRAD, Oct 26 (INTERFAX) — Deputy Russian Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray believes that "the Kaliningrad region could play a decisive role in containing the eastward expansion of NATO's influence."

Speaking on a live television interview during his visit to Kaliningrad, Shakhray said that he views the region as very special for the balance of forces in the military and strategic system of Europe since the Baltic Fleet units, 11th Army and border troops deployed there are a factor of containment of NATO's eastward expansion.

Shakhray stressed that the conservation of post-World War II borders is the cornerstone of European stability.

He called Kaliningrad Russia's western outpost.

### Submarine Reactors To Provide Electricity in North

*LD2610233795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English*
*1717 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By Valentina Alekseyeva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 26 (ITAR-TASS) — Nuclear reactors for submarines will provide heating and electric power for North Russian regions which are difficult of access, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov told ITAR-TASS.

The minister said that Russian specialists had developed a nuclear plant which would work with reactors made for small submarines. Specialists are assembling one such installation. The plants will be finished in two years.

Two installations of the type with a capacity of 100 megawatt will provide electric power for a city with

30,000 people and all industrial enterprises in the city, the minister said.

### Samara Governor Blasts 1996 Budget as Outdated

*MK2610145795 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 3*

[POSTFACTUM report: "Samara Governor Chides Center for Discrimination"]

[FBIS Translated Text] No sensible person will vote for the 1996 draft budget sent to the Federation Council. Such a view was voiced in a press conference in Samara by Konstantin Titov, head of the oblast administration. In his words, this is a "budget of the same old unitarian state" based on the former tax formula that prevents the development of either regions or industrial sectors. The governor also chided the federal authorities for discriminating against some federation components, citing Samara Oblast which, being an unsubsidized region, has received nothing under the transfer arrangements unlike its neighbors Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast and Tatarstan, who got more than one trillion and two trillion rubles respectively. Titov advised that budget reserves could lie in cutting back outlays for the state apparatus.

### Yaroslavl Governor Seeks Election Authorization

*MM2610144495 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 2*

[ITAR-TASS report: "Humblest of Requests: 'Authorize Democracy'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yaroslavl, 25 Oct — Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Anatoliy Lisitsyn has urged the Russian president to give authorization for elections of administration heads to be held this year in all oblasts and krays where the "leaders are ready." Right now Boris Yeltsin's October edict recommends that these elections only be organized "exceptionally" in a few regions, including Yaroslavl Oblast.

The presidential edict issued previously on this subject recommended that the elections of regional leaders initially scheduled to coincide with the Russian Federation State Duma elections 17 December be postponed until a later date, which caused a variety of reactions in the localities.

Anatoliy Lisitsyn thinks that appointment by election provides an opportunity to broaden the real rights of regional leaders and seek equal conditions for all Federation components and also provides additional protection against unwarranted interference from federal structures in regional affairs.

At the same time the Yaroslavl governor believes that the optimum scenario would be for oblast administration heads alone to be elected and for the governor to be entrusted with appointing other local leaders.

### Novosibirsk Governor's Election To Be Held 17 Dec

*964F0202A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 19 Oct 95 p 1*

[Article by Vladimir Kuzmenkin: "Who Will Sit In This Chair? Yesterday's Session of the Oblast Soviet of Deputies Scheduled Gubernatorial Elections for 17 December 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After Soviet power failed to cope with its regular tasks and a president emerged in Russia, the post of governor of Novosibirsk Oblast was held by two persons — first Vitaliy Mukha, and then Ivan Indinok.

Vitaliy Petrovich was not noted for any particular love for the president. Nevertheless, he was the one who was appointed at one time as governor. But by an Edict of President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, in a second attempt Mukha was relieved of his duties. As is known, he was named in working documents of then vice president Aleksandr Rutskoy as a potential prime minister. Such rebellion could not go unpunished for long....

Novosibirsk Mayor Ivan Indinok was appointed acting governor by Yeltsin. Ivan Ivanovich frequently said in those days that he did not very much want to leave the city and acquire a province. However, he soon became a "permanent" governor without the prefix "acting." Indinok remains in the position of head of the oblast administration to this day.

It must be said that great credit belongs to Indinok for the fact that gubernatorial elections in Novosibirsk Oblast will still be held. Although he himself said not long ago that he has not yet made the decision whether to run in the elections—it is clear that Ivan Ivanovich is not averse to once again becoming governor, now not by edict, but according to the results of popular will. At present the named candidates are the current governor, Ivan Indinok; Anatoliy Manokhin, representative of the president; Aleksey Manannikov, deputy of the Federation Council; and Vitaliy Mukha, vice president of the Levoberezhnyy Bank. There are of course other aspirants also.

After the December elections, someone has to occupy the chair at the governor's table. It is not ruled out that instead of the question in the headline we will have to repeat one of the two photographs that you see. However, this in fact is up to you, esteemed reader, and it depends....

### Vladivostok Resists Sale of Warships to ROK

*MK2610122595 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 25 Oct 95 p 2*

[Report by Oleg Kryuchek: "South Korea Has Finally Received the *Minsk* and the *Novorossiysk*, Sold to It a Year Ago. The Russian Side Was Reluctant To Part With Them"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Khabarovsk — The long and intricate story of the sale of the written-off Russian aircraft carriers *Minsk* and *Novorossiysk* to South Korea to be cut for metal scrap seems to have come to an end. In accordance with the contract signed on 6 October 1994 by the Young Distribution company of South Korea and the Defense Ministry Central Directorate for Material Resources and Foreign Economic Cooperation, a South Korean tug had started towing the *Minsk* to the port of Pusan. Having bid the highest price — $170 per tonne of metal — the Young Distribution company won a competition in which over 30 Russian and foreign companies participated. Thus the Russian Defense Ministry has now received the full contractual amount, i.e. $4,583,000 for the *Minsk* and $4,314,000 for the *Novorossiysk*. Representatives of the special commission in the Far East city of Sovetskaya Gavan have said that in the near future the cruiser *Novorossiysk* will also leave the Postovaya Bay in Russia.

It should be noted that the situation with the written-off ships has been rather tense over the past year. At times, the confrontation between the Defense Ministry central apparatus and the Pacific Fleet headquarters, Russian and foreign entrepreneurs, and regional and federal political authorities were taking completely unexpected turns. The question of the role and the degree of involvement in the deal between the Defense Ministry and the South Korean side of the intermediary company Kompas — whose management includes Vladimir Chernavin, former chief commander of the USSR Navy; Mikhail Moiseyev, former chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; and Admiral Igor Makhonin, former chief of Navy Rear Services — has remained undisclosed. The Defense Ministry itself is very relaxed about Kompas. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Igor Khmelnov, however, spoke very harshly about the company, calling its leaders "people who have forgotten about patriotism," and suggested that the *Minsk* and the *Novorossiysk* could be used by some hypothetical third countries as combat units.

The latter statement was picked up by the Russian special services, which claimed that there still was some secret machinery left on the written-off aircraft carriers — which had been stationed in the Postovaya Bay, in abeyance and virtually unprotected, for several years — and no gold, silver, and platinum had been extracted from the remaining instrumentation. For this reason, when in December last year tugs arrived from South Korea for the already South Korean aircraft carriers, Far East customs officers suddenly demanded that mess decks and compartments on the ships that had already been welded up be unwelded so that they could make sure again that there were no secret machinery or smuggled goods.

As a result, the tugs were standing idle for the whole winter in Russian waters, and the opportunity was seized by representatives of the Pacific Fleet and the Maritime Kray administration. They attempted to halt the dispatch of the aircraft carriers using a different approach: It was alleged that South Korea did not possess the facilities to break up ships of this caliber for metal scrap. Therefore it was proposed that the aircraft carriers be cut at a Russian enterprise, Dalintermet, whose managers said they were ready to set to work immediately. In addition, both fleet and administration officials kept giving assurances that it would be much more profitable to sell reworked metal rather than whole ships. Moreover, Vice Admiral Nikolay Lysenko, deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet, said at a press conference in Vladivostok that the *Minsk* and the *Novorossiysk* would be broken up precisely at the Dalintermet enterprise, as if a final decision had already been made.

Recent developments, however, have shown that Mr. Lysenko was mistaken: The aircraft carrier *Minsk*, already under tow, will soon be cut up for metal scrap at a ship-breaking yard in India. Under the terms of the contract, the ships are to be cut up within one month of being delivered to the yard, and a special Russian commission will supervise this. Such a seemingly happy end to this long-drawn-out story of the cruisers is, in fact, only the beginning, since, under the same contract, the Young Distribution company is sole owner of 44 more written-off ships of the Pacific Fleet. Neither the Maritime Kray administration, nor the Pacific Fleet command is willing to cede to Moscow, without a fight, an exclusive right to dispose of what is thought of in Vladivostok as the fleet's property. Both regional officials and admirals regard the utmost irregularity of payments transferred to the accounts of, say, the Pacific Fleet — running at up to 60 percent of the total amount under the contract — as one of their trump cards. Moreover, Vladivostok intends to give some serious thought to the remaining 40 percent, shared by the Russian Defense Ministry and the Navy headquarters, too.

### Krasnodar First Region Fully Provisioned With Grain

*MM2710095895 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Oct 95 p 2*

[Report by Andrey Aderekhin: "Kuban Bakes Excellent Bread and Is Willing To Sell Grain to Other Regions of Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Krasnodar Kray — Krasnodar Kray is the first and so far only area of Russia to have provided itself with enough grain to last until the new harvest: Grain procurements for local stocks have been completed in full here.

Regional stocks have procured 550,000 tonnes of wheat with kray budget money. [passage omitted]

"Hence one of the lowest prices for bread in Russia," V. Krokhmal, president of the "Kubankhleboprodukt" Joint-Stock Company, said. "In September 1 kg of bread made with top-grade flour in the Kuban cost 1,825 rubles [R]. By the end of the year we predict that the price will rise to R2,500, thus a 750-g loaf will cost around R2,000. In many other regions the price of 1 kg of bread has risen to R7,000 or even R10,000."

One should particularly mention the quality of the bread made with the latest harvest's grain. This year, according to specialists, wheat did not so much ripen as shrivel up. As a result a great deal of wheat was obtained with a high gluten content, but poor-quality. The situation was also made worse by the severe damage to the grain caused by bugs. Needless to say, the situation was different in various parts of Kuban and various farms. However, the result was that regional stocks nonetheless ended up with Grade III wheat, which can only be used for baking if improvers are added.

Nevertheless I can see from my own experience that the quality of the bread being sold in the stores has not deteriorated of late when flour from the newly harvested grain was being used. [passage omitted]

In September contracts were concluded with Nizhniy Novgorod, Bashkortostan, Smolensk, Tula, Penza, Kaluga, and a number of other regions to sell about 350,000 tonnes of grain. But so far only about 200,000 tonnes have been dispatched. Purchases of Kuban wheat are mainly being held up by regions' lack of cash.

## Economic Issues

### Ruble, Bond Movements During Crisis Reported

*LD2710004195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2008 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 26 (INTERFAX-FIA) — News of President Boris Yeltsin's illness brought the ruble down slightly against the U.S. dollar on the interbank market Thursday evening, commercial banks told the Financial Information Agency.

According to a dealer, the ruble went from 4510-4512 rubles per dollar to 4514-4516. Experts believe the fall might continue Friday but the speed of a decline would largely depend on the Central Bank.

Meanwhile, a spokesman for the European Trade Bank said the decline was temporary.

During the Russian president's illness on July 11 the ruble on the interbank market fell from 4512 rubles per dollar to 4541 in one day. The decline continued for several days to 4580 rubles per dollar but on July 17 it returned to its level of the previous week.

[Moscow INTERFAX in English, during the same transmission, adds: "The market of currency bonds traditionally sensitive to political developments in Russia reacted weakly to the news of President Boris Yeltsin's illness Thursday. According to a spokesman for the biggest operator on the market - MFK-Moskovskiye Partnyory, quotations of bonds of the third and fourth tranches slipped by merely 0.2% after media reports of Yeltsin's illness. Probably someone simply used the news for playing the bonds down. The quotations are now returning to their former level. Foreigners who have a prominent part in the market will not be selling their packages, an expert of a leading Western bank told the Financial Information Agency. 'Investors remember a similar situation last summer and their attitude is clear,' he said."

[Moscow INTERFAX in English also adds, in another item during the same transmission: "Reports of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's ailments have not influenced the Moscow interbank credit market which suffered a severe liquidity crisis last August. Mezhkombank and Kredit-Moskva bank dealers told INTERFAX's Financial Information Agency that rates have not grown in the past several hours and remained at 10-15% for overnight credits as of 5:00 p.m. Dealers believe that interbank credit rates will not change in the near future. They say that 'the interbank credit market is currently too sluggish and does not have the capacity to react to political developments.']

## 'Shadow' Economy Costs Budget 46 Trillion Rubles

*LD2610105595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0940 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 26 (ITAR-TASS) — The "shadow trade" turnover continues to grow in Russia and comprised 40 per cent of the total in 1994, thus stripping the budget of considerable tax revenues, according to the State Duma committee for economic policy.

It said in a report Thursday that illegal trade turnover amounted to 88 trillion roubles (20 billion USD) in 1994 while the total retail turnover was 216 trillion (50 billion USD).

The committee estimated the retail turnover at 213.4 trillion roubles in 1995 and at 561-576 trillion in 1996.

The state will thus lose 46.7 trillion roubles (over 10 billion USD) because of Value Added Tax dodging in 1995, the report said.

## Banks Repaying Depositors With Food, Footwear

*LD2710104695 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] A number of commercial banks of Russia that are facing a crisis situation have begun paying off the population's deposits in the form of foodstuffs. According to financial information news agency, the Lider bank in the town of Biysk is paying off its debts to depositors in the form of flour, sugar, sausages, cheese, and stewed fruit. These products belonged to the main debtor of the bank, the Altyar trading house. The Biysk branch of Gornyy Altay has began paying off the population's deposits in the form of the products of the local shoe making factory, which is also a debtor of the bank. All depositors can choose sandals and autumn boots for themselves at the factory.

## Livshits Interviewed; Promises Help to Banks

*MK2710090695 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Oct 95 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Aleksandr Livshits, presidential economic adviser, by Vladislav Kuzmichev under the "Reform" rubric; place and date not given: "There Will Be No Financial Collapse in Russia. Aleksandr Livshits Is Ready To Repulse Any Attacks by Critics of Current Economic Policy" — first passage is NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia has approached the second stage of reform. The first stage, with a double-digit monthly inflation rate and an abrupt production slump, has arguably been left behind. A situation remains, however, in which banks, which were deprived of what used to be highly profitable instruments, are in dire straits, while enterprises cannot not get loans because interest rates are inaccessible to them. Aleksandr Livshits, presidential economic policy adviser, comments on the current situation in the Russian economy.

[Kuzmichev] Many people say that Russia is in for a financial collapse by the year's end or early next year.

[Livshits] Such forecasts have been made fairly often. A food collapse used to be forecast, a standstill of the entire industry. Fortunately, none of that has occurred.

As for predictions of financial collapse, I am aware of them. Their most substantial foundation is that something has in fact changed in the economic environment this year.

For all the flaws of the federal budget, it resembles a normal budget much more than all the previous ones — at least with regard to paying off the deficit. The currency exchange rate has remained stable for a fairly long time now, and if the currency corridor were now abolished, it is far from evident that something unexpected would happen to the exchange rate.

There is yet another explanation: The government is pursuing an austere monetary policy. The Central Bank is refinancing commercial banks within an extremely narrow scope.

In other words, talk of financial stabilization and real deeds have come considerably closer together.

Our banks, which are fairly young and very weak by international standards — only six of them, including three former Soviet banks abroad, are listed in the top 1000 — have found themselves in a fairly difficult position. They have achieved a major part of their turnover through currency operations, exploiting a fickle exchange rate, at the expense of the budget, and so forth. Now some of these opportunities are already in the past.

Far from all banks can adapt themselves to the new conditions. The banking system is partly changing and evolving, partly bursting and crumbling. The situation is reminiscent of 1992, when state enterprises were confronted with market hardships for the first time. Those who were quick adapted themselves; others simply burst and crashed. Those crashes sent a political wave and appeals to the state to save them and so forth. All that ended in the writing off of mutual debts and an inflation rate with which we still cannot cope.

At the time, banks were not in such dire straits; they had other opportunities to survive. Now they have become much less numerous. Our fledgling banks shoulder an immense burden. Apart from regular banking operations, several large banks have formed a consortium to realize a plan under which they will give the state a loan against the collateral of shares in state enterprises. This is a huge distraction of resources. Moreover, one should not forget that these banks keep up the market of short-term treasury bonds. This is a very heavy burden.

When you consider the current plight of commercial banks, two approaches are possible. The first approach: first come, first served. Some could survive, others couldn't — and good riddance. This approach will entail all understandable hardships, but there is no wish to rescue all commercial banks either — this would fuel a rise in inflation.

What is needed is a more flexible plan for propping up the banking system. It is a matter, let's say, of reducing the tax burden on currency loans and banks' own reserves. The president has already issued a corresponding directive in that regard.

Our banking community currently resembles a women's dormitory, where they spend time together and are on friendly terms only when a fire has to be put out. Then they start being jealous, and so forth. These are growth-related diseases, and so as to avoid the negative consequences of the banking crisis, banks should now be supported.

In addition, it is necessary to point out that currently something that is called cash privatization is just around the corner. This is an extremely complex matter. The main problem here is money, because there are not many ways of accumulating it in this country.

In the present-day situation it is essential to heed the stance of the director corps. There are very few chiefs who would like to become state enterprise directors again, but there are many more of those who, having tasted all the pleasures of a market economy, have not yet forgotten those of a socialist economy. Many of them want to have a certain economic freedom and to receive state subsidies at the same time.

Presently, the directors have to make a choice. If we now had the fall of 1996, not the fall of 1995, then, in the event the continuity of authority is retained, it would be much easier to work. But now everything could be done differently. The alternative in the Russian economy is not "forward or backward," but "forward or stand still." If we stay put, in principle this will not be a catastrophe. I am just sorry for the people: How much longer can they wait for normalization to begin?

The psychology of a timeserver proved to be very persistent. People have become accustomed to a situation in which there are no normal laws and decisions can be made at an agency or government level. They have become accustomed to nonpayments and feel perfectly okay. They do complain, but in principle they live comfortably. Plenty of people have emerged who do not want the economy to return to normal. For this reason they are hostile to any steps aimed at stabilizing it.

The authorities, of course, bear their share of the blame. One of the main drawbacks in Russian politics is that "unbalanced," head-on decisions are still adopted and nothing is done to offset their negative consequences.

Still, certain compensatory steps have been taken: Export duties were lifted, the growth in prices for the products of natural monopolies was arrested. But in this case one thing drags another after it. On 13 October a decree was passed effectively freezing tariffs for many products until January. With regard to exports, this is a fully evident compensatory measure. But the snag is that when you freeze electric energy tariffs while you have a huge number of enterprises receiving free electric power that cannot be cut off, an obvious question arises: How can the electric power industry itself, or the railways, for that matter, survive? Their costs are also growing. Then we take a whole series of compensatory steps, this time regarding the electric power industry and the railways. In my view, this is what is called a more or less balanced economic policy.

[Kuzmichev] A number of experts think that every country has its own inflationary background, that is, an inflation rate that is natural for it. In particular, it is pointed out that it is necessary to raise prices for certain products to the world level, to introduce market prices for transport, and so forth.

[Livshits] In principle, I do not object to the term "background," but I also know that a monthly inflation rate of 4 percent will mark an end to our hopes for an upswing. This will mean that industry will receive no loans, because no one will be able to take loans at these exorbitant interest rates. The background, if any, can be 1 percent.

[Kuzmichev] Many people think that short-term treasury bonds bear too high an interest rate.

[Livshits] In my view, it is too high, but with one addition: For a whole range of banks this is the sole opportunity to keep up a high level of liquidity. Until we have taken compensatory steps with regard to the banking system, an abrupt drop in the profitability of short-term treasury bonds would mean that a full-scale collapse is approaching.

The stabilization of the ruble and the pressure of exporters asking for a breathing-space are justified and steps have already been taken to meet them half way.

But by the same token, banks are just as entitled to speak up about their plight as exporters. They are currently unable to play on exchange rate differences, on arbitration transactions between a stock exchange and the interbank market. If steps are taken to meet the first group half way, it would be logical to offer a helping hand to the second group as well.

But in conditions of a continuing budget deficit the state will keep up a high interest rate on short-term treasury bonds. There is the so-called "crowd out" effect. The state needs money, and it will get it by offering high interest rates to the banks. Currently this effect is strong. If the banks are given good support in other ways, not through short-term bonds, this effect can be diminished by reducing the profitability of these operations. But as long as there is a budget deficit, this effect is bound to work.

Therefore, the best thing that can be done is to have no budget deficit; but if you have it, it is better to have the "crowd out" effect than to fuel a rise in inflation via Central Bank loans. The whole world lives according to the scheme whereby the budget deficit is paid off by issuing treasury bonds. No one in the Central Bank takes loans directly. But the bonds that are sold by auction are short-term. Presently, the Russian economy is such that it will be very difficult to sell long-term bonds — no one will buy them, because the associated risks are too high.

In addition, we are too late in bringing state securities to the world market. This year we just started contemplating that. But in fact the key investor throughout the world is the private investor, not the Monetary Fund. The investor has a small sum of money, his favorite brokers' office, and he does not care at all where his money will be invested. What is important for him is to get a 5-percent annual return.

This is a giant market with an unbelievable capacity that does not deal with short-term instruments at all. I see the ideas of certain government members to lure foreign investors with 3- to 6-month treasury bonds as inherently flawed. There is a possibility of placing bonds abroad for a period of 3-5 years; it is just that few people have given thought to that.

The president has sent a directive to the government, tasking it with promptly devising and drawing up mechanisms and regulations to enable mid-term bonds to enter the world market. Then it will become plainly evident that the receipt of money against treasury bonds is fully realistic. Such kinds of borrowings are, first, cheaper than those made domestically and, second, they have no impact on domestic investment.

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## Government Session Discusses Investment Policy

*MM2610165595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (Weekend Edition) in Russian 27 Oct 95 p 3*

[Report by Vladimir Kucherenko: "Investments Are the Bread of the Economy. But What Is To Be Done If There Is Not Enough Money?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We do not have enough resources, and what we do have must be spent carefully — that was the upshot of yesterday's Russian Federation Government session, at which the draft federal investment program for next year was discussed.

Presenting it, Deputy Economics Minister Yakov Urinson noted: In 1995 the program is not being satisfactorily fulfilled, yet without investments it is impossible to make our way onto a normal development path. The meagerness of resources is exacerbated by their inefficient use, or to put it more simply, money-wasting. The program to boost private investments, in which the state added one ruble [R] of its own to every four private rubles, was also derailed. It emerged at the session that the reason for this was the inadequately prepared mechanism for this process.

Investments from the state budget are still a weak point in the reforms; this year these investments will be financed to only 35 percent of the planned level. As Yakov Urinson stated, the proportion of investments from the federal treasury will remain very modest next year too. Well-substantiated applications from ministries, dictated by the country's urgent needs, have already totaled R78 trillion on their own. Without this expenditure, the deputy economics minister stressed, it is not possible to embark on a "trajectory of stable growth." However, the budget can only supply R27.7 trillion, one-third of that level. The situation also remains very strained as regards the "Housing" Program, the construction of housing for servicemen, the provision of border facilities on Russia's new borders, and the development of nuclear power and transportation.

Many sector ministers expressed their dissatisfaction with the draft that was submitted. Complaints about the program were also put forward by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation: In T. Paramonova's view, the Ministry of Economics is far too optimistic about the possibility of attracting credits from commercial banks. As A. Nechayev, head of the Russian Finance Corporation, stated, the program still does not identify the state's investment policy priorities, and the projects in which the state intends to invest next year have been handed on from one program to the next, sometimes ever since 1991. Yu. Petrov, head of the State Investment Corporation, lamented the lack of a policy of national priorities in investments and the insufficiency of laws.

The head of government closed the discussion. In his opinion, it is necessary to delineate mechanisms more clearly and define the main avenues. Among the priorities are the restoration of Chechnya's economy, employment for the population there, the nuclear power industry, and the restoration of satellite communications systems. So the draft must be sent back for further work.

The session also discussed a draft program for the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, and progress in fulfilling the Russian Federation Government action plan for implementing the president's message to the Federal Assembly.

### Chechnya's Restoration Cost Said To Exceed Target

*MK2610122295 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 25 Oct 95 p 4*

[Report by Marina Mikaelyan: "Finance Ministry Not Managing To Finance Chechnya's Economy. Volume of Housing To Be Restored in Chechnya Could Reach 2.5 Million Square Meters Next Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Finance Ministry's debt to construction workers in the Chechen Republic economic restoration zone for August and September of 1995 amounts to approximately 50 billion rubles [R]. For all that, the sum necessary for housing construction and reconstruction could exceed R2 trillion in 1996.

These figures were revealed at an expanded session of the collegium of the Russian Federation Construction Ministry attended by representatives of all sectors involved in the restoration of Chechnya's economy.

In compliance with the federal targeted program for restoring the economy and social sphere of the Chechen Republic, the amount of R967.3 billion has been fixed as the limit for capital investment, which for the most part is supposed to be spent on restoring facilities located right in Groznyy. In particular, some R450 billion is required for housing reconstruction, and some R300.3 billion for the restoration of the municipal economy, public health services, and education.

According to Deputy Construction Minister Albert Marshev, some R1,106.5 billion of capital investment — that is, virtually R139.2 billion more than the target figure — had already been utilized as of 1 October 1995. It is interesting to note that the deputy minister did not mention a single source of additional financing.

Mr. Marshev said that no less than 1.5 million square meters of housing will actually be subject to restoration next year; restoration of municipal economic facilities will cost R210 billion, and restoration of public health facilities R90 billion. Chechen Government Deputy Premier Mr. Saltakhanov, however, cited the figure of 2.5 billion square meters as the housing volume. Lack of coordination in calculating housing construction requirements is linked, most likely, with differences in the assessment of the volume of housing actually destroyed during the warfare.

Nonetheless, the directors of construction organizations operating in Chechnya are far more worried about safety guarantees, whose lack could bring about an outflow of workers from the restoration zone. This issue has been repeatedly discussed at high levels, but no serious decisions to this effect have been made thus far.

Russian, Ukrainian, and Czech builders are working under conditions of a permanent threat of militants' attacks. A spokesman for the "Yugstroy" construction and financial corporation said in this respect that the company had suffered economic losses of R2.5 billion. Since the start of the restoration works in Chechnya, 27 construction workers have been killed and more than 90 injured.

### Government Edict on Energy Strategy Presented

*MM2610150095 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Oct 95 p 3*

[Russian Federation Government 13 October 1995 Decree No. 1006 from the "Documents" section: "On Russia's Energy Strategy"

[FBIS Translated Text] In execution of the Russian Federation President's 7 May 1995 edict No. 472 "On basic guidelines for energy policy and the structural restructuring of the Russian Federation fuel and energy complex for the period through 2010" (anthology of Russian Federation legislation 1995, No. 19, p 1739) the Russian Federation Government decrees:

1. That Russia's energy strategy (basic provisions) submitted by the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Energy be basically approved).

The Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy and the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy must amplify Russia's energy strategy (basic provisions) proceeding from the federal laws, Russian Federation president's edicts, and Russian Federation Government decrees adopted in 1995 on questions of economic reform and the activity of the fuel and energy complex and send it to interested federal organs of executive power and organs of executive power of the components of the Russian Federation.

2. That it be recommended to the federal organs of executive power and the organs of executive power of the components of the Russian Federation that they be guided by Russia's energy strategy (basic provisions) in elaborating and implementing measures for state regulation in the sphere of the fuel and energy complex including the formation of the energy market and the creation of a competitive environment in the sphere of the production and consumption of energy carriers and also in elaborating investment, scientific and technical, and other programs for the development of sectors and regions.

3. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Energy, the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, the Russian Federation Ministry of Finances, the Russian Federation Ministry for Atomic Energy, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technology Policy in conjunction with interested federal organs of executive power elaborate and submit in 1995 to the Russian Federation Government a draft federal "Fuel and Energy" program for 1996-2000 providing in it for measures for the structural restructuring of the fuel and energy complex with a view to ensuring reliable and effective energy supplies for the country, for the development of the raw material base of the Russian Federation fuel and energy complex, the implementation of an energy-saving policy, the safeguarding of the Russian Federation's energy independence and security, and the maintenance of its energy export potential.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government.

## International Affairs

### Prime Minister's Visit to U.S. Assessed

*WS2610120795 Lvov POST-POSTUP in Ukrainian 10-15 Oct 95 p 2*

[Commentary by Yuriy Korolyuk: "In the East Ukraine Borders Russia, in the West, With... America"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Such a "location" may seem paradoxical only at first glance. The current political situation in Ukraine testifies to the fact that Kiev must balance between two axes — Washington and Moscow — in its geopolitics. Sir Bolinbrook, a hero of the play "A Glass of Water," says: "If a small country is to be seized not by one, but two big countries, it has a chance to survive." This is precisely the impression which has taken shape following [Prime Minister] Yevhen Marchuk's visit to the United States.**

It is interesting that the basic goals of the Ukrainian delegation were not political, but economic negotiations. Ukraine, after getting rid of the USSR, has unfortunately inherited the basic principle of Soviet diplomacy and the favorite principle of Chinese scouts: "We find the difficulties ourselves and then we successfully overcome them." The basic difficulties were created by Kuchma and Marchuk when they delivered their addresses at a conference of economic scientists. The IMF and the World Bank do not understand such jokes (about reforms with a human face). As a result, Ukraine received its $350 million in the third tranche of a stand-by credit with difficulty. "Babbling" at economic conferences also frustrated the preparation of a principal resolution on granting Ukraine a new credit in the amount of $3.5 billion, including money needed to create a stabilization fund for the hryvnya.

U.S. business circles are not capable of understanding paradoxical actions of our leaders. On the one hand, one of the conditions for extending U.S. credits to the Ukrainian economy is to abolish mandatory sales of hard currency by enterprises. On the other, the Ukrainian parliament has prepared a draft resolution on 100-percent (!) mandatory sale of hard currency. In other words, as long as you live, you will have occasions to become surprised.

Regarding the true "pluses," they include an agreement with the World Bank. Ukraine will receive $114 million for reconstruction of the Dnepropetrovsk hydroelectric power plant, $32 million in credit for the development of the seed industry, and $25 million for agriculture.

Another goal of Marchuk's visit to the United States was the traditional Russian factor. The United States' interest in Ukraine can be explained very simply: The U.S. policy with regard to Russia has suffered a fiasco. Moscow's actions have not only become uncontrollable, but also unpredictable. The war in Chechnya, the opposition to NATO expansion, unequivocal support for the Serbs, Moscow's willingness to create its own military bloc — all these are alarming issues for the U.S. establishment.

A change in priorities of the U.S. policy with regard to the former USSR countries was delineated in Bill Clinton's phrase: "The United States needs a powerful, market-oriented Ukraine." Secretary of Defense William Perry spoke about 55 joint actions that are being planned for the next year. Vice President Albert Gore aired a list of Ukraine's 12 basic problems and proposed assistance in virtually all of them. Special attention, according to Gore, should be paid to the availability of independent energy resources. (The leadership of the "Eximbank" supported an idea of providing Ukraine with oil from Arab countries at the expense of those countries' debt to the United States. Ukraine will be able to obtain 2 million tonnes of oil.)

If Ukraine is now able to "play" on confrontation between Moscow and Washington, it will gain both economic and political dividends. Thus, following the negotiations held with U.S. politicians, Marchuk stated that, in the event of Moscow's unconstructive policy with regard to the Black Sea Fleet problem, Kiev does not rule out a possibility to address the United States for arbitration.

Thus, as of now, Ukraine borders with Russia in the east and... the United States in the west. Such a location between the two giants may bring either destruction or revival. The question whether Ukraine will have enough wisdom, common sense, and determination to balance between "the devil and the deep blue sea" remains open.

### Kuchma on Importance of Meeting 'Arafat at UN

*LD2610152595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1242 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brasilia, October 26 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma indicated the importance of unofficial meetings during his stay in New York for the celebration session on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. The President has singled out his meeting with PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) leader Yasir 'Arafat.

"Good prospects are opening for cooperation with Palestine," he told a press-conference in Brasilia on October 26 in reply to a question from an Interfax - Ukraine correspondent.

L. Kuchma described 'Arafat as a "no ordinary personality", indicating that the Palestinian leadership wants to see Ukraine as "a base for training personnel for reserch institutions and for the development of the Palestinian state".

On top of that, Kuchma added, they want to see us as "participants in negotiations, which is also of great importance".

A Palestinian delegation is to visit Kiev soon, Kuchma also disclosed.

### President Kuchma Strongly Opposes NATO Expansion

*LD2610193295 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukraine is against NATO's revolutionary expansion and Europe's new division into two camps, President Leonid Kuchma said at a news conference in Brasilia. Fulfilling the request of a Moscow correspondent to clear up Ukraine's stand on the further expansion of NATO, Kuchma stressed that the stand remains invariable. We are resolutely against any revolutionary ways of developing this process but in favor of its evolutionary development, he said. Perhaps, more than one year will pass, elections will take place in Russia and then in the United States and we shall get to know each other better. The more so if European countries, including Russia, agree to cooperate with NATO actively, the Ukrainian president remarked. Of course, Ukraine is against dividing Europe into two camps once more and against building any kind of new Berlin wall, Kuchma said.

Replying to a question on the expediency of more active relations within the CIS framework at the regional level rather than cooperation within an organization, similar to the Mercosur integration system in Latin America, Kuchma said: The stronger Brazil meets less developed countries half way. Unfortunately, there is no such practice within the CIS. Not one single document adopted and signed at the CIS level works. I have repeatedly told Boris Yeltsin in plain words: You should understand that if you push [other countries] some of these will definitely find themselves in a different embrace, Kuchma remarked. Unfortunately, Russia is acting today from the position of a great power confident that no country can do without it and that they will all come back. In continuation of this thought Kuchma mentioned the situation of the Black Sea Fleet as an example. Its problems could have been solved long ago, Kuchma said. Moreover, Ukraine has made significant concessions as regards this issue. However, it turns out that, for some reason, we are communicating via TV and other mass media. Here lies the difference between cooperation within the framework of Mercosur and within the framework of the CIS. The CIS countries do not enjoy respect. Moreover, they do not even feel equal partners, Kuchma stressed.

### Kuchma Feels No Common Equal Partnership With Russia

*LD2610130295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1050 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BRASILIA, Oct 26 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said that Russia bears in mind only its own interests in relations with other CIS countries.

He feels "neither respect, nor common equal partnership" he said in an interview with journalists in Brasilia.

The problem of the Black Sea Fleet "could be solved much earlier," he believes. "Ukraine is making great concessions on this issue," he added.

"We agreed with Yeltsin that our prime ministers would meet every month and every day, if necessary, to solve the problem. But the situation is quite different," Kuchma said, noting that "recently we have largely associated through mass media."

Speaking about the Bosnian crisis, Kuchma underlined that "it is impossible to solve this problem without Russian participation because the Serbs always viewed Russia as its defender."

"Ukraine is prepared to participate in crisis settling but not in military operations," Kuchma underlined. "For example, we are ready to build bridges and hospitals," he said.

Speaking about NATO's enlargement, Kuchma underlined that "this evolutionary issue may take several years," and the results of future elections in the United States and Russia may influence this process.

Kuchma emphasized that Ukraine opposes deploying nuclear weapons in Eastern European countries, NATO's potential member-countries.

### President Arrives in Argentina From Brazil

*LD2710105295 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukraine and Argentina are to sign a declaration on the principles of political relations during President Leonid Kuchma's three-day official visit to Buenos Aires. President Kuchma, who is touring Latin American countries, has arrived in the Argentinian capital from Brazil.

Today, he will meet Argentinian President Carlos Menem, visit the country's Supreme Court, and deliver a lecture at the Argentinian Council for International Affairs; the lecture is entitled: Ukraine and the International Community.

President Kuchma also plans to meet the leaders of Buenos Aires and Misiones Provinces, home to many Ukrainian emigres, whom Kiev regards as instrumental in boosting trade and economic relations with this South American country.

According to the Viktor Pashchuk, Ukraine's ambassador in Buenos Aires, the visit is aimed at strengthening bilateral relations in the political and economic spheres. The two countries established diplomatic relations on 6 January 1992, although they have shared friendship and cooperation for a long time. Argentina is home to over 350,000 Ukrainians, making up one of the largest Ukrainian expatriate communities.

## National Affairs

### Draft Constitution Envisages Two-House Parliament

*LD2610130895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1050 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BRASILIA, Oct 26 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukraine's draft constitution provides for the creation of a two- house parliament, Ukraine President Leonid Kuchma told a press conference in Brasilia Thursday.

He said the draft provides for strong executive authorities headed by a president, and also strong legislative and independent judicial authorities.

In accordance with the current constitution, the Ukrainian parliament has 450 deputies elected on the basis of a majority system. He said that political reform was the main task facing the Ukrainian leadership.

The draft is to be submitted to the Constitutional Commission in November 1995.

### Moroz Supports Kuchma on Delimitation of Powers

*LD2610124795 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1010 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no dateline as received] — "One of the most important problems that should be resolved in Ukraine's new draft constitution is the problem of delimiting the functions of power and I fully support the president on this," Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz said in an interview with UNIAN.

According to him, the constitutional commission has not yet reached agreement on this problem. He is convinced that the issue could be resolved "only by inserting a legal clause in the Constitution under which various branches of power would not function in a single legal sphere while the parliament would only concern itself with legislative matters."

Moroz considers that it would be unacceptable to include a mechanism whereby the parliament could be elected on a proportional basis with a large coalition or party majority and whereby the government is appointed on a different political basis allowing it to pursue possibly an opposing aim. "In this event the phenomenon of permanent crisis would be written into the Constitution," he stressed.

The parliament chairman emphasized that this contradiction, present in the constitutional treaty, should not be transferred to the Constitution. In his words, he will propose "several options that will help avoid this clash."

The parliament chairman also stressed that the sections of the draft constitution devoted to the judicial system and local self-government could be a "source of discussions in parliament and society."

### Moroz on Constitution Being Adopted by Referendum

*LD2610125495 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1010 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no dateline as received] — "I am very skeptical that the new constitution could be adopted by a referendum," Oleksandr Moroz, the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council said in an interview with UNIAN. He stressed that he had no doubts as to the legitimacy of holding a referendum but that "the nature of referendums are such that people will support any document that contains provisions ranging from anarchy to a monarchy."

"People should provide specific answers to specific questions but the Constitution does not envisage simple questions and simple answers," he emphasized.

He said that in an ideal world "it would be better if the Constitution were adopted by the Supreme Council rather than by some other body," as envisaged by the Constitution in force, and for this reason "it was necessary to create such a document that would satisfy the parliament."

The chairman of the Supreme Council stressed that it would be expedient for Ukraine to take into account the experiences of its neighbors who had resorted to holding referendums in order to avoid making mistakes. In his words, "it has not been ruled out that the mechanism for adopting the new constitution would need to be resolved in a legislative manner."

### Kiev Patriarchy Accuses Administration of 'Meddling'

*LD2610235095 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1910 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kiev — The Bishops' Council of the Holy Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kiev Patriarchy, has issued an appeal to believers. [passage omitted]

On 20 October this year, a group of people's deputies submitted a request to the president of Ukraine "On Interference of the President's Administration Employees in the Internal Affairs of the Church." The document says that "several employees of the president's administration have, in violation of the current legislation, been meddling in the internal affairs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kiev Patriarchy [UOCKP], connected with the election of the patriarch. Allegedly on behalf of the president, they held a meeting with the UOCKP bishops of the Galich, Ternopol, Kremenets, and Vinnitsa dioceses, during which they [words indistinct] by exerting pressure and giving promises to provide them with television air time and access to other mass media [words indistinct] withdrawal of several bishops from the UOCKP with the aim of preparing dissolution of the UOCKP as a whole. For this purpose, they held a meeting with Patriarch Yarema of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church [UAOC], so that later, manipulating dishonestly the idea of the churches' merger through the unification of several UOCKP bishops with the UAOC, they could use this as a pretext to outlaw the religious confession of the UOCKP which unites over 2,000 parishes and millions of believers."

This information has been provided specially for UNIAR by the press service of the Kiev Patriarchy.

## Belarus

### Central Commander: NATO Not Seeking Eastern Expansion

*LD2610202395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1420 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By Leonid Tratsevsky]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, October 26 (BELTA) — NATO does not seek to expand eastwards, but there are states which want to join NATO, Allied NATO Force Commander in central Europe General Hans Hansen said at a news conference summing up his two-day visit to Belarus.

He added that no one state which has not settled territorial disputes with its neighbours and its internal problems concerning ethnic minorities may be admitted to NATO.

Hansen recounted his meetings with the Belarus defence minister and with foreign ministry and parliament officials, saying that the talks were held to define intentions and stances of the sides on the procedure of Belarus accession to NATO's Partnership for Peace programme.

Hansen said the aim of the programme is to rapidly create conditions of stability, trust and security for all states of the European community.

Broad opportunities were provided to Hansen to see the reformed Belarus army.

He addressed trainees of the Belarus military academy and visited army units.

Hansen has left Belarus today.

### Roundtable With Russian Politicians Viewed

*WS2610140695 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 24 Oct 95 p 3*

[Report by Leanid Lakhmanenka: "Integration or Unification? Russia Does Not Exactly Know What To Choose"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **At the end of the last week, quite a significant event occurred in Minsk. A roundtable "Belarus-Russia: A Strategy of Partnership" was held in the International Educational Center. It was devoted to the state and prospects of Belarusian-Russian relations. The "East-West" Belarus National Center of Strategic Initiatives was the initiator and organizer of the meeting of Belarusian and Russian politicians, analysts, and political scientists.**

The aim of the meeting was "as always": to seek new mutually acceptable and profitable forms of cooperation; explain the integration processes between Belarus and Russia; and make an attempt to give a new powerful impetus to the creation of a strategic partnership to our nations' advantage. As for the "powerful impetus," I have no idea whether it was given or not, nevertheless we undoubtedly managed to clarify to a certain degree the standpoints and attitudes of both sides.

The roundtable's organizing committee proposed the following agenda for the meeting: Comparing the two standpoints — those of Minsk and Moscow — on ways to further integrate the two countries. With regard to this issue, our citizens are generally familiar with the standpoint of Belarusian officials, politicians, parties, and movements. Therefore, I believe that it would be worthwhile to more precisely acquaint our readers with the opinions voiced by the Russian participants in the round table.

I would like to point out that, in my opinion, Moscow's standpoint did not adequately correspond to the complicated nature and urgency of the issue under discussion. It was not well-considered and balanced, and did not contain constructive proposals which should be a typical feature of strategic decisionmaking. Even the thorough and polemically sharp speech by Anatoliy Maysenya — who is an independent expert and president of the "East-West" center — devoted to the rehabilitation of common sense in relations between Russia and Belarus did not "provoke" the guests from the near abroad. Meanwhile, Mr. Maysenya talked about not very pleasant matters. For instance, he mentioned that there are certain forces which under the slogans of integration will try to reestablish the former Soviet empire within the framework, at its beginning, of Russia and Belarus. This process includes the Belarusian administration's idea to form a confederation, the possible well- known referendum in Russia, and the Russian Federation Duma's support of this idea.

In Maysenya's opinion, all these add a particularly sensitive currency to relations between the two countries. The acceleration of the integration processes, without verifying them by real life, will only inflict damage and produce opposite results. This is particularly dangerous given that Belarusian-Russian relations objectively become a pattern for sensible, well-balanced, and progressive integration within the CIS framework. Currently, the acceleration of this process will lead to a loss of Belarusian sovereignty. In addition, Russia is not prepared for unification, either. Its political instability, the war in Chechnya, the state of its economy in the transitional period, and the high level of crime among the population makes a fast unification of Russia with Belarus impossible.

The Russians reacted to such an interpretation of the issue in a restrained manner and very diplomatically, as if it is not Belarus but Russia which makes every effort to unite. It seems that the reason for this kind of moderate reaction on the part of our guests does not lie in the fact that they were taken by surprise with Maysenya's speech. Judging by everything, the Russian participants "habitually" did not have (or perhaps did not want to reveal) a precise concept for integration and a standpoint on that issue.

Thus, all in all they were always "for." Russia's political advantages are obvious here. However, very profound mutually reciprocal integration will bring about a number of very complicated problems. A restrained concern over this fact was also expressed in the speech by Arkadiy Moshes, head of the European Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a speech which primarily dwelt on the topic "Moscow's standpoint." His speech was entitled: "Russia- Belarus: Old Problems and New Prospects."

According to Arkadiy Moshes, Russia is currently looking for a reliable and natural partner. But reliability is the most important factor. This is also conditioned by the fact that currently the situation in Europe has sharply changed; there is a threat of NATO's expansion at the expense of the East European states, as the result of which the deployment of nuclear arms there becomes quite a realistic problem. Russia is also not happy with the deterioration of relations with Ukraine. Whereas, Belarus is ready for integration. Russia is not against this, although it predicts quite a strong counteraction on the part of West European diplomats, particularly from Poland which is Belarus' neighbor.

However, Moshes was much more interested in the aspects of military-political cooperation; particularly in Belarus' status as a non-nuclear state. In his speech he also expressed concern over the fact how to practically ensure Belarus's sovereignty within the period of practical rapprochement, and avoid Belarus' regrets later. "How should it be done?" asked the expert, and he did not answer this question.

Similarly to other Russians who participated in the discussion, Emil Pain, deputy chief of the Russian President's Analytical Department, pointed out that this is a very complicated problem. There are many backstage speculations and insinuations and even political gossip about Russia and Belarus in Moscow. There is even a joke making the rounds that Alyaksandr Lukashenka will become a vice president in the organism newly created on the basis of the two countries. Mr. Pain thoroughly discussed the results of sociological research conducted among the Russians with regard to CIS problems. It revealed that 59 percent of the Russians are not interested in what is happening beyond Russia's border.

Overall, the Russians are not against integration with Belarus as such, but according to Mr. Pain, when the Russians felt that integration with Belarus might lead to economic problems in everyday life, the attitude of the polled immediately changed for the worse.

Mr. Pain reasonably pointed out that many of the advocates of profound integration between the two states unfortunately more often use fingers than specific calculations to justify it. He admitted that the only obstacle to integration is the state of the two countries' economies. Therefore, principal work should be conducted in this area.

Neither did Duma Deputy Gennadiy Zyuganov, the Russian communist leader, clarify this issue. I do not know whether it was intentional, but he "stuck" to the aspects of the grave all-encompassing crisis in Russia it has experienced since the collapse of the USSR — assisted by the cunning West. His speech was more of a propagandistic than constructive nature. So to speak, without profound integration none of the CIS countries will be able to establish normal production processes in the next 20 years. Zyuganov believes that delayed-action mines have been planted under the entire economy. He specified those mines: "technological," "agricultural," "social," "informational," and so on.

Incidentally, Zyuganov's colleague Syarhey Kalyakin, Belarusian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, said that despite the fact that he and his colleagues are calling for the creation of a new union of states, so far they do not have any document which would regulate relations among the members of that union.

Russian Duma Deputies Vladimir Averichev and Nikolay Stolyarov, while speaking on the issue of partnership strategy, did not say anything of a strategic nature. The former touched upon the already known economic aspects of this problem. The latter spoke emotionally with a rally fervor, and called for tighter integration of the Slavic nations. In his specific "Moscow-type point of view," the idea of unrestrained sovereignty has suffered a complete failure, and we should at least partially return to the former united market. Stolyarov warned that if the Ukrainian leadership's parochial attitude is transferred to Belarusian soil, Belarus will face a rapid, decisive, and irreversible catastrophe.

Despite the declarative nature of a majority of the Russian speeches, the round table became a positive phenomenon in our country's political life. Belarusian participants felt Russia's complicated attitude toward integration, its responsibility for taking this step and its possible results. Meanwhile, the Russians received first-hand information concerning the wide range of sometimes mutually excluding views, opinions, and assessments regarding further rapprochement between our two countries.

### U.S. Experts Arrive To Examine Accident at Dobrush Plant

*WS2710085895 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0800 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] A group of U.S. specialists has arrived in Minsk to examine the reasons for the accident at the Belkanvers Belarusian-U.S.-British joint venture at Dobrush. A preliminary investigation has found that an installation [ustanowka] made by U.S. specialists began to operate on 17 October 1995. During the days prior to the accident, work on this installation was conducted without permission from the Committee for Overseeing Safe Conduct of Work in Industry and Nuclear Power Engineering. The reasons for the fire have thus far not been found. It is known that on this tragic day 250 kg of gunpowder were brought to a workshop. Law enforcement bodies are conducting an inquiry into the accident.

## Moldova

### Popov: Chisinau To Avoid CIS Military Cooperation

*LD2710030595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2143 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CHISINAU, October 26 (Itar-Tass) - The constitution of Moldova defines it as a neutral state, and Moldova will most likely keep clear of the military-political programme of the CIS, Moldovan Foreign Minister Mihail Popov said in an interview with Itar-Tass.

He said Moldova takes part only in the CIS' economic contacts, and for this reason Russia's strategy towards the CIS members as formulated by President Boris Yeltsin is far from acceptable for Moldova.

As for NATO's eastwards expansion, Popov said NATO should give account to interests of Europian security, including Russia's.

He said despite joining NATO's Partnership for Peace programme Moldova does not seek membership of NATO.

### Protesting Students Suspend Strike Until 31 Oct

*AU2710082695 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1920 GMT 25 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau 25/10/1995 (BASA-press) — The Strike Committee told the protesters in Piata Marii Adunari Nationale that the strike is suspended until October 31 when the parliament will hear the report on government's activity. Until then students and teachers will be on passive strike. In its appeal to students, teachers and other sections of the population, the Strike Committee mentioned that "the president, government and parliament are the ones that breach the Constitution. The strikers' demands aim to improve the standard of living. The majority of people are protected neither by the President who vowed to observe the Constitution and protect fundamental rights nor by Parliament nor by Government which pursues the foreign and domestic policy, nor by unions which prefer to be on good terms with the leadership and therefore do not protect the interests of those who they represent... The strike has shown which force is capable of protecting people's interests, managed to stop the Agrarians' tendency to politicize the historical and scientific truth capitalizing on people's mildness, poverty and manipulation of public opinion." Anatol Petrencu, Strike Committee chairman, stated at the meeting that "it is not normal that such a government which has repeatedly proved its inability to solve economic problems is still at power." In his opinion, the passive strike is needed to reorganize and discipline the protesters, and to agitate the people so that October 31 will clearly show what attitude people have toward the current government. "We will ask President Mircea Snegur to make clear his opinion regarding the protests and our demands when he returns," said Petrencu. According to Oleg Cernei, Moldovan Students League chairman, Moldovan State University Senate decided yesterday that the entire faculty will join the protesters when the Parliament will consider President Snegur's legislative initiative on the official language name. According to the protocol signed yesterday between the presidential commission and the strike committee, the government shall pay off all salary and pension arrears until December 1. The commission promised to allow the strike committee to attend the parliamentary debates over Snegur's initiative and that the debates will be broadcasted live on national radio. The Moldovan Commercial Cooperative University (MCCU) Students League Senate withdrew from the Moldovan Students League today. In a press release, it argues that "the activity of the Moldovan Students League Coordination Council is in contradiction with the true demands of the MCCU students." The MCCU Students League is member of the Students Organization Federation which disapproved of the demands forwarded by the strikers.

## Kyrgyzstan

### Report on Talks Between Dzhumagulov, PRC Premier

*LD2510180995 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 25 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] As the press service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic has reported, the Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic and Li Peng, the premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, held negotiations in the House of People's Representatives on the afternoon of 23 October. In the course of these negotiations, the sides exchanged opinions on interstate relations between Kyrgyzstan and China and on other current issues of international politics.

Li Peng said that China respects the sovereignty, independence, and chosen path of the Kyrgyz Republic. The positions of both sides on many important problems of international politics coincide or are in accord. At present, cooperation between the two countries in diplomacy is broadening. The premier of the State Council expressed the hope that the border problems, which arose from history, will be settled soon with the united efforts of both sides, so that the borders between the two countries will become ties of peace and friendly cooperation. China approves the position of the government of Kyrgyzstan on the Taiwan problem and firmly speaks out against national separatist activity on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic against China. This means the activity of the some activists of the Uighur diaspora in Kyrgyzstan.

As for trade and economic relations between the two states, Li Peng announced that a healthy trend in these relations has appeared in recent years, and that trade and economic relations between two countries have great potential.

Kyrgyz Prime Minister Dzhumagulov supported the point of view of the Chinese side on trade and economic, scientific and technical, and humanitarian cooperation, and underlined that the government of Kyrgyzstan regards the present level of relations between the two friendly and neighboring countries with satisfaction, and expressed hope for the broadening of cooperation between the two countries in all spheres.

The head of the Kyrgyz official delegation confirmed that the government maintains the position of recognizing one China. To this end, he announced that the People's Republic of China is the sole government of China.

After the negotiations, the heads of government of the two countries participated in a ceremony to sign three intergovernmental agreements:

— An agreement between the governments of the People's Republic of China and Kyrgyzstan on scientific and technical cooperation;
— An agreement between the governments the Kyrgyz Republic and China on guaranteeing the quality of imported and exported goods; and
— An agreement between the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic and the State Education Commission of the People's Republic of China for the years 1995-1999.

The visit of head of the Chinese Government [as heard] is continuing.

### NATO Coordinating Unit Director Explains Activities

*LD2610220395 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 1200 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Kyrgyz Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs news service 25 October arranged a news conference for journalists, to which the leaders of the coordinating unit for implementation of the NATO Partnership for Peace program were invited. The director of the coordinating unit, General Vuller Lange [name as heard], spoke in detail about the aims and purposes of his activities in Kyrgyzstan:

[Begin Lange recording in English with simultaneous Russian translation] In reply to this question, I want to say that this program denotes a new type of activity and a new matter. That is why the main aim of my visit is to establish personal contacts with those people who are engaged in the military part of this Partnership for Peace program.

Also, I was very pleased to see the enthusiasm and interest with which the development of this program is being viewed in your republic and I think that this cooperation will also be developed further and that our department will be the necessary link between your republic and NATO. I consider it a very positive factor that our delegation was warmly met at both the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of defense and that these proposals and discussions were, I can say, mutually useful and mutually beneficial. It is also of no small importance that after the establishment of such personal contacts it will be easier for us to cooperate. If you pick up the receiver and hear the voice of somebody whom you have met personally, this simplifies all the procedures greatly. I understand very well your anxiety in relation to NATO and in my former post in my country, Denmark, we also had doubts about it at the time we joined NATO. My only regret is the shortage of time, that I have not managed to spend more time here in your wonderful country and that is why I shall look forward eagerly to my next opportunity to visit your republic. [end recording]

The chief of the personnel directorate of the Kyrgyz Republic Ministry of Defence Personnel Directorate Colonel Oleg Vitalyevich Chichin and an officer from the coordinating unit, Mr. Boufal Orda also participated in the news conference.

## Armenia

### Prime Minister Receives Japanese Businessmen

*LD2610225795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1945 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: no 206 (949)]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Armenia is interested in expanding cooperation with Japan and welcomes the steps of Japanese business circles to expand trade and economic relations between the two countries. The statement was made by Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan at his Thursday meeting in Yerevan with a group of Japanese businessmen on a four day visit in Armenia. Their visit was organized by the Armenian Chamber of Trade and Industry.

According to Bagratyan, the determination of Japanese big business to establish long-term relations with Yerevan is in tune with his cabinet's economic strategy emphasizing free trade and an open door policy of attracting investments.

Japanese businessmen who represented Chori, Matsushita and Mitsui corporations were satisfied with their stay in Armenia during which they visited key industrial facilities. They said they would inform the Japanese government about their trip and thought that the study of prospects of bilateral cooperation, primarily investments, would continue after that.

### Nuclear Power Plant To Start 'By End of November'

*NC2610142295 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC NEWS BULLETIN in English 0952 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan ("Azg" daily), 10/26/95—About 2,000 state and private enterprises of Armenia have a debt of 29 bln. drams to the Yerevan power network today.

Among the "leaders" are Nairit plant (646 mln. 274 thousand drams), YERAZ plant of vans (33 mln. 749 thousands), and Hayelectramekena plant of electric tools (18 mln. 454 thousands), as well as the Ministry of Interior, state TV, radio, etc.

Ministry of Energy reported that if the users pay the debt, the volume of gas supply from Turkmenistan will increase, and power supply schedule of the population too, will improve.

At the same time, press service of the ministry reported that the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant will start production of electric power by the end of November, as a result, 8 hours of electric power will be supplied to the population - 4 hours in daytime, 4 - in the night, if the problem of payments does not raise again.

### Nuclear Electric Power Station Reactor Back in Operation

*LD2710104995 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0800 GMT 27 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] An Armenian nuclear electric power station's [AES] reactor was made operational overnight. The second set of the Armenian AES, with a capacity of 400 megawatts, is working again, following an interval of six and a half years.

The deputy head of the Armenian Government's press service said that two weeks were needed for the station to begin to generate electric power and a further 20 days for it to reach its rated capacity of 9 million kwh of electric power every 24 hours. The station was restored in the spring of 1989, soon after a destructive earthquake in Armenia. The AES is currently operating under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision.

## Azerbaijan

### Aliyev Returns, Comments on New York Talks

*NC2610204695 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev, who has been visiting the United States since 20 October to take part in the celebrations in New York on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the UN, returned to the homeland today. On his way home, he stopped briefly in Istanbul and gave a news conference at Ataturk Airport.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Qulu Muherremov] Turkish reporters asked the Azerbaijani president various questions about his visit to the United States. The reporters were primarily interested in the Azerbaijani president's meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton, matters discussed at that meeting, and the role of the United States-Turkey-Russia troika in the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

President Geydar Aliyev replied to all these questions in a manner that satisfied the reporters, briefing them in detail on his contacts at the UN. He specifically stressed that his tenacious struggle for the independence of Azerbaijan under the current complex conditions was well received in the West. Therefore, Western political circles are trying to help resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, which has paralyzed the entire Caucasian region.

In his news conference, the Azerbaijani president also replied to reporters' questions on Turkey's participation in the oil consortium, transportation of the early oil, and Turkish-Azerbaijani economic cooperation.

After the news conference, the Azerbaijani president left Istanbul's Ataturk Airport for Baku. Turkey's Energy Minister Sinasi Altuner, Istanbul Mayor Hayri Kazakcioglu, and other officials saw the Azerbaijani president off.

After more than an hour's flight, the special plane carrying the Azerbaijani president landed in Bina at about 1630. The Republic's president was welcomed at the airport by Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Rasul Guliyev, Prime Minister Fuad Guliyev, head of the president's executive department Ramiz Mehdiyev, UN Permanent Representative in Azerbaijan Mahmud al-Sa'id, deputy prime ministers, ministers, and heads of enterprises.

Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev gave a brief interview to the news program on the results of his visit to the United States.

Our viewers only know the chronology of your visit to America. I would have liked to hear a few words from you on the importance and nature of this visit.

[Aliyev] The nature of the visit requires extensive discussion, for it differs from all my previous foreign visits in that during this visit I had approximately 30, or more, meetings. Most of them with heads of state and governments and heads of international departments of various countries. These show how important this visit was. Those accompanying me saw that our days were completely taken up with such contacts. We had a tight schedule, but the contacts were very productive. I consider all my contacts as very productive. Each meeting had a specific meaning and importance for our present and future. In general, I believe that this visit was a very positive step forward for the further consolidation and advancement of Azerbaijan's positions on the international level.

I felt during my contacts that the ongoing processes in Azerbaijan are well known to heads of state and government. They know many things, if not everything. In all my meetings, I felt that our policy is on the whole esteemed, and some of our moves are assessed as courageous and brave.

All this indicates that interest in Azerbaijan is steadily growing in the world, in all countries, and particularly in the big countries. Secondly, they are following the processes taking place in Azerbaijan with utmost interest. They are observing our difficulties as well as our achievements. They supported Azerbaijan's independence. That is, all the people with whom I talked affirmed Azerbaijan's independence. They confirmed that Azerbaijan is an independent state and despite various pressures, it protects, maintains, and wages an struggle for its independence. This, too, is an important point.

I cannot say that anyone is uneasy about the upcoming elections in Azerbaijan. I did not feel unease from any quarter. Mr. Ledskiy, head of the U.S. Democratic Institute in Washington, visited me yesterday. [Aliyev's statement drowned out by an airplane noise] This shows that naturally they want the elections in Azerbaijan to be democratic. At the same time they know that we are taking the necessary measures to hold democratic elections. I heard nothing negative as regards the measures we have been taking.

Since this visit was extremely substantive it should be discussed more extensively. If the opportunity arises I will do so.

[Muherremov] But, Mr. president you have to say a few words about your meeting with Clinton, in view of the fact that in her statement to Azerbaijani television Madam Albright described this as an historic meeting.

[Aliyev] My meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton was very important. I also agree that it was an historic meeting for us. If Madam Albright, one of Bill Clinton's closest aides, evaluates it thus, we cannot but give an even higher evaluation to it. It is clear that Bill Clinton only met two or three heads of states there, and one was his meeting with the Azerbaijani president. The Americans had widely publicized and discussed this meeting with interest beforehand. Before the official meeting, I met Bill Clinton at the UN ceremonies on several occasions and he said each time that we would meet and talk. Yes, the meeting was very important, because we discussed the development of bilateral ties and the problems relating to the exploitation of the Azerbaijani oil fields. Our joint decision with the consortium on 9 October, that is the decision on the two pipelines, was especially highly evaluated. I can state that the decision created a great sensation. Maybe we ourselves are unable to sufficiently comprehend its importance for the world community. It generated an enormous interest and was very well received. They noted that this decision was very important. Mr. Clinton and I discussed this issue, too. However, our main discussion naturally centered around settling the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict, finding the means to achieve it, and the lifting of Article 907 by the Congress. We exchanged views. He also indicated that this article is unjust and said he will exert efforts on this issue. I can state that a decision already passed through the Congress before our arrival here.

[Off-screen reporter] Yes.

[Aliyev] You know about it.

[Off-screen reporter] We know that.

[Aliyev] Have you already reported it?

[Off-screen reporter] Yes.

[Aliyev] Now there is movement on this issue, and I hope that we will achieve our objective. We discussed other issues, too. Our talks occurred in an atmosphere of great friendship, sincerity, and mutual understanding. I think that good personal relations developed between me and Mr. Clinton. [end recording]

## Georgia

### Shevardnadze Not Ruling Out Using Force in Abkhazia

*LD2710002395 Tbilisi SAKINFORM in Russian 1700 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] [No dateline as received] — Eduard Shevardnadze, the head of state, in an interview given to Georgian television, has said in particular that he remains a supporter of the peaceful settlement of the Abkhaz conflict. In his words, the current conditions are favorable, facilitating the political settlement of this problem. In particular, the position of international community is that it fully supports Georgia's territorial integrity. However, Eduard Shevardnadze does not rule out the fact that if the conflict settlement is not achieved by peaceful means, Georgia will have to use force to restore its jurisdiction in Abkhazia. Today, according to the head of state, this is barely possible. He thinks that in order to be successful in the war Georgia must be a united, strong state with a developed economy and the fully-formed army.

### Shevardnadze Promises Poti 'Free Economic Zone'

*LD2710004895 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[I. Moseshvili video report from Georgia]

[FBIS Translated Text] Within the framework of his pre-election campaign, Eduard Shevardnadze visited Poti, one of Georgia's main port towns. It is from here that the railway delivers the main foodstuffs to the republic's regions and also to neighboring Azerbaijan. Barter is being conducted with Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria, and other states.

At a meeting with the town's activists, together with the region's other problems, the heads of the country's ministries noted that immense importance is being attached to Poti as one of the main points along the Eurasian transit corridor.

Shevardnadze said that he would soon sign a decree on awarding the region the status of a free economic zone. Touching on the issues of electric power of which Georgia's plants and factories are experiencing an acute shortage, it was noted that in the next few days, Rosenergo and Gruzenergo would set up a joint enterprise, Rosgruzenergo, and with the assistance of Russian colleagues the problem in question would be resolved.

Today, Eduard Shevardnadze visited eastern Georgia and met with the public of Kakhetia. [Video shows Shevardnadze's arrival by plane in Poti, footage of the port, his meeting with Poti activists]

### Fugitive Security Chief To Be Extradited

*LD2610123995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1052 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[By Tengiz Pachkoriya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, October 26 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian Interior Ministry will take measures to hunt down, detain and extradite former Georgian security chief Igor Georgadze [according] to Georgian law enforcement bodies.

Georgadze is accused of engineering an assassination attempt on Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze on August 29 and of complicity in several other political terrorist acts.

The press centre of the Georgian Interior Ministry reported on Thursday that Colonel-General Anatoliy Kulikov, Russian Interior Minister, said about this to his Georgian counterpart Shota Kviraya at a meeting in Yerevan, Armenian Republic, on Wednesday. The general said that the ministry he heads, will fulfill obligations provided for by an appropriate treaty between Russia and Georgia.

Incidentally, the interior ministers from countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States came to Yerevan to discuss their common problems.

The Russian and Georgian ministers also discussed questions of cooperation between the two ministries.

### Advisor Discusses Possible Election Outcomes

*LD2710000095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1946 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: No 206 (949)]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The failure of Eduard Shevardnadze in the presidential elections on November 5 can result in the international isolation of Georgia the way it was under president Gamsakhurdia, an advisor of the Georgian head of state Shalva Pichkhadze told Interfax.

If Shevardnadze is not elected, it is going to mean that the public does not accept either him as a person or his strategy of democratic reforms. The advisor feels appropriate conclusions could be drawn from such a turn of developments.

However, if the chances of all the six candidates are estimated not by fortune-telling but on the basis of weekly public opinion polls, Shevardnadze should take the upper hand already in the first round of voting. Pichkhadze referred to the latest poll according to which the popularity of Shevardnadze has grown since the beginning of the month and 70 percent of voters are ready to cast their ballots for him.

On the foreign policy aspects of the current situation he said that Shevardnadze is familiar to the whole Western world. Besides, the current Russian leadership associates all the changes in Georgia with Shevardnadze. Listing the merits of the Georgian leader Pichkhadze mentioned economic reforms, loyalty to the peaceful settlement of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the adoption of the constitution. In his opinion all this proves the Georgian leader pursues a purposeful and predictable policy.

On the possible outcome of parliamentary elections to be held simultaneously with presidential ones the advisor assumed that the realistically-minded parties, including the opposition, are likely to be elected. As examples he named National Democrats, Republicans and the Union of Traditionalists. He did not doubt the victory of the Civic Union recently founded by Shevardnadze.

The advisor is convinced that voters will cast their ballots for political forces capable of compromise. As for the irreconcilable or radical opposition, Pichkhadze claimed that its rating has fallen, especially during the past few months when the parliament discussed the constitution.

He felt that as long as all the organizers of the recent acts of terrorism, including the attempt to assassinate Shevardnadze on August 29, have not been isolated, the situation will remain quite tense and can even worsen.

### Zviadist Leader Views Shevardnadze's Electoral 'Masquerade'

*AU2710091895 Tbilisi TAVISUPALI SAKARTVELO in Georgian 6-12 Oct 95 p 1*

["Address to the Georgian Nation on the Occasion of the Festival of Svetitskhoveli Cathedral" from Prince Bidzina Choloqashvili, temporary chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Council, delivered on 1 October 1995; place not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] A new era in the process of the construction of Georgian statehood began with the Act on the Restoration of Georgia's Independence declared by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Council [established under ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia] that expresses the will of the Georgian nation. The fact that Georgia was recognized as a subject of international law and designated as a de jure independent country can be ascribed to the merit of the authorities that were elected according to truly democratic principles.

Unfortunately, Georgia has not become de facto independent and is the object of new occupation and creeping annexation as the limited war that was begun by Russia in 1991 with the help of renegade Georgians, whose aim is the destruction of Georgian statehood, continues to this day.

The struggle of the Georgian nation against anti-imperial [word as published] forces shows that the people will never reconcile themselves to the domination of the regime of occupation that came to power as a result of the bloody coup [December-January 1991-92] inspired by Russia and to illusory independence and the permanent establishment of Russian military bases in Georgia.

I welcome the policy of boycotting the electoral spectacle staged by the oppressors, as there are no prospects at all of holding democratic elections under a police regime. Participating in Shevardnadze's electoral masquerade would be equivalent to treason, since such participation would signify recognizing the illegal authorities and the illegality of Georgia's membership of the CIS and the deployment of the Russian Army in Georgia. It goes without saying that the odious figures who have rejected God, the nation, and the country and who have put an end to Georgia's independence and are driving the country to the brink of disaster by adopting the Belarusian model should be boycotted in the same way that Capt. Charles Boycott was once boycotted by the people.

I should like to remind the enemies of the Georgian nation, those who forcefully banished the truly national Parliament but who were unable to defeat it, that the military coup of 6 January 1992 did not put an end to the de jure existence of the sole legitimate authorities — the Republic of Georgia Supreme Council — that were elected according to democratic principles on the territory of Georgia.

In accordance with any juridical and moral laws, the Republic of Georgia Supreme Council will continue its activities until conditions for free and democratic elections are created in a truly independent Georgia, which has rid itself of the military forces of a foreign country.

**The Republic of Georgia Supreme Council is legal according to the law!**

The Republic of Georgia Supreme Council will always remain loyal to national interests and to the ideals of freedom and democracy!

Allow me to congratulate you on the occasion of the festival of Svetitskhoveli Cathedral. Remember that, just as the life-giving pillar established its place through the prayers and blessings of St. Nino, Georgia will win its freedom through the same Orthodox strength and faith.

[Signed] Prince Bidzina Choloqashvili, temporary chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Council
[Dated] 1 October 1995

## Estonia

### Vahi Addresses Parliament on Policies of New Government

*WS2610135995 Tallinn ETA in English
0945 GMT 26 Oct 95*

["Text" of speech by Prime Minister Tiit Vahi to the parliament on 26 October — ETA "News Release"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Honourable Speaker!

Honourable Members!

Dear guests, ladies and gentlemen!

Half a year ago, on April 5, I stood before you and you trusted me to head the government of the Republic of Estonia. Neither you nor I knew then that I shall have to stand here as a prime ministerial candidate yet again in the same year.

The events which led to the resignation of the government and the disintegration of the coalition formed in the spring were beyond the logic of political development for all of us. According to the coalition agreement with the Centre Party, the cabinet had to resign after one of the parties left the coalition. This was what we did.

I hope that the parliamentary commission formed for the purpose and the official investigation in progress will bring out the truth about the recordings scandal and I shall not discuss the motives for the government's resignation any further here. The decision to step down was mine alone. I acted against many recommendations made in these difficult days. There was the option of replacing some ministers and preserving the ruling coalition at that price, but we decided that it would be extremely important to create a precedent in the Estonian politics, where the government or the minister will step down after events which harm the reputation of the cabinet or any of its members. Nobody dares to assure that scandals in Estonian politics are over. But I hope that responsibility will become a rule in our political life.

I thank the ministers of the present government for their work. I hold to my opinion that this work advanced Estonia. I thank the Centre Party for their cooperation with the Coalition Party and Country People's Association and the previous opposition for its constructive criticism, which helped the government to work and to correct the inevitable mistakes.

Honorable members of the parliament! After long principal consultations and looking for compromise, the new coalition was born. I am convinced that these couple of weeks have not weakened Estonia, but instead strengthened it as a democratic country of the rule of law, where the laws are for everybody to obey. Those Estonian and foreign analysts and politicians claiming that the recent weeks' events undermined the reliability of the Republic of Estonia in foreign relations, are in error. On the contrary, Estonia is a stronger partner after these events than it was before. Estonia has no longer a habit of ignoring or covering up of scandals.

The new ruling coalition, logically formed as a result of the negotiations, is necessary for Estonia. It was formed logically because the programmes of the two partners - the Coalition Party and the Reform Party - are similar. Leaders of the parties have cooperated earlier - let us remember the monetary reform conducted in 1992 and the launching of the economic reforms.

Much has been spoken recently about the differences of views between the Coalition Party main partner - the Country People's Association - and the Reform Party. I would like to express my position on that issue today. When looking at today's Estonia, we can clearly notice a difference between the rate of development of various regions. In a sense this could be termed the conflict between the city and the country. It can also certainly be described as the conflict between the generations. There is no sense in denying or hiding of these contradictions. They need to be moderated and solved. The worst that could happen would have the actual conflict of interest turn into a conflict between the government and the parliamentary opposition. In such a case, realistic solutions would be hard to find. We would only exploit populist slogans against each other.

Consequently, I consider it principally vital that the Reform Party and the Country People's and the Pensioners' and Families' Association are now ready to reach out to each other and to cooperate in the government coalition. Life itself forces us to find better solutions for Estonia, which can be based on faster economic development of the country.

During the negotiations, we all accepted the necessity to support regional development, life in the rural areas, the young families and naturally the elderly. The debates concerned only the methods to be used. I do not want to make any slogan promises today. I believe that everyday work of the government will provide concrete solutions to the debated issues.

I assure that the basics of the Estonian economic policy will not change. Our activities so far have led Estonia among the first of the countries conducting economic reforms. We have won a remarkable confidence internationally. These are facts which are hard to overestimate. The basis of Estonia's successful development has been the open economic space, stable monetary and fiscal policies. The government to take office will remain true to these principles. The state can only be as wealthy as its citizens are. The state can meet its social obligations according to its prosperity.

Stability must become the key word of our economic policy. The time of sudden changes is coming to close. The economy awaits considered and balanced development and clearly defined rules of the game. The state has to guarantee the partners in economy a solidity and clarity of rules, which would enable them to look further into the future than tomorrow. Despite the favouring of entrepreneurship so far, a number of bureaucratic procedures have been introduced in the recent years, which obstruct the realisation of ideas and whose necessity is not clear to us. The simplification and reviewing of procedures will liberalise the economic environment. I want to emphasize that liberalisation will not be an aim in itself, but a means for achieving stable and rapid economic growth.

Naturally, there are a number of unsolved problems, which require resolute moves of the state. I primarily mean the issue of the land reform and privatisation. Economic reforms cannot be completed without finding solutions to these problems. The land reform has been a painful issue for several governments. I am happy to inform the parliament that a package of laws, significantly accelerating the land reform, has been formulated. If the new ruling coalition will come to an agreement, we shall soon be able to make the long- awaited step ahead and the actual acceleration of the land reform will depend on the efficiency of the executive wing.

Speaking of further liberalisation of the economic environment, we should not forget our natural environment, the necessity of its conservation and improvement. Estonia has inherited a wasteful economy, which had no room for nature conservation. I consider it vital that the government took the necessary measures for the improvement of our environment and nature, together with the liberalisation of the economy.

I would not repeat all principles of the coalition agreement in this brief speech. Yet I must emphasize today that despite its limited resources, Estonia must keep alive its education, science and culture as the resources of our development and the cornerstones of our independence. The conflict of the spirit and the power is always progressive, but the spirit and the power should never become opponents in our little homeland.

Honourable members of the parliament!

The change of government will inevitable bring every state in the range of interest of the world. In that connection, I would like to point out that Estonia's foreign policy will remain unchanged. We shall continue our efforts of integration in the European structures. Neither will change our desire to improve the relations with our Eastern neighbour, where the concluding of the border agreement has currently become a priority issue.

Ladies and gentlemen! Finally, I would like to thank the Reform Party for its constructive attitude during the negotiations, which guaranteed the maintaining of political stability in Estonia. I hope that we shall continue to work, according to the signed coalition agreement, in order to turn the life of our people more secure and prosperous, to reinforce our political and economic independence and Estonia's reputation among the world's states as a reliable partner.

If you trust me today, I hope that the coalition to be formed will be able to guarantee long-lasting stability and peace. I believe that this is what our nation needs most of all now, irrespective of individual political preferences.

## Latvia

### Paper Claims Adviser Worked for U.S. Army Intelligence

*LD2710000995 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1402 GMT 25 Oct 95*

[Report by Arnis Krauze]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gundars Zalkalns, State President Guntis Ulmanis' adviser and secretary of the National Security Council, has in his time been connected with foreign secret services. Such a report was published by the newspaper RIGAS BALSS today. The documents published in the newspaper show that Zalkalns has worked for the U.S. Army intelligence service. At the start of his work at the Latvian Defense Ministry, he stated in the staff questionnaire that he served in the U.S. Army from 1963 to 1987. It is stated in the questionnaire that Zalkalns also took part in the work of the information service. According to RIGAS BALSS, that leads to the suspicion of connections with intelligence, especially because the present adviser to the state president has worked in Germany, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and elsewhere. RIGAS BALSS published a letter in which Zalkalns wrote to State Minister Valdis Pavlovskis, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that he had worked as a "security control officer" [preceding three words in English], that is as a security control officer. The newspaper mentions that former officers of the Soviet special service who are currently working in the Latvian security institutions have mixed views about Zalkalns. We recall that all the staff of secret services should quit their jobs in the Latvian security institutions by the end of this year.

I did not manage to get in touch with Zalkalns by the beginning of this news bulletin. However, in an interview to RIGAS BALSS, Zalkalns answered the question of how he would respond if a version was put forward on his former connections with the U.S. Army intelligence service, saying that he would reject it without the slightest doubt. When State President Guntis Ulmanis returns to Riga from New York on 26 October, we will ask him to give broader comments on this issue.

### Ulmanis's Talks With Foreign Leaders in New York Reviewed

*LD2610233195 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 2100 GMT 26 Oct 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] During the past day, after returning from New York, President Guntis Ulmanis gave a news conference. UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali greatly appreciates Latvia's participation in UN structures and its involvement in reinforcing the peace process with the creation of the Baltic peacekeeping battalion.

This fact was was confirmed during the celebrations of the 50th UN anniversary, when Butrus-Ghali sent the Latvian representatives a letter of appreciation of Latvia's achievements.

He also expressed appreciation of the processes that led to the creation of a sovereign independent state. Moreover, the UN leader accepted their invitation to visit Latvia in the near future.

Guntis Ulmanis noted that the United Nations is the only global organization that has been able in many cases to give much that is positive to the world, and which has a great chance of doing so in the future as well. However, the president noted that the United Nations requires structural changes and the creation of a new system of levying payments from member states.

There was also discussion of the need to reform several UN institutions, including UNESCO. Special attention was paid to the work of the UN Security Council, debating the issue of admitting Germany and Japan to this institution.

During the ceremonies, Ulmanis met U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. With Bill Clinton he discussed the implementation of the Latvian-Russian treaty on the withdawal of troops and the economic situation in our country.

As for Yeltsin's possible visit to Latvia, Ulmanis spoke to the Russian president's wife, Naina Yeltsina. During the visit Ulmanis also met the South Korean Foreign Minister Kong No-myong and Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, discussing bilateral relations as well as regional and world security issues.

The elections to the sixth Saeima in Latvia were recognized by all European countries' leaders as democratic and free. However, Ulmanis emphasized, several of them expressed anxiety about the membership of Joahims Zigerists, chairman of the People's Movement for Latvia, in the new government.

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